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CORPORATE TAX POLICY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW
Improving State Tax Policymaking
By Enhancing Legislative and Public Access
Executive Summary
During the 1980's, Citizens for Tax
Justice (CTJ), a Washington-based
think tank, was able to utilize data from
annual reports to shareholders and to
the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to document that
some of the largest, most profitable
corporations in the country were paying
little or nothing in federal income taxes.
The public outcry that resulted from the
reporting of this information was one of
the keys to the sweeping changes
included in the Tax Reform Act of
1986.

federal aid, unfunded federal mandates,
the recession, and overly ambitious
state tax reductions. In addition, many
states adopted a variety of new
corporate tax incentives in an effort to
stimulate their recession-plagued
economies. At the same time, some of
those states and others labor under
constitutional or statutory limitations
on revenue-raising at the local or state
levels.

CTJ's work cannot be replicated at the
state level. The annual reports of
publicly-traded corporations contain
information on the aggregate amount of
state and local income taxes paid, but
this information is not broken down
state-by-state. And, until recently, only
Wisconsin allowed the public to obtain
information on the amount of state
income tax paid by specific
corporations.

In light of the states' budget problems,
questions were raised about whether
corporations were paying their "fair
share" of the cost of public services.
And, specifically, the adoption of new
corporate tax incentives in the face of
looming deficits raised serious
concerns about whether these
provisions were achieving their
intended goals. It soon became obvious
that none of these questions could be
answered without more information
about the state corporate income taxes
being paid by specific, large businesses
and the amount of state tax incentives
they were receiving.

The effective use of the information
disclosed pursuant to the SEC
requirements motivated state legislators
and tax reformers to consider statelevel disclosure laws. Their interest was
heightened by the revenue shortfalls
that state and local governments were
facing as a result of reductions in

Corporations pay over $20 billion
yearly in state corporate income taxes,
but the lack of state disclosure makes it
impossible to evaluate the extent to
which the corporate tax burden is
allocated fairly or rationally in
relationship to measures of
profitability. In addition, while

State-Level Disclosure
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businesses receive billions annually in
state tax incentives it is not known
which corporations receive what types
of incentives and in what amounts.
Hence it is not possible to analyze
accurately the effectiveness of the
billions of dollars being expended
annually through state tax incentives.

The West Virginia statute has more of
a tax policy orientation. It requires the
state's Tax Commissioner to publish an
annual report indicating the name and
address of every taxpayer, whether a
corporation or individual, receiving any
one of 12 specific credits, and the
amount, by broad dollar category, of
the credit received.

The issue of state corporate tax
disclosure was raised in 1987 by a staff
study for New York State's Legislative
Tax Study Commission, and since then
three states (Arkansas, West Virginia,
and Massachusetts) have adopted laws
providing for some state-level
disclosure by corporate name. While
Wisconsin has had a disclosure law
since 1923, it has only recently been
used for tax policy purposes. In 1991,
the Wisconsin Action Coalition used
the information available under that law
to compile a list of major corporations
doing business in the state that had paid
only nominal state income taxes. This
contributed to legislative adoption, on
two occasions, of a new corporate
minimum tax, which, in both cases, was
vetoed by the Governor.

Support for disclosure legislation in
West Virginia arose after a state
government report showed that only a
small number of taxpayers benefit from
the state's so-called supercredit, with
about 50 firms claiming credits in
excess of $100,000 annually. This
credit was estimated to cost the state
$60 million in forgone revenue in FY
1991 when its corporate income tax
was yielding less than $200 million.
The first report under the West Virginia
Law is scheduled to be issued in
December, 1993.
The most comprehensive of the new
laws was enacted in 1993 in
Massachusetts as the result of the
efforts of a state-level tax reform
organization, the Tax Equity Alliance
for Massachusetts (TEAM). Originally
put forward as a state ballot question,
the new Massachusetts law was written
as part of an agreement among TEAM,
the business community, and legislative
leaders. This statute requires all
publicly-traded corporations that do
business in the state, and which already
publish, in SEC-required reports, their
federal income tax liability and their
aggregate state income tax liability, to
disclose six key items of information
related to their Massachusetts taxable
income and tax liability. The
information to be disclosed will be

In 1991, both Arkansas and West
Virginia adopted statutes providing for
the disclosure of information on the
dollar amount of certain specific credits
taken by corporate and individual
taxpayers. The Arkansas law is a
Freedom of Information Act -type
statute, and allows interested parties to
request from the Arkansas Director of
Taxation, by name of taxpayer, the
amount of benefits received pursuant to
specified business tax incentives and
any additional incentives of the same
type enacted after January 1, 1991.
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sufficient to allow for a fair evaluation
of the workings of the state's corporate
income tax. The law established similar
requirements for banks and insurance
companies. The first public filings
under this statute are due at the
Massachusetts Secretary of State's
office by December 31, 1993.

battle over access to individual returns,
supporters of disclosure gave up an
opportunity to achieve corporate
disclosure directly through the
provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code.
The few times when Congress did
focus on the differences between
corporations and individuals, it tended
to opt for more disclosure in the case of
corporations. Even today, the fact that
a 1% shareholder can inspect the tax
return of his or her corporation
(although the shareholder cannot
disclose any information obtained from
the inspection), indicates a willingness
to recognize less legitimate claims to
privacy in the case of corporations than
in the case of individuals.

Disclosure at the Federal Level
Some observers of these recent
developments have seen them as
innovative, if not radical. In reality,
extensive financial information,
including tax information, is already in
the public domain because of SEC
regulations and generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP). What is
not fully appreciated, however, is that
prior to the enactment of the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, corporate tax
returns or key items of tax information
were frequently matters of public
record.

In recent years, the need for public
access to federal corporate income tax
returns has been mooted. The SEC has
essentially preempted the issue by
mandating the disclosure by publiclytraded corporations of extensive
financial data including numerous
components of tax expense, including
specifically information on investment
tax credits.

A review of the history of public access
to federal tax returns reveals that the
issue of corporate tax disclosure was
almost always intertwined with
questions related to the privacy of
individual tax returns. The privacy
extended to federal corporate returns
generally piggybacked onto the
treatment of individual returns. The
privacy issue was basically fought--and
lost--over the issue of whether
individual returns should be public
information. However, no one on
either side of the debate went to great
lengths to distinguish the different
issues involved in corporate disclosure
from those of access to individual
returns. Having chosen to pitch their

The Case for State Level Disclosure
The debate has now shifted to whether
the public should have access to state
tax data by name of corporation. This
debate has been fueled by revelations
that large numbers of profitable
corporations were paying little or
nothing in state income taxes. For
example, until New York's major
corporate tax reform in the late 1980s,
many of that state's largest and most
profitable corporations -- some having
iii

New York sales in excess of $1 billion
and New York property in excess of $2
billion -- only paid the state's nominal
minimum tax of $250. These statistics
have led to efforts to learn more about
the workings of state corporate income
taxes, but these attempts have been
stymied by the inability to correlate
data with specific corporations.

corporations, in-state corporations and
out-of-state corporations, capitalintensive corporations and laborintensive corporations, and
corporations that sell out-of-state and
those that sell within the state. The
level playing field is still a fantasy in
most states.
Firm-Specific Disclosure is
Essential to Public Understanding
of Corporate Tax Reform Issues

Summarized below are the key
arguments for state-level disclosure and
discussions of some of the major
questions that have been raised
regarding the disclosure of corporate
tax information at the state level.

Public understanding of seemingly
complex issues has been essential to the
development and implementation of the
many important economic reforms
instituted at the federal and state levels
during the twentieth century.
Government officials are unlikely to be
able to enact economic reform
legislation, even if it is based on sound
theoretical reasoning and extensive
empirical evidence, if they are unable
to explain the need for such laws to the
ordinary citizen; nor, in our democratic
society, should they be able to do so.
Specific case studies are essential to
explaining complex economic issues to
the public, as CTJ's experience in the
1980's demonstrated.

Firm-Specific Disclosure is
Necessary for Informed Tax Policy
The public has an obvious interest in
a state's corporate income tax, if for no
other reason that huge sums of money
are involved both in the amount of
corporate taxes imposed (over $20
billion annually) and the amount
forgiven through tax incentives.
The issue of how a state taxes, or
exempts from tax, corporate activity
raises fundamental value judgments
about how the costs of government
should be distributed. Both large-scale
corporate tax avoidance and inefficient
tax expenditures mean that a state must
rely more heavily on other taxes -- with
different incidence patterns -- or cut
spending.

Opponents of disclosure contend that
the general public is unable to
understand the significance and
implications of corporate tax
information. Only tax experts, it is
held, can understand the multifarious
and complex factors that interact to
generate a corporation's tax liability.
The public would merely be confused,
or unreasonably angered, by learning of
nominal corporate tax liabilities. The
"ignorant public" argument ultimately
challenges the premises underlying a

Another significant issue is how the
corporate tax is distributed among
corporations and among industries
within states. Existing state corporate
taxes are replete with provisions that
discriminate between small and large
iv

democratic society. A well-functioning
democracy requires an informed public.
If corporations feel that the disclosed
information is likely to be
misinterpreted, they can educate the
public by providing more information
and a fuller explanation.

crack more.
State tax disclosure will also allow
securities analysts to more effectively
consider the impact of non-recurring
items of income or expense on a
corporation's earnings potential.
Although the SEC-required disclosure
is sufficient to adjust for the federal
consequences of the item involved, it
will in many cases not be sufficient to
make the necessary change in the state
tax results of the item.

Sunlight is the Best Disinfectant:
Disclosure Would Promote
Openness and Accountability
To evaluate whether tax incentives
serve their ostensible purposes, the
public must know, at the least, which
corporations received what types of
incentives and in what amounts. Only
then can the public and the state
legislatures judge whether the benefits
of these incentives justify the forgone
revenue, whether the benefits are
equitably distributed among the
corporate community, and whether
such incentives need to be enhanced,
reduced, or redirected. It can thus
restore public confidence in both the
corporate sector and government tax
policy by either showing that the
current system is working well or by
providing the information necessary for
effective reform.

Why Not Disclose Firm-Specific
Data Anonymously?
Unless the name of a taxpayer is
published along with its corporate tax
information, it would be nearly
impossible to obtain the benefits
intended by disclosure. Corporations
whose tax liabilities appear
unconscionably low cannot be
identified from statistical aggregates.
Tax policy judgments cannot be made
in the abstract but need an identifiable
context in which to operate.
The disclosure of firm-specific data
without corporate names would make it
impossible to do inter-industry or intraindustry comparisons. It would also
make it impossible to match the
disclosed tax information with other
publicly available data on employment,
investment, and other relevant factors.
And, if the same code number was not
assigned to a firm every year, it would
not be possible to do even limited
longitudinal analyses.

State-Level Disclosure will
Complement SEC-Mandated
Disclosure
Compared with the extensive
information already in the public
domain because of SEC requirements,
state disclosure is modest. Primarily
because of the SEC, the public has been
given a window into the financial
affairs, including the income tax data of
publicly-traded corporations. State
disclosure would open that window a

Will Disclosure Violate a
Corporation's Right to Privacy?
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The extent of SEC-required disclosure
by registered corporations makes it
obvious that such corporations have
long ago surrendered any claim that
their financial data should be protected
under some right of privacy. If the
disclosure of their federal income tax
liabilities and other financial
information does not raise a
constitutional issue, then neither should
the disclosure of their state tax
information.

extensions and files its return, whatever
tax information would be disclosed
would be stale.
Yesterday's
information obtained tomorrow is
worthless.
Will Disclosure Discourage the
Filing of Accurate Tax Returns?
A commonly stated rationale for
protecting the confidentiality of tax
information, at least for individuals, is
to facilitate tax enforcement by
encouraging a taxpayer to make full
and truthful declarations in its return,
without fear that those statements
would be revealed or used against it for
other purposes.

Revealing the taxes paid by small,
closely-held, corporations might be
viewed as violating legitimate
expectations of privacy by its
shareholders.
Accordingly, such
corporations could be exempted from
any disclosure requirements.

Contrary to the thesis that secrecy
induces honest reporting, if
corporations were publicly accountable
for the information furnished on their
income tax returns, their incentive to
report truthfully might be even greater.
Publicity could increase the possibility
that employees, competitors, or other
business persons would notice glaring
omissions and bring them to the
attention of the tax authorities.

Will Disclosure Reveal Proprietary
Information?
Opponents of disclosure assert that
revealing the amount of a corporation's
taxes or credits would reveal
proprietary information, but no one has
even been able to present a viable
example of this.

Will Disclosure Undercut a State's
"Business Climate"?

One does not hear this type of
argument being made any more about
the copious information that federal
laws force corporations to reveal. SEC
and other federal laws already require
many corporations to disclose tax and
financial information, and such
disclosures have not jeopardized the
economic interests of the corporations.

Opponents of disclosure argue that it
would create or exacerbate an antibusiness climate in the state. This
argument proves too much. Any
legislation that the corporate
c o mmu n ity o p p o s e s c a n b e
characterized as poisoning the business
climate.

Further, for information to be
valuable, one needs to know yesterday
what a competitor is going to do
tomorrow.
But by the time a
corporation requests the normal

Many considerations affect a
corporation's view of a state's business
climate -- plant or site availability,
vi

access to and cost of transportation,
quality and cost of labor, proximity to
markets, cost of utilities, proximity to
supplies, proximity to other company
facilities, the regulatory environment,
cost of housing, the level and quality of
public services, and the range of factors
that determine the general quality of
life offered to a firm, its employees,
and their families. Unlike most of the
factors that affect a state's business
climate, the disclosure of corporate tax
information would not affect the cost of
doing business or a corporation's
"bottom line." No one has ever argued
that the extensive reporting
requirements of the SEC have damaged
the U.S. business climate or that
Wisconsin's longstanding disclosure
law has hurt that state's economy.

than to individual data.
The SEC has essentially resolved the
federal debate by imposing extensive
financial reporting responsibilities on
publicly-traded corporations, including
the release of detailed information on
federal income taxes and the aggregate
amount of state income taxes.
Proposals for state-disclosure would
require that the state income tax
information be disaggregated and
presented in greater detail. These
proposals are intended to facilitate
thoughtful tax policymaking and more
accountability and openness in
government.
They would also
complement the SEC-mandated
disclosure.
Compared with the much more
extensive reporting requirements
already imposed on corporations by
other federal and state statutes and with
the amount of financial information
now in the public domain, proposals for
state level disclosure are clearly
unexceptional in terms of both the
administrative burden involved and the
type of data covered. The virtues of
disclosure were graphically
demonstrated by the efforts of Citizens
for Tax Justice (CTJ) at the federal
level, which resulted in many of the
corporate tax changes in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. Perhaps it is the
fears of those who are benefitting from
the flaws in the current corporate tax
system, more than any inherent defect
in the proposals, which explain the
contentious opposition of elements of
t h e b u s i n e s s c o mmu n i t y i n
Massachusetts, the one state that has
adopted a comprehensive approach to
state tax disclosure. In theory, the

Conclusion
The current debate over the disclosure
of state corporate tax data has very
deep roots. At the national level,
starting with the Civil War income
taxes, there was a robust debate over
the extent to which the public should
have access to federal tax information
of both individuals and corporations.
This debate, however, primarily
centered on individuals and their rights
of privacy rather than on large
corporations; when corporations
entered the discussion at all, it was
typically in terms of concern for the
privacy of "mom and pop" operations
that could be viewed as the alter ego's
of their owners. The few times when
Congress concentrated on the
differences between individuals and
corporations, it recognized that
legitimate reasons existed for granting
more public access to corporate data
vii

business community, as a whole,
should be supportive of attempts to
improve and rationalize government
policymaking.
Most of the arguments against
disclosure, similar to the arguments
often raised against proposals that
threaten the status quo, involve the
incantation of threadbare and shopworn
slogans.
Others are based on
speculation and unsupported assertions.
While some opponents are undoubtedly
sincere in their fears, their arguments
fall well short of rebutting the benefits
that would accompany disclosure.
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I. Introduction
One of the catalysts for the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 was the efforts
of Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ), a
Washington-based think tank.
Working with data from annual
reports to shareholders and to the
Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), CTJ
documented that some of the
largest, most profitable
corporations in the country were
paying little or no federal income
tax.
Indeed, General Electric
during a three year period actually
received tax refunds of $283
million despite pre-tax domestic
profits of over $6.5 billion. Six
other companies--Boeing, Dow
Chemical, Tenneco, Santa Fe
Southern Pacific, Weyerhaeuser,
and Du Pont--received net benefits
or refunds in excess of $100
million each, notwithstanding
profits totalling $9.8 billion.1
According to Rep. Dan
Rostenkowski, Chairman of the
House of Representatives Ways &
Means Committee, the public
outcry that resulted from the
disclosure of the nominal federal
income taxes paid by some of the
largest corporations in the country
was one of the keys to the
sweeping 1986 changes that
broadened the base, lowered the
rates, and provided more uniform
treatment of taxpayers. "When
people look at their own tax bills
and then hear that big, profitable
corporations are able to manipulate
the system to escape taxation, Mr.
Rostenkowski said, `that's when the
revolution comes.'"2

CTJ's work had a profound
effect on educating the public about
the need for corporate tax reform,
and the 1986 Tax Reform Act was
ultimately supported by many in
the business community.3 But
CTJ's work cannot be replicated at
the state level. SEC reports and
annual shareholder reports contain
information on the aggregate
amount of state and local income
taxes but the information is not
broken down state-by-state.4 And,
until very recently, only Wisconsin
allowed the public to obtain
information on the amount of state
income tax paid by specific
corporations.5
In the past several years,
attention has turned increasingly to
the states. Cutbacks in federal aid,
the recession, which continues to
plague parts of the country, and
other factors have resulted in ongoing budget problems. In many
states, corporate tax payments have
declined and varied in ways that
seem unrelated to economic
conditions.
These developments, together
with the increasing number of
corporate tax incentives being
enacted at the state level, have led
many analysts to conclude that
information about the impact of
state tax systems on specific
corporations is necessary for
intelligent tax policymaking.
Corporations pay over $20
billion yearly in state corporate
income taxes, but the lack of
information on the amount of state
income tax paid and credits taken

1

The public outcry that resulted
from the disclosure of the
nominal federal income taxes
paid by some of the largest
corporations in the country was
one of the keys to the sweeping
1986 changes that broadened
the base, lowered the rates, and
provided more uniform
treatment of taxpayers.

Even before SEC-mandated
disclosure, the amount of
income taxes paid by
corporations and even
individuals were at various times
public information.

by specific corporations in each
state makes it impossible to
evaluate the extent to which the
corporate tax burden is allocated
fairly or rationally in relationship to
measures of profitability. Nor is it
possible to analyze accurately the
effectiveness of the billions of
dollars being expended annually in
state tax incentives because it is not
known which corporations receive
what type of incentives and in what
amounts.
In 1987, an unpublished but
widely circulated study by the staff
of the New York Tax Study
Commission concluded that the
amount of state corporate income
taxes paid and other related
information should be publicly
available on a corporation-bycorporation basis.6 In the last few
years, three states have adopted
laws providing for some state-level
disclosure by corporate name.
Arkansas and West Virginia make
available by name of taxpayer-both individuals and corporations-the amount of selected credits
claimed. In Massachusetts, publicly
traded corporations, banks and
most insurance companies, doing
business in the state, will soon file
an array of state tax information
that will then be available for
public inspection on a corporationby-corporation basis.7 The rest of
the states prohibit the disclosure of
any corporate tax data by name of
corporation.8 A number of states,
however, are considering changing
their laws to provide greater public
access to corporate tax
information.9
Proposals calling for the release
of information on the amount of
state corporate income taxes paid

2

and other tax-related data on a
corporation-by-corporation basis
have been treated as innovative, if
not radical.
This reaction,
however, overlooks the extensive
nature of the financial information,
including tax information, that is
already in the public domain
because of SEC regulations and
generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP).10
Even before SEC-mandated
disclosure, the amount of income
taxes paid by corporations and even
individuals were at various times
public information. In the 1920's,
for example, newspapers trumpeted
this information on their front
pages.11 Even today, a bona fide
shareholder of record who owns at
least 1% of a corporation can
inspect its tax return and that of its
subsidiaries (but cannot disclose
anything obtained from the
inspection).12
Rather than being extraordinary,
calls for disclosure are based on
rather traditional values -- that the
public as well as elected officials
should be informed about the
workings of our economic and
legal systems; and, that, to the
maximum extent possible, public
policy should be made in an open
and informed manner.
Section II of this report traces
the history of public access to
federal tax returns.
Besides
debunking the common perception
that corporate tax returns have
always been immune from public
scrutiny, this historical survey
reveals a different story. The
privacy issue was basically fought
over the issue of whether
individual--not corporate--tax
returns should be public

information. When corporations
entered this debate at all, it was
essentially with regard to the
privacy of "mom and pop"
businesses, which were viewed as
the alter ego's of their owners.
Further, the last chapter of this
Congressional debate occurred
during the early 1930's and was
colored by the Lindbergh
kidnapping and the crime wave that
marked the Great Depression.
Individuals feared that if their
returns were made public, they
would be marked by kidnappers,
con artists, and those of similar ilk.
By way of contrast, when the issue
of whether corporate taxes should
be private was debated in 1909
independently of individual returns,
Congress opted for public
disclosure.
Section II also reviews the
disclosure of income tax
information that is currently
mandated by the SEC under its own

regulations and by its requirement
that corporations under its
jurisdiction follow GAAP. In fact,
the amount of income tax data now
required to be disclosed by the SEC
and GAAP far exceeds anything
that proponents of disclosure ever
hoped to obtain from Congress.
Section III examines the
experiences of the four states that
have adopted some form of
corporate tax disclosure legislation:
Massachusetts, West Virginia,
Arkansas, and Wisconsin.
Section IV analyzes the cases
for and against state-level
disclosure and concludes that there
is an overwhelming case in favor.
Consequently, Section V discusses
the key issues involved in the
design and implementation of statelevel disclosure laws.

3

The privacy issue was basically
fought over the issue of whether
individual--not corporate--tax
returns should be public
information.

By way of contrast, when the
issue of whether corporate taxes
should be private was debated in
1909, independently of
individual returns, Congress
opted for public disclosure.

II. The Disclosure of Income Tax Information at the
Federal Level: An Historical Perspective

This section traces the
history of public access to
federal tax returns and tax
return information. It also
reviews the disclosure of
income tax information that is
currently required by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange
Commission, and by
Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles.

The heart of this Section is a
study of the public's access to
federal tax return information,
organized chronologically around
six key time periods. The first is
marked by the Civil War income
taxes, which at one time provided
for the publication of the names of
individuals and the amount of taxes
they paid (the Civil War income
taxes did not apply to
corporations). By the end of the
war, however, Congress prohibited
this practice.
The short-lived 1894 Income
Tax apparently reflected the still
lingering hostility to the disclosure
of tax information during the Civil
War because Congress again made
it unlawful to publish income tax
data.
The next important event
occurred with the Tariff Act of
1909, the predecessor of the
modern corporate income tax.
Significantly, the 1909 law
provided that corporate returns
should be open to inspection.
Almost immediately, opponents of
disclosure started to emasculate
this provision and after some
political vacillation, Congress
provided that corporate returns
should be open to inspection upon
order of the President under rules
prescribed by the Secretary of the
Treasury and approved by the
President.
The 1913 Income Tax, the
predecessor of today's personal
income tax, carried over this
provision. However, this power

4

was never exercised very broadly
by any president. In reaction,
proponents of disclosure pressed
for broader laws and achieved
some minor victories starting in
1918.
The zenith of the Congressional
tax disclosure movement occurred
in 1924 when the public was
provided access to the names of
corporations, as well as individuals,
and the amount of taxes they paid.
Two years later, a backlash was
successful in narrowing the law to
provide access to only the names of
taxpayers filing returns but not the
amount of taxes paid.
Advocates of disclosure
achieved a hollow victory in 1934
with the infamous "pink slip"
provisions.
Corporations and
individuals were required to file a
pink slip with their tax returns
containing information on income,
deductions, credits, and tax
liability. These slips were to be
available for public inspection.
Before the effective date of this
requirement, however, a well
orchestrated pink slip rebellion
occurred and the law was repealed.
This was the last time Congress
debated the general public's access
to tax return information. The final
part of this Section describes the
extensive disclosure of financial
and income tax data mandated by
the SEC and GAAP.

A. The Civil War Income Taxes:
1861-1872
The original Civil War Income
Tax Act, passed in 1861,13 provided
that "the said taxes, when so
assessed and made public, shall
become a lien on the property or
other sources of said income for the
amount of the same..."14 This
provision was apparently the only
reference to whether tax
information was to be public.15
Because the 1861 Act never
became effective16, no information
exists on how this provision was
intended to be interpreted. The
1862 Act,17 which replaced the
1861 Act, was more explicit. The
1862 Act provided for a period of
15 days in which the public could
examine the names of taxpayers
and the amount of their liabilities.18
The public was notified of this
opportunity through newspaper
advertisements and posted notices.
Similar provisions were made for
publicizing the collectors lists.19
The reasons for publishing the
amount of taxes owed were
presumably that in an era without
mass communication, sufficient
administrative procedures or
machinery, or reliable mail
systems, the posting of both
"assessor's lists" and "collector's
lists" in public places was a means
of notifying taxpayers, first, that
they owed taxes; second, of the
determination of their taxable
income and tax liability; and
finally, of the impending arrival of
the tax collector.20 Representative
Porter of Indiana echoed this
consensus about the purpose of the
publicity feature: "Now, what is the
object of the [publicity] feature?

Obviously, it is to give the tax payer time to collect his money in
order to be ready when the
collector arrives."21
Initially, the 1862 Act was not
interpreted as permitting public
examination of the underlying tax
information.22 Early in 1863, the
Commissioner directed that returns
should be available only to tax
officials23 so that the income tax
"might not be felt to be
inquisitorial." 24
Newspapers
strongly urged that they be allowed
to print tax returns and in a second
ruling, the Commissioner
The Commissioner
acceded.25
defended his action as providing
"the amplest opportunity...for the
detection of any fraudulent returns
that may have been made."26 The
1863 legislative recommendation
of the Secretary of the Treasury
was to the contrary, however,
requesting that Congress prohibit
disclosure of tax returns.27
The Revenue Act of 1864
disregarded this recommendation,
by providing that the assessors
"submit the proceedings of the
assessors . . . and the annual lists
taken and returned to the inspection
of any and all persons who may
apply for that purpose." 28
Newspapers began publishing lists
of reported incomes and taxes
paid.29
Not all newspapers favored
disclosure, although some changed
their positions on this issue over
time. At the end of 1864, the New
York Times lamented the lack of
secrecy.30 A month later, the New
York Tribune published a list of
incomes and an editorial supporting
its decision: "So long as an income
tax shall be required
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Not all newspapers favored
disclosure, although some
changed their positions on this
issue over time. At the end of
1864, the New York Times
lamented the lack of secrecy.

About 18 months later, the New
York Times shifted its views to
those of the Tribune and stated
that publicity prevented
collusion between taxpayers and
collectors and that only by
making tax returns public could
full compliance be secured.

and levied, we are satisfied that it is
best for all who are honestly
concerned therein that there should
be no restriction on giving publicity
to the items."31 About 18 months
later, the New York Times shifted
its views to those of the Tribune
and stated that publicity prevented
collusion between taxpayers and
collectors and that only by making
tax returns public could full
compliance be secured. The Times
asserted that in 1864 and 1865 the
publicity provisions generated
millions of dollars to the
government.32 The Commercial
and Financial Chronicle argued in
opposition that publicity led to the
falsification of returns for the
purpose of ostentation and for
securing credit.33
By the end of the Civil War, it
was customary for newspapers to
publish income tax information.34
Horace Greeley concluded that
publicity "has gone far toward
equalizing the payments of income
tax by the rogues with that of
honest men."35 The New York
Times continued supporting
publicity:
"Show every taxpayer's sworn
return of income to his nearest
neighbors, his most intimate
friends, to himself, indeed, in
public journals, and you have a
security that no laws, no oaths, and
no scrutiny, has or can furnish. In
no other way can the income tax
law be so efficiently and so
searchingly executed and enforced
as by the regularity and certainty
of the publication of income
assessment lists."36
There were also more assertions
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that public disclosure had helped
increase revenue.37
While there was certainly a
splintered voice of opposition to
disclosure from the start,
"objections appeared to arise more
frequently [only] when the major
newspapers began to publish the
incomes of the leading citizens."38
Representative (and later President)
Garfield argued that tax returns
should be available to the public
but should not be published by
newspapers:
"Suppose a man has had serious
losses during the year, so that his
income would be smaller than
people expect it to be. Now, he
would not want to let that be known
so as to alarm his creditors and
bring them all down upon him
when otherwise he would come out
safely. There is no reason in the
world, unless the public interest
require, that the private affairs of
individuals should be brought out
and paraded in the public papers.
I admit that some form of publicity
is necessary to act as a pressure
upon men to bring out their full
incomes, but if the lists are left
open for public inspection it will be
an ample pressure upon them."39
Arguments such as Garfield's were
reinforced by assertions that as tax
officials gained experience, citizenwatchdog assistance was less
needed and less justifiable.40
As the post Civil War income
tax became unpopular, the publicity
feature was also attacked. In 1869,
the New York Times reverted to its
earlier position opposing
disclosure, arguing that a properly
organized revenue force could
prevent evasion

and obviate the nuisance of
publicity.41
It denounced the
publishing of returns as "offensive
and objectionable."42
In 1870, a new Commissioner
prohibited assessors from
furnishing tax lists for publication,
although the public was still
allowed to inspect returns.43 This
position, which mirrored Garfield's
views, was apparently taken in the
hope of "lowering voices" over this
increasingly contentious issue.44
Congress responded to complaints
about disclosure in 1870 by
providing that "income tax returns
or any part thereof. . . . shall not be
published."45
The Civil War
Income Tax died at the end of
1871, in part due to the rising
concerns over privacy, not entirely
put to rest by the 1870 statutory
revision.46 Because the Civil War
income taxes applied to individuals
and not to corporations, these
concerns about privacy were
limited only to individuals.47

B.

The 1894 Income Tax

The memory of these concerns,
and of the demise of the income tax
that the publicity provisions had
partly caused, was reflected in the
non-disclosure provision of the
short-lived revival of the income
tax in 1894.48 The 1894 Act
provided: "it shall be unlawful for
any person to print or publish in
any manner whatever not provided
by law, any income return or any
part thereof."49 "During floor
debates, no discussion of the
privacy aspect of the bill appears to
have occurred. Therefore, it may
only be felt that the lessons of the
Income Tax Act of 1862 were
found carried into the drafting of
the Income Tax Act of 1894, and
tax return confidentiality was
thought a significant
requirement."50 When the tax was
held unconstitutional in 1895,51 the
Commissioner ordered all income
tax returns already collected to be
burned.52
Although the earlier Acts had
only taxed individuals,53 the 1894
Act was an income tax on both
individuals and corporations.54
Thus the privacy extended to
corporate income tax returns in
1894 was adopted without the
benefit of any debate, by virtue of
the lingering public sentiment
about the privacy of individual
returns. When, however, Congress
adopted a tax on only corporations,
as was true in 1909, it was willing
to move in the direction of
disclosure.
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C. The Tariff Act of 1909

Because the 1909 Act did not
apply to individuals, this was the
first time the disclosure issue
was debated solely in the context
of corporations. Contrary to the
1894 Act, it provided that
corporate returns "shall
constitute public records and be
open to inspection as such."

Senator Bourne also felt that
disclosing corporate returns
would uncover and discourage
dishonest business practices and
bookkeeping. "All legitimate
business should welcome this
legislation, and only the
business pirate need fear and
oppose it.

In 1909, the Payne-Aldrich
Tariff Act55, the predecessor of the
modern corporate income tax, was
passed, and the disclosure issue
was resurrected. Because the 1909
Act did not apply to individuals,
this was the first time the
disclosure issue was debated solely
in the context of corporations.
Contrary to the 1894 Act, it
provided that corporate returns
"shall constitute public records and
be open to inspection as such."56
There are no statements in the
hearings or reports regarding the
underlying rationale for this
provision,57 but from the floor
debate and surrounding events, it
becomes clear Congress was
willing to adopt a different privacy
standard for corporations than for
individuals. By 1909, the growing
labor movement and the still-fresh
legacy of former President
Roosevelt's well-publicized trustbusting campaign had created a
widespread popular distrust of
corporations.
Although "[t]he
legislative history does little to
illuminate [the publicity]
provisions,"58 it seems likely that
the new national mood had much to
do with the reversal of disclosure
policy.
Floor debate on the Act provides
a barometer of the country's mood.
Senator Jonathan Bourne (R Ore.), for example, praised the
publicity provisions as follows:59
"[T]he Government, at least, will
have cognizance of all corporation
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earnings, and a method is provided
by which the stockholders may
secure such information, since the
returns to the Government become
public records. Thus will be
eliminated in the future the
possibility of concealed equities;
corporation <melon cuttings’ will
be done away with; the
responsibility of corporation
management to all the stockholders
will be established; the holder of
one share of stock will have
opportunity of acquiring as much
information concerning
corporation affairs as the owner of
100,000 shares.
Corporations will be popularized
and "peoplearized;" the tendency
will be for people to invest their
earnings in corporation securities
on the assumption that the publicity
feature and greater opportunity for
governmental supervision will
protect their investments..."
Senator Bourne also felt that
disclosing corporate returns would
uncover and discourage dishonest
business practices and
bookkeeping.
"All legitimate
business should welcome this
legislation, and only the business
pirate need fear and oppose it."60
To Senator Bourne, the public
disclosure of corporate returns was
one of the most significant
provisions of the corporate income
tax.61 Other senators, who only
marginally supported the corporate
income tax law itself, were
nonetheless strong defenders of the
disclosure of corporate returns.62

President Taft, who vigorously
defended the disclosure of
corporate income tax returns,
played an important part in winning
the support of the progressive
element of the Republican Party.63
He believed that the publicity
feature of the law was more
valuable than the tax's revenue
potential.64
Shortly after passage of the 1909
Act, opponents started an active
campaign to emasculate the
p u b l i c i t y f e a t u r e s . S ma l l
corporations, especially those
whose securities were not listed on
exchanges, and thus were not used
to providing any public
information, lobbied hard against
the broad 1909 publicity feature.65
This opposition was spearheaded
by the Illinois Manufacturers'
Association, which held a
conference of industrial and
commercial associations in 1910,
described as "the first gun for a
national movement which has in
view the uniting of all"66 seeking to
eliminate disclosure. The basic
argument was that the disclosure
provisions discriminated between
the larger and smaller corporations
and between corporations and
partnerships and proprietorships.67
Within a month of the 1910
conference, the Commissioner
issued his first decision on
administering the publicity
features. He ruled that because
Congress had made no specific
appropriation for public inspection
of the returns, they would be
treated as confidential.68 In effect,
this ruling suspended the publicity
provisions unless Congress acted.
The Illinois Manufacturers'
Association in their

published literature claimed credit
for this administrative victory.69
In response to the Commissioner
shifting the onus onto the
legislative branch, Congress
appropriated $25,000 for the
purpose of classifying, indexing,
and exhibiting tax returns,70 but
provided the significant condition
that "any and all such returns shall
be open to inspection only upon
order of the President under rules
and regulations to be prescribed by
the Secretary of the Treasury and
approved by the President."71
Presumably, Congress intended by
this provision to back away from
the public disclosure of corporate
returns. 7 2 Some felt this
compromise sorely undermined the
benefits of the publicity feature and
granted too much power to the
President. Representative Oscar
Underwood (D- Ala.), for example,
argued: "If you pass this
amendment and the President of the
United States wants to use the
publicity as a whip over any
corporation of this country, he can
do so. If you are going to have
publicity of any kind, why not have
honest, straightforward, full
publicity and let all the world know
what is going on, and not a
subterfuge of this kind."73
Pursuant to this Congressional
delegation, the Secretary of the
Treasury, with the approval of the
President, provided access to
corporate returns under two broad
circumstances. First, bona fide
shareholders could apply for
permission to inspect the tax
returns of their corporations; they
would have to make a showing of
cause, and it was discretionary with
the
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President Taft, who
vigorously defended the
disclosure of corporate income
tax returns, played an important
part in winning the support of
the progressive element of the
Republican Party. He believed
that the publicity feature of the
law was more valuable than the
tax's revenue potential.

Progressives argued that
publicity would end improper
trade policies, business methods,
and conduct, and would assure
fuller and more accurate
reporting by taxpayers.

Secretary whether to grant
permission. Second, anyone could
inspect the returns of corporations
listed on exchanges, or those whose
stock was advertised in the press or
offered for public sale by the
corporation itself.74 Returns could
only be inspected, however, at the
office of the Commissioner and
there were no provisions for
furnishing a copy of any return to
any person.75 Further, the law
made it unlawful for anyone to
print or publish in any manner
whatever not provided by law, any
income tax return or any part
thereof.76 The commonly accepted
interpretation of this provision was
apparently that it prevented the
publication of information obtained
from inspecting returns.
D. 1913 - 1923
The 1913 Act imposed an
income tax on individuals and
corporations. The law mirrored the
1910 changes regarding disclosure.
Tax returns "shall constitute public
records and be open to inspection
as such: Provided, That any and all
such returns shall be open to
inspection only upon the order of
the President, under rules and
regulations to be prescribed by the
Secretary of the Treasury and
approved by the President."77 The
President, however, did not
exercise his authority to provide
public inspection of individual tax
returns,78 allowing Progressives in
Congress to debate access to
income tax returns during the
consideration of subsequent
revenue acts.79 Progressives argued
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that publicity would end improper
trade policies, business methods,
and conduct, and would assure
fuller and more accurate reporting
by taxpayers.
In 1918, advocates of disclosure
nibbled away at the President's
discretionary power by requiring
the Commissioner to make
available for public inspection in
the offices of every collector, and
elsewhere in his discretion, lists
enumerating the names of
individuals, but not corporations,
who had filed returns in that
district.80
The law was also
amended to grant to a bona fide
shareholder of record who owned
1% or more of the outstanding
stock of a corporation the right to
examine the annual income tax
returns of such corporations and its
subsidiaries.81 The law provided,
however, that it was a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine not exceeding
$1,000 or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year for a
shareholder to make "known in any
manner whatever not provided by
law the amount or source of
income, profits, losses,
expenditures, or any particular
thereof, set forth or disclosed in
any such return."82 Presumably,
this provision would be violated if
a shareholder published in a
newspaper the amount of tax paid
by a corporation. Also reissued
were the regulations allowing the
public the right to inspect returns of
listed or publicly-sold corporations
and allowing any shareholder, at
the discretion of the Secretary of
the Treasury, upon a proper
showing of cause, to inspect the
return of his or her corporation.83

The right of 1% or more
shareholders to examine the income
tax returns of their corporations
still exists, along with the
pr ohi bi t ion on disclos i ng
information obtained.84

E.

The 1924 and 1926 Acts

By 1924, the public disclosure
of income tax returns had become a
rallying cry for farm-bloc Senators,
who warned that "secrecy is of the
greatest aid to corruption" and
urged that "to-day the price of
liberty is not only eternal vigilance
[sic] but also publicity."85 Forces
calling for disclosure achieved
some success in the Revenue Act of
1924, which required the names of
both individuals and corporations
filing returns to be posted, along
with, significantly, their tax
liabilities.86
Although some
advocates of disclosure wanted the
entire return published,87 questions
were raised about whether this
would seriously hamper the routine
work of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.88
The 1924 change was supported
by Democrats and insurgent
Republicans.89 Supporters offered
two principal arguments: (1)
publicity would discourage tax
evasion, promote honesty, and
increase revenue; and (2) publicity
would end improper trade policies,
business methods, and conduct.90
Publicity was bitterly opposed by
Secretary of the Treasury Mellon,
Senator Smoot, Secretary of
C o mme r c e H o o v e r , 9 1 a n d
Representative Ogden L. Mills,
who would later become Secretary

of the Treasury under President
Hoover. They maintained that
publicity had failed to increase
revenue in the past and actually
encouraged tax evasion, and led to
undesirable newspaper gratification
When
of public curiosity.92
President Coolidge signed the bill,
he issued a statement objecting
inter alia to the publicity
provisions.93
These provisions apparently
raised almost no popular
indignation until tax information
was printed in the newspapers a
few days before the 1924 election.94
"Although some newspapers
refused to publish this information,
coverage was extraordinarily
comprehensive. Whole pages were
devoted to lists of payments by
local citizens. Feature stories
reported on the biggest corporate
assessments and the tax payments
of prominent out-of-towners like
Babe Ruth or Standard Oil.
Teasers told of divorcees who were
investigating their husband's
income and wealthy taxpayers who
e s c a p e d w i t h pal t r y t a x
payments."95
The New York Times and other
newspapers devoted entire pages to
publishing the taxes paid by
thousands of persons.96
Enterprising persons published
pamphlets containing the names of
taxpayers and the amounts they
paid.97 The U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the right of newspapers to
print the lists made public.98
The New Republic added a new
twist in its defense of the publicity
provisions, by focusing on how
many person's salaries were already
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The right of 1% or more
shareholders to examine the
income tax returns of their
corporations still exists, along
with the prohibition on
disclosing information obtained.

public information:

Supporters of the 1924 law
declared that it would reveal the
illegal practices of tax evaders,
apparently by drawing attention
to suspiciously low payments.

First. . . are. . .the [e]mployees of
cities, counties, states, and nation-the laborers, street-sweepers,
firemen, policemen, clerks,
stenographers, mail-carriers,
bookkeepers, teachers, librarians,
scientists, accountants--all those
whose salaries are fixed by public
authority and printed in official
reports, the worth of whose work is
a regular subject of debate, who
must usually make heroic efforts to
exhibit the inadequacy of their
incomes in order to secure tardy
increases. Next march the serried
divisions of the employees of
private industry who receive their
recompense in wages...The hourly
or weekly rates paid...are published
in official documents...Last of all
march the multitude of farmers
who...cannot count much on
secrecy when the yields and prices
of their crops are so obvious."99
According to the New Republic,
the existing law did not go far
enough. "Little, after all, can be
learned concerning the evasions or
the incomes received merely from
records of the taxes paid. Full
publicity of the returns themselves
is the only logical procedure. The
government now has gone far
enough to cause irritation to the
taxpayer and the public, but not far
enough to reap the substantial
benefits of candor."100
Supporters of the 1924 law
declared that it would reveal the
illegal practices of tax evaders,101
apparently by drawing attention to
suspiciously low payments. The
New York Times, however, carried
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front page stories about how
income tax collectors felt that the
publication of individual tax
returns had no appreciable effect on
tax administration.102
Yet the
Times also published on its front
page the names of wealthy and
prominent New Yorkers who paid
no income tax, which presumably
would have led to inquiries by the
tax administration.103
Other
editorials attacked the new law as
unnecessary because most persons
are honest and in any event, the
government maintains a large force
of inspectors to check doubtful
cases.
By now, the anti-disclosure
rhetoric was predictable.
Disclosure was criticized as
"flagrantly undemocratic, exposing
to the general gaze the affairs of
only a small minority. It is petty,
furnishing food for the impudent
curiosity of gossips and
busybodies. It opens a door to
business fakers, offering them
choice lists of moneyed <prospects.’
It furnishes confidential
information of a certain value to a
business man's rivals."104 "Partners
are checking up on each other;
husband and wife are on the fiscal
trails of their mates, alimony
hunters are running wild, and
<sucker lists’ of the wealthy are
being prepared by those who have
something to sell....Economically,
the new policy will be costly;
morally, it is indefensible; socially,
it is deplorable...Decent Americans
will not care to act as spies, and,
we believe, they will bitterly resent
being spied upon."105
"Those
forgotten men who do the work and
pay the bills and the taxes, who

honestly fulfill their duties as
citizens, who try to obey even the
most whimsical and capricious
laws, who discharge their public
and private obligations honorably
and decently--how long will they
consent to this exposure of their
private affairs to the eager eyes of
the scandal-monger, the
blackmailer, the parasite, and the
taunt?"106 "[T]he land is filled with
a luxuriant crop of envy, suspicion,
hatred, insinuation and innuendo,
much of it false and unfair; for the
honesty of an income-tax return
cannot be determined by the mere
amount of payment in a single
year.....The publication of the
amount of tax paid is not only
unfair; it confuses still more both
the understanding and the
administration of the income
tax.....Sensible people, whether tax
experts or those without
pretensions to specialized
knowledge in this field, know that
the only way to make the income
tax fairer and more equitable is
gradually to lighten it."107
Information on the taxes paid by
prominent persons was used by one
journal to support Secretary
Mellon's call for reduced income
surtaxes.
"John D. Rockefeller, Jr., [paid]
about $7,000,000; and Secretary
Mellon, $1,173,987.
In these
cases, where the highest surtaxes
are operative, the Government is
obviously not imposing a levy on
the rich man's extravagances. It is
safe to assume that neither Mr.
Rockefeller nor Mr. Mellon deprive
themselves of any indulgences to
meet their tax bill; they pay their

taxes out of their industrial funds.
The tax amounts to a levy on
industry, a diversion of capital
from business channels into
Government channels.
High
surtaxes are not so much a
personal blow to the inordinately
wealthy as a graduated penalty
inflicted upon industries in direct
proportion to their prosperity. A
tax that punishes efficiency and
success may gratify the passions of
business-baiters, but is not just and
is hardly conducive to the welfare
of the country."108
In his annual message to
Congress at the end of 1924,
President Coolidge voiced his
opposition to disclosure:
"Every one desires a reduction of
taxes, and there is a great
preponderance of sentiment in
favor of taxation reform. When I
approved the present tax law I
stated publicly that I did so in spite
of certain provisions which I
believed unwise and harmful. One
of the most glaring of these was the
making public of the amounts
assessed against different income
tax payers. Although that damage
has now been done, I believe its
continuation to be detrimental to
the public welfare and bound to
decrease public revenues so that it
ought to be repealed."109
Secretary of the Treasury Mellon
expressed similar sentiment:
"Publicity is wholly unnecessary
from an administrative standpoint.
Publicity serves one purpose,
however. It gives to business rivals
and to those having some ulterior
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Information on the taxes paid by
prominent persons was used by
one journal to support Secretary
Mellon's call for reduced
income surtaxes.

"It is difficult to image any one
thing which would be a greater
spur to the efforts of all
taxpayers to avoid a taxable
income than the threat that the
amount they paid will be
pilloried."
- Treasury Secretary Mellon

motive information which is of
value to them solely to the extent it
is detrimental to the taxpayer.
They gain by the taxpayer being
hurt.
"It is difficult to image any one
thing which would be a greater
spur to the efforts of all taxpayers
to avoid a taxable income than the
threat that the amount they paid
will be pilloried. To the direct
monetary value of saving payment
of an inherently high tax is added
the incentive, in many cases much
stronger, of preserving business
privacy.
"Immediately upon the recent
publication of this information
opened to the public, the
newspapers reported a stimulation
in the market for tax-exempt
securities.
We may promptly
expect renewed use of the many
means of tax avoidance, with the
consequent decrease in the
productivity of the income tax. The
provision should be repealed."110
Consistent with Secretary
Mellon's opposition, Treasury
officials asserted that they were
unable to point to a single case in
which a tax dodger had been
uncovered as a result of public
disclosure.
For example, the
Treasury reported over 13,000
persons had neglected to file a
return of their income in 1925-some of whom were bootleggers-and that the names of these persons
did not appear on the lists that were
published.111 Treasury officials
asserted that public disclosure had
not had the effect of increasing
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revenue from delinquents, that the
data made available for publication
were of no particular value, and
that disclosure was an added
expense to the federal government
for which there was no offsetting
benefit.112
In 1926, the vehement
opposition of Treasury Secretary
Mellon,113 representatives of big
business,114 and President Coolidge,
led to the law being altered to
require the posting of only the
names and addresses of taxpayers
and not the amount of their
liabilities.115
This change,
intended to placate the champions
of disclosure, 116 essentially
remained law until 1966.117
According to one commentator, the
change successfully prevented the
"spotlight from being thrown in the
future on the hierarchy of wealth
which had come to dominate
American society. . . .
The
resulting public concern about the
concentration of wealth," that was
triggered by the 1924 publicity
provisions, "impelled Mellon and
his associates to safeguard their
privileged positions by keeping
from the public vital facts about the
individuals who composed the high
income elite."118
F. The Pink Slip Provisions:
1934 - 1935
No further changes in the law
occurred until 1934.
The
groundwork for the 1934 changes
was laid by a well publicized
scandal involving income tax
evasion that arose during
consideration of the National

Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).
Senator Robert LaFollette,
Jr., who had inherited the cause of
income tax disclosure from his
father, declared that the
"unconscionable evasions and
understatements of income
revealed by the investigation of the
Senate...would never have taken
place [had disclosure been in
effect]."119 LaFollette seized the
opportunity by proposing an
amendment for full publicity,
which sailed through the Senate on
a 56-27 vote.120 The Conference
Committee, however, informed by
Treasury experts that publicity
would be administratively
"cumbersome," left the issue of
disclosure once again to the
President's discretion.121
Progressives were infuriated, and
joined en masse with Republicans
to nearly sink the NIRA
Conference package.122
Progressives were keenly aware
of the Treasury's opposition to
publicity and skeptical of President
Roosevelt's inclination to use his
discretionary power to broaden
public access to tax returns. When
their skepticism proved correct, the
Senate attached LaFollette's full
publicity amendment to the 1934
Revenue Bill.123 Although Congress
refused to publicize the
complete income tax return, it did
authorize the so-called pink slip
requirements.124
Each taxpayer was required to fill
out a pink slip with his or her return,
containing name and address, total
gross income, total deductions, net
income, total credits, and tax
liability. These slips were available
for public inspection. The pink slip
law also applied to corporations and
partnerships.
Passed during the depths of the
Depression, pink slip supporters
played on the popular resentment
Advocates
toward the rich.125
thought disclosure would deter tax
evasion. They claimed that there

would be vast increases in tax
payments by the wealthy once
publicity incited public indignation.
"Publicity is the greatest cure for
evils which may exist in
government."126 If someone "knows
that his return is a matter of public
record, he will hesitate a long time
before he will resort to any device
designed to relieve him of his fair
share of the tax."127
Another rationale for disclosure
was the automatic self correction in
which "loopholes will be discovered
immediately and legislation passed to
Those
correct evasions." 128
advocating disclosure doubted the
impartiality of employees of the
Internal Revenue Bureau (the
predecessor of the IRS) and argued
that disclosure would keep tax
administrators honest.129
Opposition to the pink slips was
fierce and immediate.
A group calling itself the 'Sentinels
of the Republic' mobilized the push
for repeal before anyone would
actually have to submit the [slips.]
Its race with the March 15, 1935,
filing deadline stirred wide press and
popular support, for this time the
question of access to tax returns
loomed as a matter of life and death:
The 1932 Lindbergh kidnap gripped
the public con-sciousness.130
Senator Robert LaFollette, Jr.,
declared that the "unconscionable evasions and
understatements of income
revealed by the investigation of
the Senate...would never have
taken place [had disclosure been
in effect]."
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Another rationale for disclosure
was the automatic self
correction in which "loopholes
will be discovered immediately
and legislation passed to correct
evasions."

"The first group that will scan
them carefully will be the
racketeer, the gunman, and the
possible kidnaper. In each
small town throughout the
country they will be interested in
knowing whether a man could
profitably be blackmailed or
whether a kidnaping could
possibly yield results."
- U.S. Representative Bacon,
February 20, 1935

The
Sentinels
mailed
approximately 12,000 letters
throughout the country asking "Do
you want the inquisitorial income
publicity law repealed?" "It can be
repealed if even 25 per cent of those
citizens who resent it will express a
demand for its repeal." The letter
advised taxpayers to write across the
pink slip "I protest against this
outrage to my right of privacy!"131
The Sentinels of the Republic laid
the groundwork for a massive
taxpayer protest. Special anti-pink
slip packets furnished taxpayers with
propaganda sheets and a petition to
Congress, urging them to write
Secretary Morgenthau, their
Congressman, and their local
newspapers. When the Treasury sent
out the pink slips and filing date for
income taxes approached, an
avalanche of indignant telegrams and
letters, many of them identical,
inundated Congress. In addition,
many people affixed to their pink
slips a sticker--available in the
Sentinels' packet and at some banks-declaring "I protest against this
outrageous invasion of my right of
Privacy."132 This orchestrated protest
apparently impressed Congressmen,
who often commented that the bulk
of the protests came from "the small
taxpayers."133
A common theme was that the
information would be used for
wrongful purposes.
"The only
people who can possibly be
interested in this information will be
a man's competitors or the idle and
malicious curious."134 "With the
country still in the throes of a terrible
crime wave, many opponents voiced
concern that pink slips would be red
"The
flags for criminals."135
Dillingers, the Carpis, and the `Baby
Face' Nelsons and their ilk will
eagerly scan each list in his own
community for a clue as to possible
profitable victims."136 "The first
group that will scan them carefully
will be the racketeer, the gunman,
and the possible kidnaper. In each
small town throughout the country
they will be interested in knowing
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whether a man could profitably be
blackmailed or whether a kidnaping
could possibly yield results. There is
a fear going throughout the country
because of this threat."137 "Another
group who will be very interested in
this information will be those
citizens who prey on defenseless
widows and others by trying to sell
them fake securities. Those who
make up `sucker lists' will be greatly
aided."138 "Many a person who lives
in security may, upon publication of
his tax return, be revealed as
attractive prey for racketeers. As an
illustration of publicity let me quote
from a Washington paper of
February 18,
1935: `Eleanor Hanley was hailed as
an exceedingly lucky person when
she won $110,000 on the Irish
Sweepstakes two years ago. This
New Jersey woman has been
hounded since by gangsters and is
now in an asylum. Doctors hold she
is unable to handle her affairs.'"139
Others feared the effect of the
pink slips on social harmony: "All
those in the community on the list
will be talked about, wondered
about; talk will beget talk until ill
feelings are bound to become
engendered, resulting in the creation
of social discord and indefinite
damage to social standards." "I
cannot begin in the short space of an
evening, to uncover all the
ramifications, embarrassments,
distress, humiliation, and
discouragements that will put
themselves in the way of the smaller
taxpayers unless this section is
repealed." 140
The disclosure
movement had "been loyal in the
cooking pots of demagogues whose
ulterior motives are not the public
interest, but class cleavage and the
creation of class hatreds."141
The Saturday Evening Post
described the pink slip provisions as
"peculiarly stupid and half-baked,"
"grossly unfair," "it arouses
prejudices and suspicions based on
utterly misleading information."
Some challenged the value of the
information that would be made

available. "It hurts the standing and
credit of those who report
abnormally small incomes because of
depression conditions and poor
collections. It makes other incomes
appear abnormally large when they
are not so at all, if various
obligations, such as other taxes,
contributions to charity, domestic
complications, and dependents for
whom deductions cannot be taken
are considered..." "[S]o different are
the sources of income of large or
even moderate taxpayers...and so
diverse are the deductions, that the
facts contained in the pink slip were
meaningless even to a trained
accountant or an internal-revenue
investigator.
It is not only
demagogic claptrap, it is quite untrue
to say that the Government is
prevented by secrecy from collecting
taxes....Envy, malice, prejudice and
passion are easy crops to raise, but
raising them is as stupid as it is
easy".142
The New Republic countered that
the only good reason why any person
would object to the release of income
data was "because he is ashamed of
its size or source; a good reason from
his point of view, but certainly not
from that of the community."143
Others argued that opponents of
disclosure feared showing how well
they had done under the New Deal:

superrich, and the idle rich,"
especially the "burglars of wealth,
idle holders of idle capital, lounge
lizards of the blue-blooded, and
pink-toed aristocracy of wealth."145
The pink slip rebellion basically
concerned individual returns and not
corporate returns.
Even when
corporations were specifically
mentioned, it was the "mom and
pop" operations: "One of the most
serious abuses that will be brought

Others argued that opponents of
disclosure feared showing how
well they had done under the
New Deal:
[T]here are thousands of
business men, manufacturers,
and others whose return will
show substantial profits in 1934,
who in 1930, 1931, and 1932,
under the Republican
administration, suffered
tremendous [losses].

[T]here are thousands of business
men, manufacturers, and others
whose return will show substantial
profits in 1934, who in 1930, 1931,
and 1932, under the Republican
administration, suffered tremendous
[losses]. It is these gentlemen who
have been the beneficiaries of the
new-deal legislation, who, under this
provision will be compelled to make
true returns showing that conditions
have improved under the present
administration . . . .144
No side had a monopoly on
hyperbole. One supporter of the pink
slips, for example, argued for
"pitiless publicity . . . thrown upon
the incomes of the rich, the
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The House Ways and Means
Committee Report on the
question of repealing the
disclosure feature referred to the
previous unsuccessful attempts
at publicity without
differentiating between
corporate and individual
returns, or between big and
small businesses. The report
focused almost solely on
individuals.

about by this section is the
publication of business information
to a man's competitor, and I am not
at this moment thinking of large
business or industry...but the smaller
business men in the cities, and the
small merchants in the towns of the
country."146
Representative Bacon wrote in a
letter to the Chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means: "I
do not think I need to give a
summation of the reasons in
opposition to the 'pink slip' section.
However, I will say that most of the
complaints I have received have been
from people of modest means, small
business men and the salaried or
wage classes."147 The House Ways
and Means Committee Report148 on
the question of repealing the
disclosure feature referred to the
previous unsuccess-ful attempts at
publicity without differentiating
between corporate and individual
returns, or between big and small
businesses. The report focused
almost solely on individuals.
The uproar over the pink slip
provisions led to their repeal in 1935
before ever taking effect.149 The
House Report recommending repeal
argued that disclosure was
unnecessary because "ample
authority is contained in other
sections of existing law authorizing
the inspection of income-tax returns
by the committees of Congress
charged with the responsibility of
levying taxation...[P]ublication... will
be of slight benefit to the Treasury in
the prevention of tax evasion, which
is the main argument advanced for
such publicity. The real remedy...is
careful auditing of returns and the
swift imposing of penalties for such
evasion."150
In addition, Congress cited
unfavorably the experience of
Wisconsin, the only state having a
disclosure law at that time
(presumably because of the influence
of LaFollette).151 The House Report
quoted from a report by the
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Wisconsin Tax Commission, which
stated that the disclosure provisions
had been introduced in 1923 but that
none of the asserted benefits had yet
materialized.
According to the
Wisconsin report, the published
returns were used by credit
companies, salespersons, business
competitors, and to annoy and harass
taxpayers.152 The Wisconsin report
indicated that disclosure had not
resulted in the discovery of
unreported income and claimed that
it had actually led to more incorrect
returns being filed.
No explanation was provided why
the number of incorrect returns
should have increased or if they did,
why that increase should have been
attributed to disclosure.
The Wisconsin report was
contrary to assertions made by
LaFollette some years earlier. He
claimed that Wisconsin's disclosure
laws revealed that taxpayers had
fraudulently underpaid $9,000,000
during a period when returns were
secret.
He claimed that such
behavior was eliminated in 1923
when Wisconsin adopted its
publicity provisions. "I believe, that
the fact that the income-tax returns
are public records produces a very
different psychology upon the part of
the individual taxpayer when he
makes out his return, whether it be
under a secret provision or whether it
be under a provision where it is a
matter of public record." 153
Nonetheless, the House Report
concluded that the pink slips would
"greatly aid the racketeers, gangsters,
kidnapers, and the criminal element
of the country."154
The repeal of the pink slips could
be explained in part by
Congressional self interest. One
Congressman, recalling the country's
earlier experience with disclosure,
reminded his colleagues that "when
the first income-tax payments were
made public ... the names of the
Congressmen were the first ones
most eagerly published and

scanned."155 One commentator gave
credit for the repeal to the ability of
the anti-publicity forces to
characterize themselves as defending
the middle class. They would, for
example, emphasize how
embarrassed an unsuccessful
businessmen would be at seeing his
or her business affairs laid out on the
local front page. The specter was
raised of creditors cutting off the
flow of funds. The Sentinels of the
Republic also used small-business
imagery that obscured their
dependence on wealthy
conservatives.156
Repeal of disclosure was certainly
not a sure thing. As late as February
1935, there was actually little hope
for repeal.157 Subsequently, the
repeal forces quickly and effectively
began to assemble a formidable
coalition of merchants' associations,
chambers of commerce, and other
business groups. The Bureau of
Internal Revenue and other Treasury
officials also supported repeal.
Although Secretary of the Treasury
Morgenthau refused to endorse
repeal, the Treasury was anything
but neutral. In addition, Roosevelt's
apparent caution, conservatism, and
drift in early 1935 made the
disclosure law vulnerable.158 As the
tide turned in favor of repeal, a lastditch amendment in the House to
confine publicity to people earning
over $25,000 a year was easily
defeated.159 Remarkably, only one
month after the pundits had
discounted the chances of repeal, it
swept Congress.160
The pink slip proposal was the
last time the issue of access to tax
information by the general public
was debated by Congress.161 Similar
to most of the earlier debates, the
focus was on individuals and to a
lesser extent, on small corporations.
The lobbying effort (as exemplified
by
the Sentinels of the Republic), the
appeal made to the public (invoking
the fear of kidnapping, criminal

extortion, constant solicitation), the
pressure put on Congress (as
Representative Bacon said, coming
mostly from those of "modest
means"), the House Report, and the
debate in Congress, all centered on
the concerns of individuals and of
small corporations. No attempt was
made to distinguish those concerns
from those of publicly-traded
corporations.
Until 1976, the law continued to
provide for the 1910 delegation of
authority to the Executive branch to
open tax returns to inspection upon
order of the President and under
rules prescribed by the Secretary of

One commentator gave credit
for the repeal to the ability of
the anti-publicity forces to
characterize themselves as
defending the middle class.
They would, for example,
emphasize how embarrassed an
unsuccessful businessmen
would be at seeing his or her
business affairs laid out on the
local front page...They also used
small-business imagery that
obscured their dependence on
wealthy conservatives.
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"The stock market crash of
1929...led to an "outcry for full
disclosure in all matters
corporate and financial."

The SEC has through the
years mandated extensive
disclosure of income tax data
both through its own regulations
on this issue and by its
requirement that SEC-regulated
corporations must follow
Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP).

the Treasury and approved by the
President.
Debate over this
provision shifted to governmental
access to tax returns by agencies
other than the IRS. This debate was
marked by a dizzying sequence of
policy flips and turns,162 with
unelected administrators in the
Executive branch exercising
enormous power: "[T]he story is one
of the exercise of discretion granted
by a Congress unwilling to define
precisely the policy to be
followed,"163 concluded a 1975
report to the Senate. The Tax
Reform Act of 1976164 ended the
Executive branch's discretion. In the
aftermath of the abuses of
Watergate,165 Congress announced
the general rule that "[r]eturns and
return information shall be
confidential,"166 except as otherwise
authorized.
G. SEC Disclosure:
1933 - Present
In the late 1920's and early 1930's,
increasing attention was focussed on
the financial reporting practices of
large corporations. In a series of
articles in the Atlantic Monthly and
then in his influential book, Main
Street and Wall Street, Harvard
economist William Z. Ripley
accused large corporations of
deceptive and misleading financial
reporting.167 Following the stock
market crash of 1929, which led to
an "outcry for full disclosure in all
matters corporate and financial,"168
the American Institute of
Accountants and the New York
Stock Exchange began working
together to improve corporate
financial reporting. In 1933, the
New York Stock Exchange for the
first time threatened a listed
company (Allied Chemical) with
delisting unless it improved its
financial disclosures.169 In the same
year, the Securities Act of 1933 was
enacted,170 which required "full and
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fair disclosure" in the prospectuses
that accompany the interstate
issuance of securities.171 This was
immediately followed by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,172
which created the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to
administer both the 1933 and 1934
Acts. The 1934 Act also required the
filing of periodic reports by
companies whose securities were
listed on the national exchanges.
A primary function of the SEC
was seen to be the regulation of
disclosure and measurement
standards,173 based largely upon
the belief that the securities markets'
failure of the 1930's resulted from
inadequate disclosure and an
excessive number of measurement
methods used by public
companies.174 For this reason, the
Securities Act of 1933 is often
referred to as the "truth in securities
law."175
The SEC has through the years
mandated extensive disclosure of
income tax data both through its own
regulations on this issue and by its
requirement that SEC-regulated
corporations must follow Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP), as established by the
appropriate accounting bodies
(currently the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB)).176 Other
countries have adopted similar
rules.177
Taxes as a significant item of
expense have been included in the
financial statements of most large
corporations, at least since the postDepression era. There has long been
a consensus that income taxes should
be disclosed; more controversial has
been the treatment of interperiod
allocations, that is, how to treat the
tax implications of differences in
timing of the recognition of income
for book and tax purposes. Although
these technical rules have continued
to be refined, neither the SEC nor the
authoritative accounting standards
bodies have ever found the

arguments against disclosure of
income taxes to be persuasive.
In 1973, the SEC adopted the
current rules on the disclosure of
The 1973
income taxes. 178
arguments made by opponents of the
SEC's position are similar to those
that have been raised during
the current debates regarding statelevel disclosure and thus merit
mention. In response to comments
that the 1973 proposals would violate
the confidentiality of federal income
tax information and provide valuable
data to competitors, the SEC
observed that the full and fair
disclosure of material information is
a basic part of the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Act
Exchange of 1934.
Each Act
provides that registration statements
must contain, in addition to other
information specified, such
information "as the Commission may
by rules or regulations require as
being necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection
of investors." The SEC believed that
its 1973 rules were consistent with
this authority. The SEC also noted
that opponents did not provide any
specific examples of how the
detailed reporting of income taxes
would help com-petitors, but in any
event it concluded that the needs of
present and potential investors were
best served by providing such
information, notwithstanding there
may be an increased risk of adverse
consequences at the hands of
competitors.
The 1973 changes, requiring
detailed information on federal
income taxes and aggregate data on
state income taxes, is part of a
panoply of financial data that the
SEC requires to be disclosed. Such
information is presented in Form 10K, which publicly-traded
corporations must annually file with
the Securities and Exchange
Commission.179 The 10-K180 must be
sent to stockholders of record or
beneficial owners on request without

charge.181 Some corporations also
make it available to public on
request. It is also accessible on the
SEC's electronic data gathering
analysis and retrieval system
(EDGAR), as well as through
commonly used computer data bases
such as LEXIS and Compustat.
EDGAR will soon be available on
Internet.182
Form 10-K consists of four
general parts, only one of which
deals with federal income taxes. The
first contains detailed disclosures
relating to business, properties, legal
proceedings and submission of
matters to a vote of security holders.
The second part consists of market
price data for the company's common
stock, a
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Although technical rules have
continued to be refined, neither
the SEC nor the authoritative
accounting standards bodies
have ever found the arguments
against disclosure of income
taxes to be persuasive.

In 1973, the SEC noted that
opponents did not provide any
specific examples of how the
detailed reporting of income
taxes would help competitors,
but in any event it concluded
that the needs of present and
potential investors were best
served by providing such
information.

Working with SEC Forms 10-K,
annual reports, and related
information, Citizens for Tax
Justice (CTJ) was able to
compare the amount of federal
income taxes paid by many of
the nation's largest corporations
with the amount of their income.

summary of financial data
appropriate for trend analysis, three
years of audited financial statements
and management's discussion and
analysis of the issuer's financial
condition. The third part consists of
the traditional proxy disclosure
information relating to directors and
executive officers, executive
compensation, beneficial ownership
of securities and certain relationships
and related transactions. The fourth
contains the required financial
The federal tax
statements.183
information that must be disclosed
includes the following:184
(1) current aggregate income taxes
paid to all governments: income
taxes paid to the United States,
foreign jurisdictions, and state and
local governments must be
identified separately;
(2) deferred tax expenses
disaggregated by U.S. government,
state and local governments, and
foreign jurisdictions. Deferred tax
expenses represent those taxes that
the corporation would have incurred
if the timing and recognition of
revenue and expenses for financial
accounting purposes were identical
to the timing and recognition of
revenue and expenses for federal
income tax purposes. A corporation
must identify by amount each major
item that contributes to the difference
between actual and deferred tax
expenses, such as depreciation;
(3) tax effects of net operating losses;
(4) amount of investment tax credit;
(5) expected U.S. income tax
expense. This expense is the amount
of tax that the corporation would pay
if all of its book income were subject
to the highest statutory federal
corporate income tax rate;
(6) actual U.S. income tax expense as
a percentage of its book income;
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(7) the identity and amount of each
major item responsible for any
differences between expected and
actual income tax expense.
There are numerous other reports
that also must be filed with the
SEC.185

H. Citizens for Tax Justice and
the Use of SEC-Required
Disclosure for Tax Policy
Analysis
Working with SEC Forms 10-K,
annual reports, and related
information, Citizens for Tax
Justice (CTJ) was able to compare
the amount of federal income taxes
paid by many of the nation's largest
corporations with the amount of
their income.186 Through a series of
reports in the 1980s, CTJ was able
to show that
many of the most profitable
corporations in the United States
were paying little or no corporate
income tax. Incredibly, some
companies were receiving subsidies
from the federal government in the
form of tax

rebates while making billions of
dollars in profits. Thus, some
companies actually had negative
tax rates.
CTJ found that the federal
corporate income tax policies of the
early 1980s—intended to stimulate
increased investment — had
became a device for corporations to
“shelter” their income in misplaced
investments and considerably
reduce or eliminate their tax
liability. In fact, in a report issued
just before the 1986 Tax Reform
Act, CTJ found that more than half
of the 250 most profitable
corporations in the US that were
surveyed enjoyed at least one
federal tax-free year between 1981
and 1985.
For example, CTJ found that
Boeing corporation made close to
$3 billion in profits from 1981 to
1985 and received rebates totaling
more than $245 million from the
government—a net tax rate over
those years of negative 8.3 percent.
Likewise, the federal government
gave Dow Chemical Corporation
rebates over that period totalling
$200 million on $771 million in
profits—a negative 25.9 percent
rate.
Many of the provisions that gave
these companies such large tax
benefits had been adopted in the
name of economic growth. But a
detailed analysis of 41 companies
that paid no federal income tax at
all from 1981 to 1984 found that
they reduced their aggregate capital
spending by 4 percent during that
period and cut their total number of
employees by 6 percent over the
same period. Yet these corporations
received those huge tax breaks
ostensibly to encourage growth in
capital spending and job creation.
In contrast, the 43 highest-taxed
companies in CTJ's 1981-84
analysis boosted their capital
spending by 21 percent and added
4 percent to their workforce.
Another flaw in the federal

corporate income tax revealed by
CTJ was the unequal treatment of
direct competitors. A 1984 study,
for example, revealed that General
Electric obtained $283 million in
tax rebates while earning profits of
$6.5 billion in 1981-83. At the
other end of the spectrum, one of
the highest taxed corporations in
the survey also was a major
manufacturer of appliances.
Whirlpool Corporation paid 45.6
percent of its profits in federal
income taxes. Thus, direct
competitors had significant
differences in their after-tax rates
of return because of the tax code.
The publication of this type of
information by CTJ had a
staggering impact. Although
information on the aggregate
decline and disparities in federal
corporate income taxes had been
available previously, none of it had
the force of CTJ's documentation.
When the CTJ studies were
published, both conservatives and
liberals were outraged.
Conservative columnist James
Kilpatrick, for example,
complained about corporate
welfare to Senator Robert Byrd on
national television, saying that a
mother of three, who earned

In a report issued just before the
1986 Tax Reform Act, CTJ
found that more than half of the
250 most profitable corporations
in the US that were surveyed
enjoyed at least one federal
tax-free year between 1981 and
1985.
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When the CTJ studies were
published, both conservatives
and liberals were outraged.
Conservative columnist James
Kilpatrick, for example,
complained about corporate
welfare to Senator Robert Byrd
on national television, saying
that a mother of three, who
earned $12,000, paid more in
taxes than Boeing, GE, DuPont,
and Texaco, combined.

Because the 1986 federal tax
reform closed business tax
loopholes, Congress and
President were able to reduce
the top corporate income tax
rate from 46 percent to 34
percent—and still increase the
revenue from the corporate
income tax substantially.

By 1988, only seven of the
250 corporations that CTJ had
earlier surveyed were now able
to avoid federal income taxes
entirely.

$12,000, paid more in taxes than
Boeing, GE, DuPont, and Texaco,
combined.
Largely because of this public
outrage, and the very real policy
problems exposed by CTJ's work,
federal tax reform in 1986 included
a strengthened alternative
minimum tax. Other significant
changes repealed the investment
tax credit, tightened the “completed
contract accounting rules” that had
eliminated taxes for defense
contractors, and restricted other
corporate tax shelters. Because of
the added revenue from these
changes, Congress and the
President were able to reduce the
top corporate income tax rate from
46 percent to 34 percent—and still
increase the revenue from the
corporate income tax substantially.
By 1988, only seven of the 250
corporations that CTJ had earlier
surveyed were now able to avoid
federal income taxes entirely. Only
forty-five companies were able to
bring their effective tax rate below
10 percent. In contrast, 113 of these
same companies had paid less than
10 percent of their profits in taxes
over the full 1981-1985 period. All
but two of the forty-one
corporations that paid no tax at all
over the 1981 to 1985 period had to
pay at least some federal income
tax in 1988. The combined tax rate
for these 41 companies, which was
a negative 4.3 percent from 1981 to
1985, increased to 27.9 percent of
their profits in 1988.
In addition, tax reform brought a
more level playing field for GE and
Whirlpool. In 1988, GE paid 21
percent of its profits in taxes;
Whirlpool paid 27 percent. The gap
between their effective tax rates
narrowed from 50 percentage
points to only six.
Although opponents of tax
reform argued that business
investment would decline as a
result of changes in the corporate
tax structure and predicted
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imminent economic collapse, just
the opposite occurred. There was
actually a strong surge of business
investment.
Real business
investment in industrial equipment, which rose by a minuscule
0.1 percent annually from 1981 to
1986 (the years when corporate
incentives for investment were
greatest), increased by an annual
4.0 percent during the three years
following the 1986 changes.
From 1986 to 1989, real
business fixed investment grew at
an annual rate of 2.7 percent,
appreciably more than the 1.9
percent rate of growth over the
previous five years.
I. Summary
Since the repeal of the pink slip
provisions in 1934, Congress has
not revisited the issue of public
access to federal tax returns. The
semi-hysterical atmosphere in
which the pink slips were debated
proved to be the death knell for
public access to both individual and
corporate tax returns. In a sense,
subsequent events have reduced the
need for public access to federal
corporate income tax returns. The
SEC has essentially preempted the
issue by mandating the disclosure
of extensive data by publiclytraded corporations.187 Because of
the cornucopia of data already in
the public domain, it is easy to
understand why there has been no
further debate at the federal level
about public access to corporate
returns. Our increased concern for
individuals' rights to privacy also
makes it easy to understand why
there has been no post-1934 debate
over access to individual tax
returns. It is unthinkable in 1993
for proposals like the pink slip
returns for individuals to be taken
seriously.188
The history of disclosure at the
federal level indicates that on the
occasions when Congress focused

on the differences between
corporations and individuals, it
tended to opt for more disclosure in
the case of corporations. Even
today, the fact that a 1%
shareholder can inspect the tax
return of his or her corporation
(although a shareholder cannot
disclose anything obtained from the
inspection), 189 indicates that
corporations are treated as having
less legitimate claims to privacy
than individuals.190
What is
surprising in reviewing the history
of the federal debate is the
inordinate amount of attention that
the Progressives placed on
obtaining the income tax returns of
individuals to the neglect of
corporations. If the Progressives

and other supporters of disclosure
had more carefully distinguished
between corporations and
individuals and proposed separate
and independent laws governing
access to the tax returns of each,
they might have been more
successful in protecting the victory
they won in 1924 and perhaps
salvaged the pink slips for
corporations. No one apparently
on either side of the debate went to
great lengths to distinguish the
different issues involved in
corporate disclosure from that of
access to individual returns.
Having chosen to pitch their battle
over access to individual returns,
supporters of disclosure gave up an
opportunity to achieve cor-porate
disclosure. But as was seen,
LaFollette and the Pro-gressives, as
well other early advocates of
disclosure, were eventually
vindicated by the SEC's actions
over the last 60 years.
The use of SEC-mandated
disclosure by CTJ to transform the
inaccessible and arcane world of
corporate taxation into a
cornerstone of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act has not been lost on
state tax reformers. With the SEC
effectively resolving the issue of
federal tax disclosure, debate has
shifted to the state level and to the
disclosure of state corporate
income taxes.
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The SEC has essentially
preempted the issue by
mandating the disclosure of
extensive data by publicly-traded
corporations. Because of the
cornucopia of data already in
the public domain, it is easy to
understand why there has been
no further debate at the federal
level about public access to
corporate returns.

The history of disclosure at
the federal level indicates that
on the occasions when Congress
focused on the differences
between corporations and
individuals, it tended to opt for
more disclosure in the case of
corporations.

III. Disclosure at the State Level

In 1992, due to the efforts of
the Tax Equity Alliance for
Massachusetts (TEAM),
Massachusetts voters approved a
ballot question calling for
extensive corporate tax
disclosure. The law applied to
all publicly-traded corporations
that already disclose
information about their federal
tax expenses and their state
corporate tax expenses on a 50state aggregate basis, all banks,
and virtually all insurance
companies doing business in the
state.

The effective use of the federal
disclosure laws in the mid-1980s
motivated state legislators and tax
reformers to consider similar laws at
the state level. Their interest was
heightened by increasing concern
about state revenue shortfalls,
brought about by a number of
factors, including reductions in
federal aid, the recession and
statutorily-mandated limitations on
revenue-raising at the local or state
levels. In addition, several states
adopted an array of corporate tax
credits and other tax expenditures in
an effort to stimulate their recessionplagued economies.
In light of the states' budget
problems, questions were raised
about whether corporations were
paying their "fair share" of the cost
of public services. And, specifically,
the adoption of new corporate tax
incentives in the face of looming
deficits raised serious concerns about
whether these expenditures were
achieving their intended goals. It
soon became obvious that none of
these questions could be answered
without more information about how
much specific, large businesses were
paying in state taxes.
At the state level, only Wisconsin,
the home of both the LaFollettes, has
long had a history of income tax
disclosure, but until recently its law
went unnoticed by other states.
Perhaps this neglect was
understandable since only lately have
Wisconsin tax reformers used the
disclosure law effectively. Three
other states have adopted disclosure
laws within the past few years, the
most controversial being
Massachusetts. This Section reviews
these states' experiences with
disclosure.
A. Massachusetts
In 1992, due to the efforts of the
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Tax Equity Alliance for
Massachusetts (TEAM),
Massachusetts voters approved a
ballot question calling for extensive
corporate tax disclosure. The law
applied to all publicly-traded
corporations that already disclose
information about their federal tax
expenses and their state corporate tax
expenses on a 50-state aggregate
basis, all banks, and virtually all
insurance companies, doing business
in the state. These corporations were
required to file annual reports with
the Secretary of State, listing specific
items from their state excise
(income) tax returns, which would be
available for public inspection upon
request.
The ballot question called for a
panoply of information to be
disclosed:191 gross profit; taxable
Massachusetts tangible property;
taxable net worth; gross receipts or
sales; net income; total net taxable
income; income subject to
apportionment; income taxable in
Massachusetts; total net and gross
direct premiums in or allocable to
Massachusetts; taxable premiums;
gross investment income;
Massachusetts taxable investment
income; net underwriting profit;
admitted assets; total adjusted
taxable income; each deduction,
exemption, credit, offset, adjustment,
or credit to carry over that reduces
income subject to taxation or
otherwise affects tax liability; the
percentage used, if any, to establish
what portion of
total net taxable income is
apportioned to Massachusetts; total
Massachusetts excise or tax due; any
excess tax credits or credits subject
to carryover to future years; and net
income according to a company's
books on its federal return. A
company could request permission to
attach additional information.
Entities filing a consolidated return

had to list all the entities that were
consolidated.
A coalition of business groups
aggressively opposed the ballot
question.
Two months before
successful passage of the ballot
question, TEAM, the business
community, and legislative leaders
reached a political compromise and
agreed to adopt a less extensive form
of disclosure that would take effect at
the end of 1993, regardless of the
outcome of the ballot vote.
Ultimately, both houses of the
Legislature passed this compromise
and Governor Weld signed it into
law.192 As part of this compromise, a
Special Commission on Business
Tax Policy was created to study
Massachusetts business taxes.193
Although the same taxpayers are
subject to the law actually enacted,
the amount of information required
to be disclosed was reduced.
Specifically, businesses are currently
required to disclose the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

corporate name;
address of principal office;
Massachusetts taxable
income;
total Massachusetts excise
tax due;
non-income excise tax due;
gross receipts or sales;
either gross profit or credit
carry overs to future years;
income
subject
to
apportionment.194

The items covered are slightly
different in the case of banks and
insurance companies, in recognition
of the different bases on which they
are taxed.195 Corporations filing a
combined return must report the
names and addresses of all the
corporations that are combined.
The Secretary of State must make
available a list of all taxpayers that
are subject to disclosure. The first
reports under the new law are due
December 31, 1993, based on the
taxpayer's most recently filed
Massachusetts tax return.
The enacted bill continues to

provide corporations covered by the
disclosure requirement with the
opportunity to provide the Secretary
of State additional information as
part of their annual disclosure
reports. This provision was included
to provide corporations with an
opportunity to provide a fuller
understanding of the financial and
tax information being disclosed.196
The Secretary of State has to make
all of the above information available
for public inspection.
The Commissioner of Revenue is
required to publish an aggregate

A coalition of business groups
aggressively opposed the ballot
question. Two months before
successful passage of the ballot
question, TEAM and legislative
leaders reached a political
compromise and agreed to adopt
a less extensive form of
disclosure that would take effect
at the end of 1993, regardless of
the outcome of the ballot vote.

The Massachusetts law allows
corporations to provide
additional information as part of
their annual disclosure reports
in order to provide a fuller
picture of their financial and tax
situation.
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Under legislation passed in
1991, the West Virginia Tax
Commissioner must publish in
the State Register the name and
address of every taxpayer,
whether a corporation or
individual, receiving any of
eleven specified tax credits, and
the amount, by dollar category,
of each such credit received.

statistical report of the taxes
collected from corporations and
other businesses, as well as many of
the tax credits, deductions,
exemptions, and exclusions claimed
under Massachusetts law. The report
has to disaggregate data by industry
and categories of firm size.
Notwithstanding the political
compromise that led to the thinned
down disclosure provisions, more
changes may still occur. In July,
1993, the Special Commission on
Business Tax Policy voted seven to
five to recommend legislation that
would replace the existing tax
disclosure law with a system of
coded disclosure under which
corporations would be identified
only with a number. It was further
recommended that the coded
disclosure indicate the amount of tax
credits claimed by a corporation.
Finally, it was recommended that
each corporate filer, which is not part
of a combined return, should enter on
its tax disclosure report a numerical
code indicating the multicorporate
entity, if any, with which it is
affiliated.197
In a controversial parliamentary
procedure of dubious legality,198 the
Massachusetts Senate adopted a
version of the Majority Report.199 In
a significant deviation from the
Majority Report, however, the
Senate bill provided that the number
assigned to each corporation as part
of the anonymous disclosure must be
changed from year to year.
Moreover, there is no provision for
identifying affiliated corporations.200
B. West Virginia
Under legislation passed in 1991,
the West Virginia Tax Commissioner
must publish in the State Register the
name and address of every taxpayer,
whether a corporation or individual,
receiving any of the following twelve
tax credits, and the amount, by dollar
category, of each such credit
received:
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Business Investment and Jobs
Expansion Credit;
Industrial Expansion and
Revitalization Credit;
Research and Development Credit;
Residential Housing Development
Credit;
Management Information Services
Facility;
Coal Conversion Facility Credit;
Coal Loading Facility Credit;
Excess Generation of Electricity
from Coal Credit;
Low Income Electric Utility
Credit;
Low Income Gas Utility Credit;
Low Income Telephone Utility
Credit; and
Capital Company Credit.
The following dollar categories
are to be used in the required
disclosure report:
Not more than $50,000;
More than $50,000, but not more
than $100,000;
More than $100,000, but not
more than $250,000;
More than $250,000, but not
more than $500,000;
More than $500,000, but not
more than $1,000,000; and
More than $1,000,000.

The statutorily-stated purpose
behind the legislation was to
recognize "the citizens' right to
accountable and efficient state
government."201 The Department of
Revenue will issue its first report in
December, 1993.
Support for the disclosure
legislation arose after publication of
a report by the West Virginia
Department of Tax and Revenue.202
This study showed that only a small
number of taxpayers benefit from the
state's investment and jobs expansion
tax credit (known as the
As of 1990,
supercredit).203
approximately 200 taxpayers have
utilized the supercredit, representing
less than 1% of total corporate net
income filers. About 50 taxpayers
claimed credits in excess of $100,000
annually.204 The supercredit is used
primarily by industries that have
been reducing employment,
especially the coal industry, which
between 1985 and 1988 received
nearly 90% of the credit. According
to the study, the costs of the
supercredit have escalated. In 1985,
the supercredit cost $287,000, but by
fiscal year 1991, it was expected to
cost the State $60 million.205 The
supercredit effectively eliminates all
West Virginia tax liabilities for a
thirteen year period for most
qualifying taxpayers.
The disclosure legislation was
resisted on the grounds that it would
impair West Virginia's business
climate. Businesses did not lobby
strenuously against it, however, out
of fear that the Legislature might
actually reduce the supercredit.206
Although they were not successful at
stopping the legislation, businesses
won a major concession in the way
the categories used for reporting
purposes were to be designated. The
last category, the "more than
$1,000,000," was favored by large
companies "eager to conceal their
annual tax credits of over
$10,000,000."207

In 1991, Arkansas authorized the
disclosure by name of taxpayer-including both individuals and
corporations--of the amount of any
tax credit, tax rebate, tax discount, or
commission for the collection of a
tax received under the following
provisions:
2% discount for prompt payment of
the sales tax;
Manufacturer's investment sales
and use tax credit;
Steel mill tax incentives;
Motor fuel shrinkage allowance;
Arkansas Enterprise Zone Act;
Commission for sale of stamps for
cigarettes in the collection of
cigarette taxes;
Motion Picture Incentive Act;
Credit on severance tax of oil
producers;
Credit on severance tax of gas
producers;
Refund of motor fuel tax for
agricultural purposes;
Refund of motor fuel tax by
municipal buses;
Refund of distillate special fuel tax
to interstate users;
Credit against severance tax for
discovery of commercial oil pool;
and,
Native wine credit.208

C. Arkansas
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The statutorily-stated purpose
behind the legislation was to
recognize "the citizens' right to
accountable and efficient state
government."

The disclosure legislation was
resisted on the grounds that it
would impair West Virginia's
business climate. Businesses
did not lobby strenuously
against it, however, out of fear
that the Legislature might
actually reduce the supercredit.

Issues of tax reform did not play
a dominant role in the Arkansas
discussions; the disclosure issue
was basically argued in terms of
openness in government.

The Arkansas law also provides
that the disclosure requirement will
cover any tax incentive program
enacted after January 1, 1991, which
provide a tax credit, tax rebate, tax
discount, or commission for the
collection of a tax, with the
exception of any such benefits under
the state's income tax laws.209
Although the law is drafted in terms
of "disclosing" the name of the
taxpayer and the amount of the tax
benefit, the Arkansas Department of
Finance and Administration is not
required to publish any type of report
or to analyze the data covered by
disclosure.210 Rather, a person must
request the information from the
Director of Taxation. The Director
must notify the taxpayer that
information has been requested.211
The taxpayer has up to seven days to
challenge the release on the grounds
that it would give an advantage to
"competitors or bidders," or that it is
in some other way prohibited.
Apparently, only a few businesses
have opposed the release of
information, although the seven day
period may discourage challenges.
One group of taxpayers that
successfully enjoined the Director
from disclosing information to an
out-of-state competitor involved
wholesale tobacco distributors. They
successfully argued in the lower
court that disclosing the amount of
commissions received by cigarette
wholesalers in Arkansas for the sale
of stamps for cigarettes and the
collection of cigarette taxes received
by a tobacco wholesale grocery
could be used to determine total
cigarette sales. In conjunction with
other available data, this disclosure
would give competitors an advantage
in marketing and selling cigarettes.
The decision is currently under
appeal.212
The disclosure legislation in
Arkansas has a unique background,
with its roots in that state's Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA). In 1986,
the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled
that motor fuel tax records were
subject to disclosure under Arkansas'
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FOIA--one of the broadest in the
country. 213 To overrule that case,
key oil dealers in the Arkansas
Legislature sponsored a 1987
amendment that insured the
confidentiality of all tax returns and
tax reports. The Arkansas Society of
Professional Journalists fought this
amendment unsuccessfully in 1987
but their
persistent efforts led to the 1991
disclosure law.214
Issues of tax reform did not play a
dominant role in the Arkansas
discussions; the disclosure issue was
basically argued in terms of openness
in government.215 Because income
tax data were never within the
purview of the FOIA, no one, during
the debates over the 1991 law,
suggested that disclosure be
extended to that tax. Moreover, no
one suggested that information
covered by the 1991 law be
published by the state. Under the
FOIA, information would have been
available only to the person making
the request, and the 1991 law,
intended to mirror the status quo ante
under the FOIA, adopts a similar
position.

D. Wisconsin
Wisconsin's first income tax law,
enacted in 1911, prohibited tax
administrators from disclosing
income tax information under
penalty of fine or imprison-ment.216
In 1919, the statute was amended to
permit disclosure of income tax
information to property tax assessors
"as may be necessary in the proper
performance of [their] duties."217 In
1923, the nondisclosure provisions
were repealed,218 partially in
response to concerns that
corporations were using the secrecy
provisions as a shield for tax
evasion.219 From 1923 until 1953,
the actual Wisconsin income tax
return was public information,220
despite strong opposition from
business organizations 221 and
attempts by the Legislature to restore
the secrecy provisions.222 In 1953,
anti-disclosure advocates succeeded
in amending the law to deny public
access to the actual tax returns but to
permit disclosure only of net taxes
paid.223
In Wisconsin, the public has
access to the amount of income tax
paid by both individuals and
corporations.
The State's
Department of Revenue must furnish
to any Wisconsin resident who
requests it the net income tax,

franchise tax, or gift tax reported in
any year by any individual or
The following
corporation.224
conditions must be satisfied:
(1)

individuals seeking the
i n fo r ma t i o n must b e
Wisconsin residents;225

(2)

persons must pay a fee of $4
per return from which
information is sought;

(3)

persons must prove their
identity and sign a statement
disclosing their addresses
and reasons for making the
request.226 This information
is sent to the individual or
corporation whose tax
information is being
requested.227

The Wisconsin Action Coalition
(WAC) used this provision of
Wisconsin law to compile a list of
major corporations doing business in
Wisconsin that had not paid state
income taxes. WAC's work played a
major role in the passage by the
Legislature, on two different
occasions, of legislation establishing
to pass twice a new corporate
minimum income tax. In both cases,
the Governor successfully vetoed the
proposed tax.228
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Wisconsin's Department of
Revenue must furnish to any
state resident who requests it the
net income tax, franchise tax, or
gift tax reported in any year by
any individual or corporation.

E. Lessons to Date

The Massachusetts law has the
potential for being catalytic
because of the intense scrutiny
now being given to the issue by
all sides in Massachusetts. Its
future, however, is problematic
due to the vitriolic opposition of
elements of the business
community, the recent
recommendation of the Special
Commission on Business Policy
and the vote of the
Massachusetts Senate.

What lessons can be drawn from
the experience to date in other states?
As the efforts of Citizens for Tax
Justice (CTJ) have demonstrated,
federal tax information in the public
domain can be used constructively to
focus attention on the esoteric and
sometimes intimidating world of
corporate taxation.
What little
experience exists at the state level is
consistent with CTJ's federal success.
In Wisconsin, for example, the
Wisconsin Action Coalition was able
to use publicly-available state data to
generate an informed discussion of
the need for a corporate minimum
tax. The result of this discussion, to
date, has been the passage by the
Wisconsin Legislature, on two
occasions, of bills establishing a
corporate minimum tax and the veto
of both bills by Governor Tommy
Thompson.
The laws in Arkansas (1991),
West Virginia (1991), and
Massachusetts (1992) are so newly
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enacted that no information is yet
available on their use or impact. The
first disclosures under the
Massachusetts and West Virginia
legislation are scheduled for
December 1993. The Arkansas
disclosure requirements were not
motivated by tax reform
considerations; whether it will be
used for this purpose may depend on
the newspapers and other media that
advocated for that state's law. The
West Virginia legislation, which
deals only with credits, suffers
because the categories for presenting
the data are not detailed enough to be
very useful.229 The Massachusetts
law has the potential for being
catalytic because of the intense
scrutiny now being given to the issue
by all sides in Massachusetts. Its
future, however, is problematic due
to the vitriolic opposition of elements
of the business community, the
recent recommendation of the
Special Commission on Business
Policy and the vote of the
Massachusetts Senate.230

IV. Evaluating the Case for State-Level Tax Disclosure by
Publicly-Traded Corporations
This Section evaluates the
arguments on behalf of state-level
disclosure. The arguments assume
that disclosure would apply to
publicly-traded corporations, 231
which are already subject to the
extensive disclosure requirements of
the SEC. These corporations not
only reveal extensive financial data
about their activities, but they also
disclose the amount of their federal
income taxes and the aggregate
amount of their state income taxes.232
State-level disclosure would require
that these corporations disaggregate
information that they already make
public, albeit in aggregate form.
This Section also considers the
arguments against disclosure and
concludes that the arguments in favor
easily outweigh the arguments
against.
Accordingly, the next
Section discusses some of the policy
and technical issues that need to be
resolved in formulating a state-level
disclosure law.
A. Firm-Specific Disclosure is
Necessary for Informed Tax
Policy
Residents, businesses, and public
officials in every state have an
obvious interest in the workings of
their states' corporate income tax
laws.
If for no other reason,
significant sums of money are
involved -- both in the amount of
corporate taxes collected and in the
amount forgiven through tax
expenditures.233
On a more fundamental level, the
issue of how a state taxes, or exempts
from tax, corporate activity raises
fundamental value judgments about

how the costs of
government should be distributed.
Both large-scale corporate tax
avoidance and inefficient tax
expenditures mean that a state must
have a higher than necessary
corporate tax rate, rely more heavily
on other taxes--with different
incidence patterns, or reduce
spending for important capital or
operating purposes.
In addition to the question of how
taxes are distributed between
corporations and individuals, another
significant issue is how the corporate
tax burden is distributed among
corporations in the same industry and
among different industries. At the
federal level, at least prior to the
1986 tax reforms, corporate tax
incentives were shown to benefit
some industries and firms
disproportionately.234
The federal corporate income tax
was characterized by striking interand intra-industry disparities in
effective corporate tax rates. Similar
state tax differentials undoubtedly
exist. In many states,

Residents, businesses, and
public officials in every state
have an obvious interest in the
workings of their states'
corporate income tax law. If for
no other reason, significant
sums of money are involved-both in the amount of corporate
taxes collected and in the
amount forgiven through tax
expenditures.
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The federal corporate income
tax was characterized by striking
inter- and intra-industry
disparities in effective corporate
tax rates. Similar state tax
differentials undoubtedly exist.

Disclosure allows the public to
evaluate more effectively
corporate claims that they are
straining under an excessive tax
burden.

the corporate tax is replete with
provisions that distinguish between
small and large corporations, in-state
corporations and out-of-state
corporations, capital-intensive
corporations and labor-intensive
corporations, and corporations that
sell out-of-state and those that sell
within the state.235 The level playing
field that was a goal of the 1986
federal tax reforms is still a fantasy
in most states.
Tax credits and other incentives
or subsidies represent another feature
of the corporate income tax that is of
major concern. To evaluate whether
tax incentives serve their ostensible
purposes, researchers must know, at
the very least, which corporations
received what types of incentives and
in what amounts. Only then can it be
determined whether the benefits to
society of these incentives justify the
forgone revenue, and whether such
incentives need to be enhanced,
reduced, or redirected.
Firm-specific data facilitate
consideration of a full range of issues
surrounding corporate tax policies.
Disclosure facilitates informed and
critical evaluation of the distribution
of tax burdens among corporations
and of corporate requests for tax
relief--requests that may be
underscored
by express or implied threats to
abandon a state for a more favorable
tax climate. Disclosure allows the
public to evaluate more effectively
corporate claims that they are
straining under an excessive tax
burden. And, disclosure would
discourage corporations from
misleading legislators and the media
by taking public positions that are
inconsistent with the facts.
Without firm-specific data, it is
not possible to do the type of
analysis, known as microsimulation,
which provides the most accurate
picture of the impact of tax policy
changes. Only with microsimulation
is it possible to consider the
interrelationship of different
provisions of the tax code. The use
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of aggregate data can result in
significant over or underestimates of
the impact of policy changes,
particularly when more than one
change is being made, which is
usually the case when tax laws are
being revised.
Microsimulation
is
an
increasingly important tool within
sophisticated governmental tax
policy units and a growing number
of consulting firms are developing
microsimulation models of particular
state taxes. State agencies and other
interested parties realize that such
models are important if they are to
participate in tax policymaking in an
informed manner.
Microsimulations evaluate the
impact of particular changes in the
tax law on both the yield of the tax
involved and on the distribution of
the burden among taxpayers. For
example, a corporate income tax
micro-simulation model would allow
the user to determine how much of a
reduction in the rate of a particular
tax could be financed by eliminating
a particular credit without reducing
the overall yield of the tax. A
microsimulation model can also
determine how such
a revenue-neutral change would
redistribute the burden of the tax
involved among industries or among
firms in different size categories;
how many firms are likely to pay
more and how many are likely to pay
less; and, the number of such
increases and decreases that are
likely to result in particular size
categories.
A microsimulation model for a
particular tax involves the interaction
of two key components, both of
which must be carefully developed
and maintained. The first component
is a computer model or simulation of
the tax. Similar to the PC software
that is now widely available for the
computation of the federal personal
income tax, this component involves
programming the model to compute
the tax liability of a particular firm or
individual. This programming must

account for all the various options
and elections the law allows and be
intricate enough to capture all the
nuances and subtleties that are
characteristic of tax planning. The
difference between this component
of a microsimulation model and the
software sold for tax preparation
purposes is that the former must be
designed to provide the user with the
ability to modify different aspects of
the rules (e.g., changes in the
apportionment factor, changes in the
rules for combined reporting, altering
the availability, size, or nature of
various deductions, exemptions, or
credits) in order to determine the
impact of policy options on the tax
liability of a taxpayer with a
particular mix of income, deductions,
filing status, etc.
The second component is a data
base consisting of either the universe
of the taxpayers subject to the tax or
a stratified sample of actual
taxpayers. In the case of
microsimulation models for the
personal income tax, the typical data
base is drawn from a statistically
valid sample of tax returns, with the
identities of the taxpayers protected
for privacy reasons, and with
weightings attached to each file
based on the total number of
taxpayers for whom this sample file
is representative.
Some state
personal income tax simulation
models use samples drawn from state
tax returns, while others use a sample
of the federal tax returns filed by
residents of the state involved.
For the corporate income tax, no
comparable data base is readily
available. Because of the relatively
small number of corporate income
taxpayers compared to personal
income taxpayers, and the relatively
small number of firms that represent
the bulk of a state's corporate tax
revenues, it is not possible to take a
sample of returns that is statistically
valid without running the risk of
revealing the identity of individual
firms. Consequently, the data
necessary for a corporate

microsimulation model are not
available, under current law, to
parties outside state revenue
departments.
This significantly
limits the ability of other interested
organizations to participate in
debates over corporate tax policy in
the most informed manner possible.
Only with firm-specific corporate tax
disclosure can this important tool be
used most effectively to enhance

35

Consequently, the data
necessary for a corporate
microsimulation model is not
available, under current law, to
parties outside state revenue
departments. Only with firmspecific corporate tax disclosure,
can this important tool be used
most effectively to enhance
openness and democracy in the
tax legislative process.

There are other areas where
firm-specific data is needed
rather than aggregate data. For
example, it is virtually
impossible based only on
statistical aggregates to evaluate
the claims of various
corporations for tax relief or to
verify other tax-related
information that corporations
might provide in their lobbying
efforts.

If, for example, a few of the
largest, most profitable
corporations in a state pay no
(or only a minimum) income
tax, such information is highly
relevant from a policy
perspective but might be lost if
buried in an aggregate.

openness and accountability in the
tax legislative process.
An additional constraint exists in
developing a valid data base for state
corporate microsimulation models.
While a state personal income tax
microsimulation model can be
constructed with a sample of federal
tax returns filed by residents of the
state involved, this would not be
possible with regard to the corporate
income tax.
Unlike a state corporate income
tax, states tax their residents on their
worldwide income. A state sample
built on federal returns can be
derived for the personal income tax
because individuals who file federal
returns are considered to be residing
in the states indicated in their mailing
addresses. Their worldwide income
can be determined from their federal
income (although some adjustments
are typically necessary.) By contrast,
states tax corporations on an
apportioned share of their income.
Where a corporation is resident (i.e.,
incorporated) is much less important
than in the case of individuals.
Moreover, the amount of income that
a corporation reports to a state
cannot be determined from the
federal return. 2 3 6 State-level
corporate disclosure, such as that
enacted last year in Massachusetts,
would allow for the development of
an effective corporate
microsimulation model at the statelevel.
In addition to facilitating the use
of micro-simulation, there are other
areas where firm-specific data are
needed. For example, it is virtually
impossible based only on statistical
aggregates to evaluate the claims of
various corporations for tax relief or
to verify other tax-related
information that corporations might
provide in their lobbying efforts.
Moreover, it is difficult to evaluate
the worth of various tax incentives
without knowing the identity of the
beneficiaries. Indeed, the only way
to do a meaningful cost-benefit
analysis of a provision like the
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investment tax credit is to identify
the major beneficiaries and do
longitudinal studies using other
sources of data, such as employment
and investment data.
Disclosure eliminates one of the
subtle, but serious defects with the
use of aggregate data. All too often,
what is of interest to researchers are
the "outliers." For example, a 1982
study of the New York investment
and employment tax credits indicated
that two corporations received nearly
forty percent of all of the credits
allowed--$56.8 million.237 Yet, on an
aggregate basis, the average credit
claimed was $16,423 and half of the
claimants received credits of less
than $1,172. Clearly, statistical
aggregates can simply hide much of
value in evaluating a state tax
system. If, for example, a few of the
largest, most profitable corporations
in a state pay no (or only a
minimum) income tax, such
information is highly relevant from a
policy perspective but might be lost
if buried in an aggregate.238
Moreover, firm-specific
information on gross receipts, gross
sales, or gross profits is essential in
attempting to pinpoint the use of
transfer pricing to minimize tax
liabilities. For example, an analysis
of similar firms in the same industry
might reveal differing ratios of taxto-gross receipts. Knowing the
identity of the corporations involved
can help identify which ones are part
of multicorporate families that might
be reducing their state taxes through
intercorporate transfers.
A
correlation between low ratios of taxto-gross receipts and transactions
among related corporations merits
further attention as a possible
situation involving transfer pricing
abuse.239
In addition, publishing statistical
data without identifying the
taxpayers involved inevitably limits
its use by researchers. Statistical
information can be presented in
various ways. For example, income
taxes paid by a corporation can be

compared with its receipts, property,
number of employees, amount of
assets, type of business, and so forth.
The value of the data is obviously
constrained by the way it is
presented. What might be a valuable
presentation for some policymakers
and researchers would be irrelevant
for others. By contrast, if the data
are presented with the name of the
corresponding co rp o r ations,
researchers can correlate the tax
information with any other publicly
available data which they wish to
utilize. Researchers can pursue
whatever issues are most relevant-then, or at any time in the future.
Without knowing the name of the
corporations, researchers would not
be able to use the information

disclosed in conjunction with the
information in Form 10-K's, annual
reports, and other data bases.
Finally, many states today
routinely publish aggregate data on
corporate taxes. But the fear of
violating existing laws on the privacy
of tax returns constrains the
publication of statistical data.
Situations commonly exist in which
knowing certain limited information
about an unnamed corporation, such
as its size and the nature of it primary
business activities, allows an
informed judgment to be made about
its identity. Consequently, in order
to avoid publishing statistical
information in a manner that
facilitates identifying particular
corporations, a common practice is to
sanitize the data by intentionally
aggregating it and presenting it as
part of a larger group or class.
Obviously, the need to present data
in a manner that protects the identity
of a taxpayer reduces the value of the
information that can be made public.
Moreover, those situations in which
the data need to be sanitized are
probably those situations in which
the public interest is greatest because
they involve major taxpayers.
As the above demonstrates, the
practice of using statistical
aggregates is no substitute for data
on a corporation-by-corporation
Nonetheless, the
basis. 2 4 0
Massachusetts Special Commission
suggested that firm-specific data
could be released on an anonymous
or coded basis. This suggestion is
evaluated below.241
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Publishing statistical data
without identifying the
taxpayers involved inevitably
limits its use by researchers.

Public understanding of
seemingly complex economic
issues has been essential to the
development and
implementation of the many
important economic reforms
instituted at the state and
national levels during the
twentieth century.

To be sure, government officials
can not justify far reaching
changes on the basis of
anecdotal information. At the
same time, however, they are
unlikely to be able to enact
legislation, even if based on
sound theoretical and empirical
reasoning, if they are unable to
explain the need for such laws
to the ordinary citizen; nor, in
our form of democracy, should
they be able to do so.

The impact that CTJ had on
federal tax reform provides a
dramatic example of the
effectiveness of using "warm
bodies" rather than impersonal
data. After all, there was no
shortage of statistics before
CTJ's work, but the arid raw
data alone was not enough to
galvanize the public into
supporting sweeping reform.

B. Firm-Specific Disclosure is
Essential to Public
Understanding of Corporate
Tax Issues

Public understanding of
seemingly complex economic issues
has been essential to the
development and implementation of
the many important reforms
instituted at the state and national
levels during the twentieth century.
Public awareness, understanding, and
pressure laid the groundwork for
food and drug laws, securities laws,
antitrust laws, wage and hour laws,
statutes regulating the rates of
railroads, public utilities, and other
firms with monopoly power. Public
opinion was critical in supporting the
corporate tax changes in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. In our system
of democratic capitalism with its
extensive system of checks and
balances, significant economic
reforms usually require the force of
public opinion. Obviously, public
opinion is not sufficient in and of
itself for the enactment of major
reforms, but it is clearly a necessary
condition.
Economists, lawyers, and other
" e x p e r ts" ca n d e v e l o p a n
understanding of complex issues in
the abstract, based on either
theoretical or empirical reasoning.
But for the non-specialist, the
intelligent layperson who is not
devoting his or her working life to
mastering a particular issue or
problem, real-life examples help
develop the necessary understanding.
To be sure, government officials can
not justify far reaching changes on
the basis of anecdotal information.
At the same time, however, they are
unlikely to be able to enact
legislation, even if based on sound
theoretical and empirical reasoning,
if they are unable to explain the need
for such laws to the ordinary citizen;
nor, in our form of democracy,
should they be able to do so.
As the federal experience in 1986
powerfully demonstrates, without
disclosure the public will remain
strangers to the world of corporate
tax reform. Aggregate data or even
firm-specific but anonymous data242
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are no substitute for disclosure.
It is a basic truth that in order to
spark interest in an issue it must be
made real and human. A cold
statistic is just that--cold. Eyes glaze
and interest wanes. Policymakers
and other concerned citizens cannot
have a dialogue with a statistic. The
impact that CTJ had on federal tax
reform provides a dramatic example
of the effectiveness of using "warm
bodies" rather than impersonal data.
After all, there was no shortage of
statistics before CTJ's work, but the
arid raw data alone were not enough
to galvanize the public into
supporting sweeping reform.
Opponents of disclosure contend
that the general public is generally
unsophisticated about tax matters and
would be unable to understand the
significance and implications of
c o r p o r a t e t a x i n f o r ma t i o n .
According to opponents, only tax
experts can understand the
multifarious and complex factors that
interact to generate a corporation's
tax liability. The public will merely
be confused, or unreasonably
angered, by learning of nominal
corporate tax liabilities. The public
lacks the astuteness and
sophistication to appreciate why a
corporation's liabilities are only
nominal.243 Of course, the fact that
the public is relatively uninformed
about state corporate taxes is an
argument in favor of--not against-disclosure.
Taken seriously, the "public will
misunderstand" argument would
emasculate much of the SEC
disclosure requirements as well as
similar provisions in other
legislation.244 The lay public may
not be able to read a balance sheet,
but it can understand those who are
able to translate the impenetrable
world of financial accounting into
understandable language. The public
may not have comprehended the
intricacies of tax shelters, accelerated
depreciation, or investment tax
credits, but it understood the need to

reform the federal tax system in
1986.
This "ignorant public" argument
ultimately challenges the premises
underlying a democratic society. A
well-functioning democracy requires
an informed public. If corporations
feel that the disclosed information is
likely to be misinterpreted, they can
educate the public by providing more
information and a fuller
explanation.245 If the media report a
large, profitable corporation with a
seemingly low tax liability, that
taxpayer can use its public relations
resources to explain, for example,
how the existence of loss carryovers
or tax credits helped lower its tax
liability.246 This dialectical process
is one that routinely occurs in
contemporary society, exemplified
by corporations that buy advertising
space in newspapers and magazines
regarding tort or health care reform,
plant closings, labor disputes, or
alleged malfeasance by corporate
officers. This process plays a critical
role in a healthy democracy.247
Perhaps the real fear is not that the
public will misunderstand but that it
will understand too well. As the
Staff of the Massachusetts Special
Commission on Business Tax Policy
observed, "[D]isclosure of tax
information on specific companies
has proven to be an effective means
of crystallizing support for tax
reform."248

for poor policies and political ills.
"Information is the currency of the
`marketplace of ideas,' the
prerequisite for political selfdetermination, and a security against
usurpation by secret cabals."251
"Secrecy interferes with rational
decision-making, accountability, and
the choice of

Of course, the fact that the
public is relatively uninformed
about state corporate taxes is an
argument in favor of--not
against--disclosure.

This "ignorant public"
argument ultimately challenges
the premises underlying a
democratic society. As
mentioned above, a wellfunctioning democracy requires
an informed public. If
corporations feel that the
disclosed information is likely to
be misinterpreted, they can
educate the public by providing
more information and a fuller
explanation.

State disclosure is just another
reminder that as Justice
Brandeis observed, "sunlight is
the best of disinfectants."

C. Sunlight is the Best
Disinfectant: Disclosure
Would Promote Openness
and Accountability
State disclosure is just another
reminder that as Justice Brandeis
observed, "sunlight is the best of
disinfectants."249 Not surprisingly,
the principal architects of the early
securities acts were disciples of
Justice Brandeis. 2 5 0
Good
government requires openness; the
free flow of information is a remedy
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Openess and accountability
make it less likely that tax laws
will be made behind closed
doors, where special interests
are more likely to prevail over
the public's interest.

"Sunlight" in regard to state
corporate income tax data will
help to restore confidence in
both the business community
and the tax system. If disclosure
shows that the current tax
system is working, it will help to
convince the public that large
businesses are indeed paying
their fair share and that they are
good citizens. If, on the other
hand, disclosure helps to
identify shortcomings in the
current system, it will provide
the basis for necessary reforms
which will help restore public
confidence in the corporate
sector and the tax system.

(government) goals."252 Openness
and accountability make it less likely
that tax laws will be made behind
closed doors, where special interests
are more likely to prevail over the
public's interest.
The modern trend in the United
States, inspired in part by the SEC, is
for more--rather than less-disclosure.253 The SEC's disclosure
requirements have had a "profound
influence on post-World War II
legislation, including the 1957 Civil
Rights Act, the various air, water,
and toxic substances pollution
statutes, the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act,"254 the Freedom of
Information Act;255 the Truth in
Lending Act;256 the Interstate Land
Sales Full Disclosure Act;257 the
Consumer Credit Protection Act;258
the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act;259 the Fair Credit
Reporting Act;260 and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act
(Pension Reform Act).261 As these
various pieces of legislation
exemplify, our society has a clear
bias in favor of making as much
information available, not only so
that we may make informed
decisions, but also so that we may
have confidence in our institutions.
We should esteem disclosure for the
same reason we should esteem
`sunlight'-- because it illuminates.262
"Sunlight" in regard to state
corporate income tax data will help
to restore confidence in both the
business community and the tax
system. If disclosure shows that
large businesses are indeed paying
their fair share, it will help to
convince the public that the current
tax system is working. If, on the
other hand, disclosure helps to
identify shortcomings in the current
system, it will provide the basis for
necessary reforms which will help
restore public confidence in the
corporate sector and the tax system.
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D. State-Level Disclosure Will
Complement SEC-Mandated
Disclosure
Compared with the extensive
information already in the public
domain because of SEC
requirements, state disclosure
appears modest and mundane.
Primarily because of the SEC, the
public has been given a picture
window into the financial affairs,
including the income tax data of
publicly-traded corporations. State
disclosure would open that window a
crack more.
Moreover, state-level disclosure
would improve the utility of the
SEC-required information to many
users of financial statements.
Among the primary users of the tax
information in SEC-mandated
financial statements are securities
analysts and other financial analysts
who evaluate the financial
performance of publicly-traded
corporations. Many occasions exist
when an analyst must remove an
unusual and non-recurring income or
expense from an income statement in
order to evaluate the on-going
performance of the corporation
involved; for example, in attempting
to assess the quality

of a firm's earnings and the trends in
its income and expenses that are
likely to continue. "When a nonrecurring item needs to be removed
from the income statement, the tax
results of that item also need to be
removed."263 A failure to take the tax
consequences of such an item into
consideration will distort the analysis
of income by the use of an improper
tax rate and will also result in an
inconsistent presentation of the
balance sheet. Although the SECrequired disclosure is sufficient to
adjust for the federal consequences
of the item involved, it will in many
cases not be sufficient to make the
necessary change in the state tax
results of the item.
The SEC-disclosed federal tax
information is also used by analysts
to determine how well or poorly the
company's management handles tax
planning and implementation.264
This aspect of the analyst's work
could also be enhanced by the
availability of state-specific data.
Some critics of state-level
disclosure have argued that the
availability of information on a firm's
state tax liability might somehow
disclose proprietary information.265
If this were true, then the current
SEC requirement for disclosure of
the aggregate amount of state income
taxes would have more of a negative
impact on those corporations paying
state income taxes to only one (or a
few) states than on those operating
nationwide or internationally. State
disclosure would then level the
playing field among these publiclytraded corporations.
State disclosure would level the
playing field in yet a different
manner.
According to some
commentators, the public knows a
great deal about small and medium
corporations because they are more
specialized than larger corporations.
For the smaller, more specialized
corporations, the annual report and
Form 10-K provide real insight into
their line of business. "But not so
with a large conglomerate
corporation whose annual report

masks more than it reveals. Not
surprisingly, therefore, it is the large
corporation that invariably resists
steps to strengthen disclosure
requirements--steps that in practice
would, at most, place it on a par with
smaller corporations."266
E. Why Not Disclose FirmSpecific Data Anonymously?
The Massachusetts Special
Commission on Business Tax Policy
recommended that their state's
current law be amended to provide
that the required data be released on
a corporation-by-corporation basis
but without identifying the name of
the corporation.267 For example,
information on each corporation
would be available but a corporation
might be identified only by a number
that would not reveal its identity.
State-level disclosure would
improve the utility of the SECmandated information to many
users of financial statements.

Although this approach would
allow outliers to be identified rather
than being buried in a statistical
aggregate, the other inherent defects
of using aggregates would remain.
For example, the enhancement of
public and legislative understanding
would be as difficult to achieve with
anonymous corporation-by-corpora-
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Although the SEC-required
disclosure is sufficient for a
securities analyst to adjust for
the federal tax consequence of
unusual and non-recurring
items of income and expense, it
will in many cases not be
sufficient to make the necessary
change in the state tax results of
the item.

The enhancement of public and
legislative understanding would
be as difficult to achieve with
anonymous corporation-bycorporation data as it has
proven to be when only
aggregates are available. In
addition, researchers would be
limited to only what was
published and would have no
way of tapping alternative
sources of data. The crosstabulation of disclosed and nondisclosed data would be
impossible.

None of the goals of accountability, openness in government,
and the involvement of the
public in issues of tax reform
are likely to be achieved with
anonymous disclosure.

tion data as it has proven to be when
only aggregates are available. In
addition, researchers would be
limited to only what was published
and would have no way of tapping
other sources of data. The crosstabulation of the disclosed tax data
with other publicly-available
information would be impossible.
Longitudinal studies would be
difficult, as would studies about the
effectiveness of tax incentives.268
Corporations would still be able to
take public positions that would be
inconsistent with the facts. None of
the goals of accountability, openness
in government, and the involvement
of the public in issues of tax reform
are likely to be achieved with
anonymous disclosure. After all,
information that Corporation #123
has paid the minimum tax despite
over $100 million of profits will be
unlikely to have any lasting effect on
tax reform. By comparison,
disclosure, by name of corporation,
has proven to be an effective means
of increasing public understanding of
tax reform issues.269
Anonymous disclosure will be
particularly problematical in states in
which the disclosure system is being
administered by an agency other than
the state tax department.
In
Massachusetts, the administering
official (the Secretary of State) has
no basis on which to evaluate the
accuracy of the information
submitted. With anonymous
disclosure, this problem is
compounded because the information
submitted by a firm does not have to
stand the test of public scrutiny by
those who would have a basis for
evaluating its accuracy in terms of
general orders of magnitude. This
might include securities analysts,
other researchers and tax reform
groups.
The disclosure of
firm-specific data without corporate
names would make it impossible to
do interindustry or intraindustry
comparisons. It would also make it
impossible to match the disclosed
tax information with other publicly
available data on employment,
investment, and other relevant
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factors. And, if the same code
number was not assigned to a firm
every year, it would not be possible
to do even limited longitudinal
analyses.
Finally, anonymous disclosure
will inevitably lead to public
speculation about which corporations
are involved.270 Because the benefits
of anonymous disclosure are
insignificant, a state might as well
dash public speculation by
identifying the corporations by name.
Indeed, if disclosure provides
valuable information to competitors
as opponents have argued,271 these
competitors can be expected to try to
match the information released with
public information from Form 10-K
and other sources. Those willing to
go to this trouble will presumably be
able to break through the anonymity.
Consequently, anonymous disclosure
does not protect against any
competitive disadvantages but only
against public attention and scrutiny.
The above discussion, combined
with the favorable experience at the
national and to a more limited extent
at the state levels, establish a
presumptive case in favor of
disclosure. Unless compelling
reasons exist, state tax data should
not be immunized from public
scrutiny. The remainder of this
Section272 examines such reasons.
F. Will Disclosure Violate a
Corporation's Right to
Privacy?
The extent of SEC-required
disclosure of information by
publicly-traded corporations makes it
obvious that such corporations have
long ago surrendered any claim that
their financial data should be
protected under some right of
privacy. If the disclosure of their
federal income tax liabilities and
other financial information does not
raise a constitutional issue, then
neither should the disclosure of their
state tax information. As early as
1911, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld a federal law that provided
for the public inspection of corporate

tax returns against attacks that it was
unconstitutional.273 The modern day
embodiment of this argument is that
disclosure will reveal proprietary
information.274
To be sure, in certain situations
the business affairs of a corporation
may be closely identified with that of
the shareholders. Revealing the
taxes paid by a small, mom and pop,
closely-held corporation might be
viewed as violating legitimate
expectations of privacy by its
shareholders.
However, such
corporations would be exempted
from disclosure requirements limited
to publicly-traded firms.275
G. Will Disclosure Reveal
Proprietary Information?
A corporation can assert a
legitimate interest in protecting the
confidentiality of proprietary
information.
Opponents of
disclosure assert that revealing the
amount of a corporation's state tax
data would reveal proprietary
These kinds of
information.276
arguments have long marked debates
over the disclosure of any kind of
financial information.
"The
reluctance of many business
corporations in the pre-1933 period
to disclose what today is considered
essential balance sheet and income
statement data and the more recent
reluctance of many firms to disclose
(or effectively disclose) line-ofbusiness data or earnings projections
often has been explained by business
representatives as fear of revealing
useful data to competitors."277
Typically, these arguments are based
more on fear than on reality. To
illustrate, consider the following
argument used by A.H. Belo Corp.
(owner of the Dallas Morning News)
against a minority shareholder
proposal that it become a publiclylisted company:

be available to its main competitor,
the Dallas Times Herald, which is
owned by Times Mirror Co., Los
Angeles.
Belo maintains that
because it is significantly smaller
than Times Mirror, financial
disclosures required by the SEC
would reveal too much of its inner
workings.
Times Mirror owns
several major papers and can group
its newspaper financial data for
reporting purposes. By contrast, the
Dallas Morning News is the only
major newspaper property of Belo.278

The extent of SEC-required
disclosure of information by
publicly-traded corporations
makes it obvious that such
corporations have long ago
surrendered any claim that their
financial data should be
protected under some right of
privacy.

The company maintains that
publishing information required of
public companies by the SEC would
put it at a severe competitive
disadvantage, since the data would
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Opponents argued that the
disclosure of tax information
would be valuable to competitors
since it would reveal tax
strategy, but no examples were
provided and the SEC concluded
that the needs of present and
potential investors in public
corporations are best served by
providing such disclosure.

The opponents of disclosure
have never been able to
articulate how knowing the
amount of tax that a competitor
paid reveals anything of
competitive value. For
information to be valuable, a
business needs to know
yesterday what a competitor is
going to do tomorrow.
Yesterday's information
obtained tomorrow is worthless.

For information to be valuable,
a business needs to know
yesterday what a competitor is
going to do tomorrow.
Yesterday's information
obtained tomorrow is worthless.

In responding to the company's
argument, one commentator notes
that "on at least the revenue side,
competing sources already provide
considerable information about the
Dallas Morning News. This paper is
a member of the Audit Bureau of
Circulation which publishes very
detailed unit circulation figures on
the Dallas Morning News every six
months.
"The advertising rates of the paper
are readily available to an external
party in a booklet titled Retail
Advertising Rates.
The list of
advertising clients of the paper is
available for 15¢ a day (50¢ on
Sunday). These competing sources
of information are considerably more
detailed and cover more facets than
does the `sales' figure required in the
10K of a publicly listed company."279
The same competitive arguments
were made in 1973 against the SEC's
successful proposal to require more
extensive reporting of federal income
tax data.280 Opponents argued that
the disclosure of tax information
would be valuable to competitors
since it would reveal tax strategy,281
but no examples were provided and
the SEC concluded that the needs of
present and potential investors in
public corporations are best served
by providing such significant
information even though there may
be an increased risk of adverse
consequences at the hands of
SEC and other
competitors.282
federal laws already require many
corporations to disclose extensive tax
and financial information, and
apparently such disclosures have not
jeopardized the economic interests of
the corporations.
When pressed, those who argue
that disclosure will reveal proprietary
information have never been able to
provide a detailed illustration.283 The
opponents of disclosure have never
been able to articulate how knowing
the amount of tax that a competitor
paid reveals anything of competitive
value.
Moreover, even if this
information were relevant in the
abstract, it is unlikely to be available
in a timely-enough fashion to be very
useful.
For information to be
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valuable, a business needs to know
yesterday what a competitor is going
to do tomorrow. By the time a
corporation requests the normal
extensions and files its return--a
precondition to the public's gaining
access to whatever tax information is
subject to disclosure--the information
will be stale (or could be aged to
ensure that it was stale). Yesterday's
information obtained tomorrow is
worthless. For a businessperson to
learn two years after the fact that a
competitor paid $X in state taxes or
claimed $Y in state credits pales by
comparison with what can learned by
reading the trade press, schmoozing
at trade shows and conventions,
searching computer data bases, or
hanging out at the local bars that dot
large plants--all traditional ways of
obtaining current information about
competitors.
In investigating the degree to
which information divulged under
Massachusetts law might be useful to
competitors, the staff of the
Massachusetts Special Commission
on Business Tax Policy interviewed
twelve industry analysts who
specialized in different industries
including banking, life insurance,
biotechnology, electronic
components, retailing, and computer
services. Of the twelve, eight stated
that Massachusetts law would reveal
little information of value to
competitors for the following
reasons: 1) comparable
information is available from other
reports, such as annual financial
reports and reports compiled by
consulting firms and underwriters; 2)
the information would not be
disaggregated enough to be of much
value, even if reported on a
subsidiary-by-subsidiary basis;284 3)
tax accounting principles differ so
much from financial accounting
principles (especially in the case of
banks), that tax information provides
very little insight into the financial
condition and operational
characteristics of a company; 4) the
information would be disclosed with
a long lag; 5) companies have the
option of disclosing either gross
profit or tax credit carryovers under

Massachusetts law.
One analyst suggested that
disclosure might provide insight into
product trends and profitability
which, over time, might allow
competitors to determine business
strategies. How a competitor might
determine business strategies from
the disclosed tax information was
never explained. It was also alleged
that corporate raiders could use the
information to help them select
targets for hostile takeovers,285 which
seems somewhat fanciful because of
the time lags involved. Takeover
targets are most likely to be selected
based on the best and most current
information available about a firm's
national (and international) financial
condition. Massachusetts tax
information, disclosed two or more
years after the fact, could hardly add
much of relevance. The analyst
stated that the resulting anticompetitive damage would be most
severe in industries where the pace
of innovation is slow but price
competition is intense, such as
retailing.
But another analyst,
specializing in retailing, felt that the
data divulged in tax disclosure
reports would reveal nothing that
rivals do not already know from
other sources.
Yet another analyst agreed that
disclosure would be especially
harmful to retailers because it would
provide insights into the profitability
of Massachusetts retail markets with
respect to those of other states. Also,
by analyzing the tax data of specific
stores, in conjunction with other
publicly available data, competitors
would gain insights into which
products in Massachusetts stores are
most profitable.286 Out-of-state rivals
could use the data to decide whether
to expand stores and which products
it should market aggressively within
that state.
Left unexplained, once again, was
how tax data would help identify
which products were most profitable.
A retailer, such as a department
store, might sell thousands of
different products.
And, even
assuming that the pace of innovation
is slow in retailing, certainly fads

exist and this year's hot seller may
well be next year's dog. The time lag
inevitable under any disclosure law
would seem to limit the usefulness of
any information released for such
purposes. It is unclear how a
competitor would be helped by
learning about which products were
relatively more profitable two or so
years ago. Finally, in areas of
In investigating the degree to
which information divulged
under Massachusetts law might
be useful to competitors, the
staff of the Massachusetts
Special Commission on
Business Tax Policy interviewed
twelve industry analysts who
specialized in different
industries including banking,
life insurance, biotechnology,
electronic components, retailing,
and computer services. Of the
twelve, eight stated that
Massachusetts law would reveal
little information of value to
competitors.

retailing, such as apparel, where
orders are typically placed months in
advance of sale, it is not even clear
how a competitor might

It was also alleged that
corporate raiders could use the
information to help them select
targets for hostile takeovers,
which seems somewhat fanciful
because of the time lags
involved. Massachusetts tax
information, disclosed two or
more years after the fact, could
hardly be add much of
relevance.
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To the extent that disclosure
leads to more competition, it is
consistent with a market
economy. "Contrary to the
assertions of many corporate
spokesmen, corporate secrecy-not corporate disclosure--is the
great enemy of a market
economy in a free society."

capitalize on information that was
current, rather than being at least one
year old.
An analyst specializing in life
insurance commented on the possible
competitive harm that tax disclosure
will inflict on automobile insurers.
In the view of this analyst, many
auto insurers believe that
Massachusetts is an unattractive
place to do business because of its
reputation for bad drivers. Recently,
however, automobile insurance has
been profitable. Yet, because the
perception that Massachusetts is a
poor market lingers, out-of-state
competitors stay away.
If believable, these comments
describe a rather unsophisticated
insurance industry -- one in which
automobile insurers have no more
refined information about the
Massachusetts market than its
reputation, whether deserved or not,
for having poor drivers. Presumably
the industry has better means than
hearsay of determining whether
automobile insurance is profitable in
Massachusetts.
But more fundamentally, suppose
the analyst is correct and because of
disclosure more insurance companies
started to write policies in
Massachusetts. Presumably, this
competition would be good for
policyholders, resulting in lower
premiums and greater choice of
options.
Indeed, one of the
characteristics of a market economy
is the general bias in favor of the free
flow of information. Unlike a patent
or a copyright, or some other form of
intellectual property, a company
should not be able to assert a
proprietary interest in whether
Massachusetts is a profitable place to
write car insurance. Similarly, to the
extent that disclosure would increase
competition in retailing, consumers
would ultimately benefit from the
lower prices. Moreover, increased
jobs might also be expected.287
Indeed, an accepted goal of
disclosure in other contexts is
increased competition. For example,
the Federal Trade Commission's
"Line of Business" (LOB)

46

disclosures instituted in 1974 had as
one of their beneficial effects the
"increased competition in product
markets; firms considering entry into
new markets would be better able to
discern existing `excess' profit
situations."288
To the extent that disclosure leads
to more competition, it is consistent
with a market economy. "Contrary
to the assertions of many corporate
spokesmen, corporate secrecy--not
corporate disclosure--is the great
enemy of a market economy in a free
society."289 A market economy relies
on the self-corrective mechanism of
the marketplace to keep competition
robust and monopoly in check. A
firm that holds a strong market
position resulting in higher than
ordinary profits induces the entry
into the field of new businesses.290
To the extent that disclosure
reinforces this mechanism, it
facilitates the dynamics of a market
economy. This philosophy is similar
to that underlying the SEC disclosure
rules: "The idea of a free and
open public market is built upon the
theory that competing judgments of
buyers or sellers as to the fair price
of the security brings about a
situation where the market price
reflects as nearly as possible a just
price....There cannot be honest
markets without honest publicity."291
Consequently, even assuming the
analyst is correct does not
necessarily tip the balance in favor of
nondisclosure.
Further evidence that the
competitive harm argument might be
exaggerated comes from Arkansas,
where businesses subject to
disclosure can apply for an
exemption on the grounds that the
release of the requested information
would result in competitive harm.
Apparently, very few businesses
have ever requested such an
exemption,292 although the seven day
period may be short enough to
discourage such requests. To be
sure, the Arkansas procedure
provides a safety valve; the risk is
that in a state such as Massachusetts
where the business community has

aggressively fought against
disclosure, the safety valve will turn
into a dilatory tactic to undercut the
law.

H. Will Disclosure Discourage
the Filing of Accurate Tax
Returns?
The successful operation of the
U.S. income tax depends on the
voluntary cooperation of taxpayers.
A commonly stated rationale for
protecting the confidentiality of tax
information is to facilitate tax
enforcement by encouraging a
taxpayer to make full and truthful
declarations in its return, without
fear that those statements will be
revealed or used against it for other
purposes. The assumption is that
even limited access by government
agencies to information obtained
from tax returns will deter some
taxpayers from truthful reporting.
Secrecy is a necessary palliative to
taxpayers who might otherwise
falsify their tax returns if they knew
that non-tax officials would have
access to that information.
The "full and frank disclosure"
rationale presumes that secrecy helps
assure honesty and that publicity
discourages it.293 If this presumption
is correct, the SEC reporting
requirements must have led to less
honest tax returns--a position that
apparently has never been argued in
the literature--and one that seems far
fetched on its face. If corporations
were not induced to file false federal
returns by SEC disclosure, why
should it be assumed they will do so
in response to state disclosure?
Moreover, some researchers have
even cast doubt on the asserted
relationship between tax return
confidentiality and honest reporting
by examining a 1976 federal change,
in response to Watergate, which
dramatically increased the degree of
confidentiality accorded federal
income tax returns. Proponents of
the change had predicted that the
increased level of confidentiality
would encourage more honest
reporting but apparently voluntary

compliance actually decreased.294
Contrary to the thesis that secrecy
induces honest reporting, it could be
argued that if taxpayers are publicly
accountable for the information
furnished on their income tax
returns, their incentive to report
truthfully would be even greater.
Publicity would increase the
possibility that employees,
competitors, or other business
persons will notice glaring omissions
and bring it to the attention of the tax
authorities.
Public disclosure might actually
discourage corporations from
minimizing their tax liabilities
through tax avoidance techniques.
For public relations purposes,

The "full and frank
disclosure" rationale presumes
that secrecy helps assure
honesty and that publicity
discourages it. If this
presumption is correct, the SEC
reporting requirements must
have led to less honest tax
returns--a position that
apparently has never been
argued in the literature--and
one that seems far fetched on its
face.

If corporations were not induced
to file false federal returns by
SEC disclosure, why should it be
assumed they will do so in
response to state disclosure?
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Public disclosure might actually
discourage corporations from
minimizing their tax liabilities
through tax avoidance
techniques. For public relations
purposes, corporations required
to disclose tax information
might be leery of paying only
nominal amounts of tax.

corporations required to disclose tax
information might be leery of paying
only nominal amounts of tax. The
scrutiny of the public and the
possibility that increased publicity
would aid taxing authorities in
detecting illegitimate tax avoidance
or fraud could help safeguard the
integrity of the corporate income tax.
In reality, little is definitively
known about the effects of
confidentiality on taxpayer behavior
and whether, for this purpose, large
corporations should be distinguished
from small corporations and
individuals. Nor is tax disclosure
defended by its supporters as a way
of increasing taxpayer compliance.295
Tax withholding, information
returns, civil and criminal sanctions,
and information sharing with other
taxing authorities all help to insure
voluntary corporate compliance with
tax laws. The role played by the
confidentiality of returns is simply
unknown. Accordingly, both the
direction and magnitude of the
impact disclosure might have on
corporate reporting, especially if
only a limited range of information
will be published, is sheer
speculation.
I. Will Disclosure Undercut a
State's "Business Climate?"
Opponents of disclosure argue
that it would reflect or exacerbate an
anti-business climate in the state.
Disclosing corporate taxes would
antagonize the business community
and fuel the hostility of its enemies.
Opponents argue that it would
detract from the aura of goodwill that
creates a positive "business climate,"
and would provide one more weight
in the balance of factors that may
ultimately influence a corporation to
relocate its business to a friendlier
state.296
On a general level, this argument
proves too much. Any legislation
that the corporate community
opposes can be characterized as
poisoning the business climate.
Obviously, in considering any
legislative proposal, the intended
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benefits must be weighed against
possible deleterious effects.
On a more specific level,
evaluating this argument is difficult
because the factors that comprise a
state's "business climate" elude easy
analysis. Many considerations affect
a corporation's view of a state's
business climate, and the issues
important to one corporation may be
unimportant to another.
Factors that might contribute to a
specific corporation's perception
include the cost of energy, land,
labor, or transportation; zoning
regulations; restrictions on
construction; the attitude of those
public officials with whom a firm
most often deals; the speed with
which telephone calls are returned
from the public sector; the degree of
governmental regulations; the way
businesses are treated by a tax
department's auditors; the level of
civility that characterizes interaction
with government personnel; the
amount of red tape that exists; the
number of forms and permits
required; and the governmental
assistance provided to a new firm
and its employees in relocating.297
Perceptions of business climate are
also based on intangibles and
imponderables that defy easy
analysis or quantification (e.g.,
personal idiosyncracies of
executives). But unlike many of the
factors that affect the business
climate the disclosure of corporate
tax information would not affect the
cost of doing business or a
corporation's "bottom line."298
There are many provisions in a
tax code that are adopted to improve
the business climate. Some of these
provisions were even adopted at the
specific request of a corporation, in
an attempt by a legislature to induce
the corporation to invest in a state (or
to remain or expand its operations in
a state). It is disingenuous to use the
business climate argument in support
of the adoption of these provisions
and then use the same argument to
prevent the public from evaluating in
a meaningful way the effectiveness
of such provisions.
Even if disclosure were viewed as

undercutting the business climate, it
is not clear what defensive actions a
corporation would take. If disclosure
is limited to all publicly-traded
corporations that do business in the
state, there would be two ways of
avoiding this requirement. The first
is to cease doing business in the state
by removing all property and
personnel and basically conduct a
mail order business.299 The second is
to conduct business in a noncorporate form. Both would be
rather extreme reactions.300 If a
corporation felt so strongly about
avoiding state disclosure that it
would operate as a partnership,
presumably it would have already
done so to avoid the SEC's rules on
disclosure. Of course, this option
could be precluded if disclosure were
extended to partnerships above a
certain size.301
Any legislative proposal to
withdraw, albeit slightly, the cloak of
secrecy that protects the
confidentiality of corporate income
tax data will be controversial. But
not all businesses might resist such a
proposal, and some might actually
welcome it, if only to dispel the
negative image that corporations are
somehow tax freeloaders.
Corporations that pay little or no
income tax may be few in number
but, in the public's mind, might be
seen as representative of business in
general.
Disclosure of tax information
could help to correct the perception
that corporations are all under taxed,
and thereby enhance, rather than
prejudice, attitudes toward business.
Moreover, some businesses might
respect, if not welcome, legislative
efforts directed at examining an
important component of the state's
revenue structure.
Should disclosure lead to a more
level playing field, as it did at the
federal level in 1986, businesses in
general will benefit. A state that
rewards corporations for their
business decisions rather than their
tax decisions ought to be viewed as
advancing the business climate.302
Finally, the business community
has some control over how the media

and corporations in other states will
come to view a disclosure law. If the
business community characterizes a
disclosure law as evidence of a
state's fiscal responsibility, its desire
to introduce more responsibility and
openness into government, and its
willingness to eliminate waste and
inefficiency in its tax system, the
business climate should be enhanced
rather than undercut.303

There are many provisions in a
tax code that are adopted to
improve the business climate. It
is disingenuous to use the
business climate argument in
support of the adoption of these
provisions and then use the same
argument to prevent the public
from evaluating in a meaningful
way the effectiveness of such
provisions.

Unlike many of the factors that
affect the business climate the
disclosure of corporate tax
information would not affect the
cost of doing business or a
corporation's "bottom line."

Disclosure of tax information
could help to correct the public
perception that corporations are
all under taxed, and thereby
enhance, rather than prejudice,
attitudes toward business.
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If the business community
characterized a disclosure law
as evidence of a state's fiscal
responsibility, its desire to
introduce more responsibility
and openness into government,
and its willingness to eliminate
waste and inefficiency in its tax
system, the business climate
should be enhanced rather than
undercut.

State-level disclosure holds
the promise of significant
benefits. The arguments
against disclosure do not
provide a basis for rejecting
the case in favor. And, some
of those arguments, when
carefully analyzed, actually
support the case for
additional disclosure.

J. Conclusion
This Section examined the case
for and against disclosure. Based on
CTJ's experience with SECmandated disclosure and the limited
state experience, state-level
disclosure holds the promise of
significant benefits. The arguments
against disclosure, many of which
could also be made (and in some
cases have been made) against SECmandated disclosure, do not provide
any reasons to reject the case in
favor. And some of the arguments
against disclosure, when analyzed,
turn into arguments on behalf of
disclosure. Consequently, the next
Section discusses three major issues
that need to be resolved in
formulating state-level disclosure
policy: who should be covered by
disclosure; what information should
be disclosed; and which state agency
should administer disclosure.
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V. Formulating State Disclosure Policy
A. Who Should be Covered by
Disclosure?
Although there are situations where
the law requires financial
information about individuals to be
disclosed to the public,304 individuals
are generally perceived and treated
as having greater rights of privacy
than do corporations. The most
compelling arguments in the
congressional debate over public
access to tax returns centered on
individuals and their rights to
privacy. There should be a higher
burden of proof than in the case of
publicly-traded corporations that
disclosure of individual tax
information justifies the resulting
loss of privacy. With the exception
of individuals who are the
beneficiaries of significant tax
expenditures,305 this higher standard
does not justify the wholesale release
of individual tax information.306
In addition to publicly-traded
corporations,307 disclosure should
also be extended to firms in regulated
industries such as banks, utilities,
and insurance companies, whether
publicly-traded or not. These
corporations are key economic actors
in which the public has a well
established special interest, as
evidenced by the extensive reporting
and regulatory provisions to which
they are subject. Because they
already submit extensive financial
data to state authorities, no new
privacy issues or compliance burdens
arise by bringing them within the
purview of a disclosure law.308
Corporations that are publiclytraded on foreign exchanges should
also be included for purposes of
disclosure.
Many developed
countries have financial disclosure
laws similar to those of the United
States. Although in some cases these

laws may not be as detailed as those
of the United States, the principle of
disclosure is well established. All
the reasons for including U.S.
publicly-traded corporations within a
disclosure law extend equally to
foreign-traded corporations.
Treating both groups the same
preserves a level playing field.
At a minimum, disclosure should
cover publicly-traded corporations,
whether domestic or foreign, doing
business in the state, and banks,
insurance companies, and utilities,
doing business in the state, whether
publicly-traded or not. All of these
corporations are already used to
publishing detailed financial
information about their operations,
including extensive data on their
federal tax liabilities. These
corporations have long ago
surrendered claims of confidentiality
and privacy regarding their financial
affairs.
Requiring state-specific
information to be released is a small
additional compliance burden.

Publicly traded corporations are
already used to publishing
detailed financial information
about their operations,
including extensive data on their
federal tax liabilities. Requiring
state-specific information to be
released is a small additional
compliance burden.
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The public's right to know who
is receiving public funds should
not be undercut simply because
benefits are being offered
through the tax system rather
than through direct spending
programs.

Some states might wish to extend
disclosure to large corporations that
are privately-held, such as Bechtel,
Mars, UPS, Caltex Petroleum,
Egghead, Computerland, Milliken,
Montgomery Ward, American
Standard, Revco, Wordperfect and
Gateway Computers.309
Large,
privately-held corporations are key
participants in a state's economy and
may also be responsible for helping
to shape a state's tax regime. Unlike
small "mom and pop" corporations,
large privately-held corporations are
not merely the alter ego's of their
owners and the business matters of
the corporation are not inextricably
intermingled with the individual
shareholder's personal financial
affairs.
Moreover, unlike a small "mom
and pop" corporation, large
privately-held corporations can
easily comply with a disclosure law.
Accordingly, a state could set forth
certain criteria (e.g., assets, income,
net worth) to determine which
privately-held corporations might be
subject to disclosure.
In the case of tax expenditures,
those situations in which a state
"spends" money through special nonnormative tax provisions, such as tax
credits or special deductions or
exemptions,310 disclosure should be
extended to all beneficiaries, whether
publicly traded or not, and whether
corporate or individual.311 The
increased accountability and
openness that would accompany
disclosure can properly be viewed as
a legitimate requirement of any
entity or individual benefitting from
the expenditure of public funds.
Indeed, one of the major arguments
in favor of SEC-disclosure applies
equally to identifying the
beneficiaries of tax expenditures:
"The financial community, the
accounting profession, the bar and
industry generally have come not
only to accept but to support the
principle that those who make use of
the public's money must supply the
information essential to the
formulation of intelligent investment
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decisions, and that it is a proper
responsibility of government to keep
an eye on the accuracy and adequacy
of such information."312
Further, identifying beneficiaries
by name is consistent with the
philosophy underlying the concept of
a tax expenditure. The major tax
expenditures tend to be investmentrelated subsidies, like an investment
tax credit. If these expenditures took
the form of an explicit spending
program, the identity of the
recipients would most likely be
public information either as part of
the application process for the
subsidy or through freedom of
information laws. Information that
sensibly would be made public as
part of a spending program should be
similarly disclosed as part of a tax
expenditure analysis. The public's
right to know who is receiving public
funds should not be undercut simply
because benefits are being offered
through the tax system rather than
through direct spending programs.
To make the flow of information
manageable, however, only
corporations or individuals receiving
tax expenditures above a certain
aggregate amount should be subject
to disclosure.
B. What Information Should
be Disclosed?
1. Tax Expenditures
Conceptually, any tax can be
analyzed as if it consisted of two
distinct structures. The first would
be its normative structure; for
example, those provisions that are
necessary parts of a tax structure
intended to tax only "income."313
These provisions would include rules
on defining gross income, business
deductions, the apportionment
formula, and so forth.
A second set of provisions are
known as tax expenditures. All
governments use their tax systems
for more than just the raising of
revenue. Tax laws typically contain
provisions intended to subsidize

favored economic activities or to
relieve personal hardships. These
provisions accomplish their goals by
granting a tax reduction to selected
taxpayers.
Because these "subsidy" or
"relief" measures are spending
programs implemented through the
tax system, they commonly are
known as tax expenditures.314 A tax
expenditure can be viewed as if the
taxpayer had actually paid the full
amount of tax owed in the absence of
the special provision and had
simultaneously received a grant
equal to the savings provided by the
special provision. Characterized in
this manner, a tax expenditure is just
one of a number of ways of
providing governmental assistance
and should be reexamined
periodically using traditional budget
and funding criteria: How much
money is being spent; how is the
money being distributed; is the
expenditure achieving its intended
goal; and is the expenditure the best
means of achieving such a goal?
The concept of a tax expenditure
is a powerful analytical tool that has
revamped traditional ways of
viewing a tax system.
One
application of the concept has been
the compilation of a tax expenditure
budget, which identifies "subsidy" or
"relief" provisions and estimates
their cost in forgone revenue.315 In
1968, the Treasury Department
published a tax expenditure budget316
analyzing the federal personal and
corporate income taxes. In 1974, the
Congressional Budget Office began
publishing its own annual tax
expenditure report, and in the same
year the Office of Management and
Budget began including a tax
expenditure analysis with the
President's annual budget request to
the Congress. No doubt inspired by
these federal actions, the concept of
a tax expenditure budget spread to
the states. By 1993, 22 states
prepared some form of tax
expenditure budget.317
An unusually voluminous and
fertile literature exists on the concept

of a tax expenditure.318
That
literature makes a convincing case
that unless attention is paid to tax
expenditures, a state does not have
either its tax policy or its budget
policy under full control.319 The
State of New York provides dramatic
evidence of the correctness of this
warning.
In 1969, New York
adopted an investment tax credit
(ITC) without any revenue estimate
of its cost. By 1983, more than $660
million of investment-related tax
credits had been claimed by
corporations.

Tax expenditures should be
reexamined periodically using
traditional budget and funding
criteria: How much money is
being spent; how is the money
being distributed; is the
expenditure achieving its
intended goal; and is the
expenditure the best means of
achieving such a goal?
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Because tax expenditures
represent silent or back door
spending, which should be
scrutinized annually the same as
explicit spending programs that
are formally included in a
budget, they should clearly be
part of any information that is
disclosed on a corporation-bycorporation basis.

In 1982, the most recent year for
which detailed data are available,
two corporations used nearly 40
percent of the total amount of credits
used that year.320 Until a 1985 report
by New York's Legislative Tax
S t u d y C o m- mis s i o n , 3 2 1 t h e
investment tax credit, estimated to
cost $224 million in 1993--more than
the budgets of most state agencies-received less review and analysis
than did explicit spending programs
that cost a million dollars or less. For
the 1986 liability year, 82% of the
credits earned in that year went to
companies paying New York's
minimum tax.322 It is inconceivable
that had the investment tax credit
been implemented as an explicit
spending program, 16 years would
have elapsed before any rigorous
study was undertaken.
Without identifying the corporate
beneficiaries, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to evaluate whether and
to what extent a credit such as the
ITC, is helping or hurting a state.
For example, are companies
receiving credits for consolidating a
factory while moving most of their
operations out-of-state? Is the credit
encouraging the purchase of
machines that eliminate jobs?
Once a spending program is
adopted in the guise of a tax
provision, it tends to escape the same
level of accountability that is applied
to explicit expenditures. Because tax
expenditures represent silent or back
door spending, which should be
scrutinized annually the same as
explicit spending programs that are
formally included in a budget, they
should clearly be part of any
information that is disclosed on a
corporation-by-corporation
basis.323 This information is easily
understandable and explainable to
legislators and should be of concern
to policy makers and analysts on an
ongoing basis.
The type of information disclosed
will be determined by the nature of
the tax expenditure. At a minimum,
the amount of the special tax
provision claimed along with the
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resulting tax savings should be
disclosed by name of beneficiary.324
In the case of an investment tax
credit, for example, the amount of
the credit claimed, the amount used,
the amount of any carryovers, the
amount of the investment that
triggered the credit should all be
disclosed.325 Similarly, if a credit is
based on a certain amount of
employment, or research and
development, those amounts should
also be disclosed. Depending on the
nature of the tax expenditure, the
reasons leading to its adoption, plus
other state-specific features
surrounding its use, a state might
wish to have other information
disclosed that would aid in
evaluating the efficacy of the tax
expenditure.
2. Normative Provisions
Normative provisions of a state
corporate income tax are not
motivated by the same subsidy or
relief considerations underlying the
adoption of tax expenditures.
Nonetheless, normative provisions
represent a series of policy decisions
and trade-offs among competing
values, such as administrative
convenience,

simplicity, equity, economic
neutrality, and efficiency. These
trade-offs were often made decades
ago and remain memorialized in
existing statutes.
Recent
developments and trends challenge
the premises underlying the tradeoffs. These trade-offs need to be
reexamined because of changes in
the judicial climate; a relaxation of
federal controls, especially in the
areas of transportation,
communications, and banking;
startling advances in technology that
have facilitated innovative business
practices; a flurry of federal tax
legislation; the rise of multinational
corporations and conglomerates; and
the shift in the economy from
manufacturing to services.326
The nature of the information
disclosed with respect to the
normative provisions of a tax might
vary among the states because of
state-specific statutory differences.
Nevertheless, although the states
vary in the details of their
approaches, there are more
similarities than differences so that
some general observations are
appropriate.
At the least, it is useful to disclose
any gaps between a corporation's
income for financial accounting
purposes and its federal taxable
income, which to one degree or
another is the starting point in
calculating most states' income taxes.
Accordingly, a corporation might be
required to disclose its accounting
book income and identify significant
differences between that amount and
its federal taxable income.

Many provisions in a state income
tax are automatically incorporated
from federal law. For example, with
varying degrees of fidelity all states
base their definition of taxable
income upon the federal definition.
But provisions that are normative in
the context of the federal system may
be problematic in the context of a
state income tax.
Consider, for example, the socalled dividends received deduction.
For federal purposes, a corporation
may deduct at a minimum 70% of the
dividends received from taxable
domestic corporations; 80% may be
deducted if the dividends are
received from a corporation in which
the payee owns at least a 20%
interest; and 100% may be deducted
if the payee owns at least an 80%
interest.327 Many states track this
feature of federal law;328 others
provide even more generous
treatment by allowing a deduction
for all dividends.329
The deduction for intercorporate
dividends serves as a useful example
because in most states it is a
longstanding provision that rests on
questionable assumptions that need
to be reexamined. The normative
rationale for the federal dividends
received deduction is the elimination
of multiple taxation.330 The profits
out of which the dividend is paid
have already been taxed at the
federal level as income of the payor.
A legitimate policy question arises
whether those same profits should be
taxed again at the federal level when
received by the payee.
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The normative provisions of a
state corporate income tax
represent a series of policy
decisions and trade-offs among
competing values, often made
decades ago and memorialized
in law.

At the least, it is useful to
disclose any gaps between a
corporation's income for
financial accounting purposes
and its federal taxable income,
which to one degree or another
is the starting point in
calculating most states' income
taxes.

At present, most states
probably have no information on
the amount or distribution of
revenue they forgo by adopting
implicitly features of the
Internal Revenue Code. Such
information would not
necessarily be included in a tax
expenditure budget.
Disclosing by name of
corporation the amount that it
benefits from a federal provision
that is adopted by state law is a
necessary first step in identifying
which provisions should be
subject to a cost benefit analysis.

Many states allow
corporations to claim additional
deductions in moving from
federal taxable income to state
taxable income. The more
significant of these should also
be subject to disclosure.

At the state level, however, the
state levying a tax on the payee is not
necessarily the same state that is
taxing the profits out of which the
dividend was paid. As an additional
complication, even if the same state
taxed the profits out of which the
dividend is paid, the business
apportionment factor of the payor is
unlikely to be identical to the
business apportionment factor of the
payee.331
In other words, the
premises upon which the federal
dividend received deduction is based
are not equally relevant in the
context of a state income tax.
The dividend received deduction
was purposely chosen as an
illustration.
First, it nicely
demonstrates the possibility of state
law going astray when it blindly
mimics a federal provision. Second,
the dividend received deduction is
the kind of longstanding tax
provision that escapes the attention
of most legislators.
Third,
administrative convenience, which
often explains why a state
incorporates a federal provision,332
do not carry much weight with
respect to this deduction.
A
corporation can
easily add back in calculating its
state taxable income the amount of
its federal dividend received
deduction, which appears on a
separate schedule on the federal
corporate return.333 Fourth, the state
dividend received deduction can
result in the restructuring of a
multistate business for tax avoidance
purposes.
For example, consider a
corporation that is conducting a
multijurisdictional business, taxable
in State A. Assume A allows a
100% dividend received deduction.
Orthodox tax planning would
determine whether the corporation
could reduce its tax liability in A by
incorporating its out-of-state division
and repatriating the profits of the
subsidiary as a tax-free dividend.334
This type of tax planning might well
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escape attention.335
In addition to the dividend
received deduction, a state might
well be interested in identifying other
provisions that it automatically
incorporates by using federal taxable
income as its starting point.336 A
state might find that the reasons that
led to the federal deduction might
carry little weight at the state level.
At present, most states probably
have no information on the amount
or distribution of revenue they forgo
by adopting implicitly features of the
Internal Revenue Code.
Such
information would not necessarily be
included in a tax expenditure budget.
Disclosing by name of corporation
the amount that it benefits from a
federal provision that is adopted by
state law is a necessary first step in
identifying which provisions should
be subject to a cost benefit analysis.
In each state, tax policy analysts,
legislators and their staff, and tax
administrators should be able to
identify which provisions in the
corporate income tax should be
covered by a disclosure law.
Many states allow corporations to
claim additional deductions in
moving from federal taxable income
to state taxable income. The more
significant of these should also be
subject to disclosure.
After calculating state taxable
income, a corporation typically
apportions that amount to a state
using an apportionment formula.
The formula usually takes into
account the percentage of a
corporation's property, payroll and
receipts attributable to the taxing
state. The components of this
formula are useful for identifying
both tax avoidance techniques and
long-run trends and should also be
part of the information disclosed.
For example, major corporations
that have a low in-state receipts
factor may highlight a need for a
state to examine the adoption of a
throw back or a throw out rule.

Further, an abrupt change in a
property or payroll factor involving
a corporation that is known not to
have changed its operations
significantly may also suggest the
use of tax avoidance techniques
warranting further analysis. Data
such as gross receipts, gross sales, or
gross profits can also be useful in
identifying transfer pricing abuses.337
In order to further help identify
possible transfer pricing problems,
corporations should disclose the
names of any related corporations
with which they have had any
transactions and the nature and
extent of those transactions.
Specialized industries, such as
insurance and banks, are typically
subject to special tax regimes. In
many states, insurance companies are
subject to a tax on their premiums
rather than an income tax. Items
subject to disclosure will thus differ
in these cases from what is required
of general business corporations.
Finally, corporations should have
the right to explain any of the
disclosed information in further
detail.

Code that establishes safeguards that
a state must impose as a precondition
to obtaining federal returns or return
information from the IRS. A
violation of this section would be
serious because most states have
entered into an exchange of
information program with the IRS,
which provides them with valuable
audit leads. Specifically, a state
cannot require a taxpayer to "attach
to, or include in, any State tax return
a copy of any portion of his Federal
return, or information reflected on
such Federal return,

Corporations should have the
right to explain any of the
disclosed information in further
detail.

A state should publish whatever
information is subject to
disclosure in a readily usable
format.

C. The Mechanics of Disclosure
Little is gained from procedures
that require the public to request
affirmatively information from a
state on specific corporations.
Instead, a state should publish
whatever information is subject to
disclosure in a readily usable format.
If the information subject to
disclosure is limited to items found
on the return, the tax department
would be the logical agency to
administer the law. Presumably, the
information would already be
keypunched into computers for use
in audit selection. This information
could be printed out in a standard
format and made available to the
public.
A possible problem with this
approach is whether it would violate
a section of the Internal Revenue
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In an informal opinion, the
IRS told the staff of the
Massachusetts Special
Commission on Business Tax
Policy that as long as the
Secretary of State's office
obtains the disclosed data from
reports filed with it by
corporations, which is what the
Massachusetts law provides,
there would be no violation of
the statute.

The current privacy provisions
of the U.S. Internal Revenue
Code were adopted in the
aftermath of the Watergate-era
abuses of the tax returns of
individuals and non-profit
organizations that were
perceived to be subversive.

unless such State adopts provisions
of law which protect the confidentiality of the copy of the Federal
return (or portion thereof) attached
to, or the Federal return information
reflected on, such State tax return."338
The question that arises is how to
interpret this provision if a state law
requires the disclosure of information
contained on the federal return, such
as federal taxable income.
In an informal opinion, the IRS
told the staff of the Massachusetts
Special Commission on Business
Tax Policy that as long as the
Secretary of State's office obtains the
disclosed data from reports filed with
it by corporations, which is what the
Massachusetts law provides, there
would be no violation of the statute.
The informal view of the IRS is that
it has entered into an information
sharing agreement with the
Massachusetts Department of
Revenue, which has no role in the
preparation of the taxpayer-specific
reports that are disclosed. Under the
Massachusetts disclosure law, the
Department of Revenue would be
honoring the agreements so that no
The
violation would exist.339
Massachusetts Commissioner of
Revenue independently reached the
same conclusion.340
Although their opinions appear to
be a technical interpretation of the
statute, both the Massachusetts
Commissioner of Revenue and the
IRS reach the right answer. The
section of the Code at issue was
introduced in the aftermath of
Watergate. The abuse of income tax
returns during Watergate focused on
individual returns and those of nonprofit organizations, rather than on
corporate returns.
For example,
the House Internal Security
Committee examined the tax returns
of Students for a Democratic Society,
the Black Panther Party, the New
Mobilization Committee to End the
War in Vietnam, the Progressive
Labor Party and the returns of
officers of these groups. Other
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government agencies made extensive
use of individual returns. The Senate
Co mmittee on Government
Operations used tax returns for
investigations of riots, civil and
criminal disorders and campus
disturbances.341 The Civil Service
Commission used tax-return data to
investigate job seekers; the Veterans
Administration used returns to check
the income of pension claimants; the
Federal Housing Administration
looked into the eligibility of families
for housing assistance by inspecting
their income tax returns. Income tax
returns were also examined by the
Federal Communications
Commission in ferreting out "payola"
taken by disc jockeys and the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board used returns
to determine whether activities of
savings and loan associations and
their staffs violated federal laws.
The Securities and Exchange
Commission was a regular user of
tax returns in its surveillance of
stockbrokers. The Small Business
Administration used tax data to
decide on the merits of loan
applicants and to assist in pressing
for loan repayments. Apparently, the
biggest user of returns for routine
law enforcement purposes was the
Social Security Administration. The
biggest users for investigative
projects were the Justice Department
and U.S. Attorneys, who had easy
access to tax returns. It was reported
that U.S. Attorneys inspected more
than 18,000 individual returns in
1974.342
Because the Watergate abuses
centered on individuals and not
corporations, it seems reasonable to
read the relevant section of the Code
as being limited to individuals.343
Also, because a corporation's federal
taxable income can be inferred from
information contained in the Form
10-K and in annual reports, there is
no need for an overly broad reading
of the statute.
Moreover, suppose a state instead
of passing a law that requires a

corporation to use federal taxable
income as its starting point, which is
a common approach, actually
adopted as state law all of the federal
provisions that enter into the
calculation of federal taxable income
but called this amount "state taxable
income." Suppose that the state now
required disclosure of that amount.
It is hard to understand why that state
should be denied the benefits of the
IRS exchange of information
program because it chose to disclose
the amount of a corporation's state
taxable income. Why should a
different result be reached just
because a state chooses to avoid the
cumbersome process of explicitly
adopting all of the federal provisions
that impact on the definition of
taxable income and incorporates
them by reference?
This last point supports not only
the informal opinion of the IRS
regarding the Massachusetts
disclosure law, but also supports the
position that no violation of the Code
would result even if a tax department
were the agency that administered a
disclosure law. Any doubts on this
matter could be resolved through an
official pronouncement by the IRS or
through an amendment to the Code.
Alternatively, the entire issue could
be avoided if the SEC were to
mandate the disclosure of more
detailed information on state income
taxes.
If the informal opinion of the IRS
regarding the Massachusetts law
reflects official policy, a state will
avoid violating the Code by
following the Massachusetts
approach of having a corporation
submit the required information to
the Secretary of State (or some other
person not involved with the tax
department). If a state chooses to
disclose information that the tax
department would not normally have
because it does not appear on the
return, little loss in administrative
efficiency would result if a
corporation submits its information

directly to the Secretary of State.
The real advantage in having the
tax department involved arises from
the assurance that the information
being released is the same
information appearing on the returns
that were filed. If the tax department
is not involved in the process,
adequate safeguards have to be
provided to both ensure that all
corporations covered by the law
actually file with the Secretary of

Because the Watergate abuses
centered on individuals and not
corporations, it seems
reasonable to read the relevant
section of the Code as being
limited to individuals.

If the informal opinion of the
IRS regarding the
Massachusetts law reflects
official policy, a state will avoid
violating the Internal Revenue
Code, by following the
Massachusetts approach of
having a corporation submit the
required information to the
Secretary of State (or some
other person not involved with
the tax department) should be
followed.
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The real advantage in having
the tax department involved
arises from the assurance that
the information being released
is the same information
appearing on the returns that
were filed.

Verifying the data released
would be particularly difficult if
a state adopted a system of
anonymous disclosure, in which
a corporation is not identified by
name but only by a number.

State, and that the information
submitted is accurate. For example,
a certified pubic accountant should
be required to attest to the accuracy
of the information reported. In
addition, a list of publicly-traded
corporations doing business in the
state, as well as other entities subject
to disclosure should be published so
that it could be cross-checked against
those filing with the Secretary of
State. Verifying the data released
would be particularly difficult if a
state adopted
a system of
anonymous disclosure,344 in which a
corporation is not identified by name
but only by a number.
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VI. Conclusion
The current debate over the
disclosure of state corporate tax data
has very deep roots. At the national
level, starting with the Civil War
income taxes, there was a robust
debate over the extent to which the
public should have access to federal
tax information of both individuals
and corporations.
This debate,
however, primarily centered on
individuals and their rights of
privacy rather than on large
corporations; when corporations
entered the discussion at all, it was
typically in terms of concern for the
privacy of "mom and pop"
operations that could be viewed as
the alter ego's of their owners. The
few times when Congress
concentrated on the differences
between individuals and
corporations, it recognized that
legitimate reasons existed for
granting more public access to
corporate data than to individual
data.
The SEC has essentially resolved
the federal debate by imposing
extensive financial reporting
responsibilities on publicly-traded

corporations, including the release of
detailed information on federal
income taxes and the aggregate
amount of state income taxes.
Proposals for state-disclosure would
require that the state income tax
information be disaggregated and
presented in greater detail. These
proposals are intended to facilitate
thoughtful tax policymaking and
more accountability and openness in
government.
They would also
complement the SEC-mandated
disclosure.
Compared with the much more
extensive reporting requirements
already imposed on corporations by
other federal and state statutes and
with the amount of financial
information now in the public
domain, proposals for state level
disclosure are clearly unexceptional
in terms of both the administrative
burden involved and the type of data
covered. The virtues of disclosure
were graphically demonstrated by
the efforts of Citizens for Tax Justice
(CTJ) at the federal level, which
resulted in many of the corporate tax
changes
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in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Perhaps it is the fears of those who
are benefitting from the flaws in the
current corporate tax system, more
than any inherent defect in the
proposals, which explain the
contentious opposition of elements of
the business community in
Massachusetts, the one state that has
adopted a comprehensive approach
to state tax disclosure. In theory, the
business community, as a whole,
should be supportive of attempts to
improve and rationalize government
policymaking.
Most of the arguments against
disclosure, similar to the arguments
often raised against proposals that
threaten the status quo, involve the
incantation of threadbare and
shopworn slogans. Others are based
on speculation and unsupported
assertions. While some opponents
are undoubtedly sincere in their
fears, their arguments fall well short
of rebutting the benefits that would
accompany disclosure.
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Revenue Revision, 1925: Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 69th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1925), pp.8-9.
113. The roots of Mellon's opposition may have been personal. He could not have been
pleased when the New York Times trumpeted that he paid $1,173,987 in income tax, the
largest of any individual in the Pittsburgh district. The headline of the same article went on to
mention that his brother paid $348,646 and a nephew paid $225,834. New York Times, Oct.
25, 1924, p. 2.
114. Hearings, supra note 112, pp. 65-66, 278-79, 280-83.
115. Act of Feb. 26, 1926, Ch. 27, Sec. 257(e); 44 Stat. 9, 52 ("The Commissioner shall as
soon as practicable in each year cause to be prepared and made available to public inspection
in such manner as he may determine, in the office of the collector in each internal-revenue
district and in such other places as he may determine, lists containing the name and the postoffice address of each person making an income-tax return in such district").
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As of 1926, the rules governing access by private individuals to non-corporate returns were
as follows. Individual returns were open to inspection by the person who made the return,
their duly constituted attorney in fact, a receiver in bankruptcy, guardian, or similar legal
custodian. I.T. 2087, Cum. Bull. III-2, 328 (1924); In re Epstein, 300 Fed. 407; S. M. 2353,
Cum. Bull. III-2, 327 (1924); reg. 74, Art. 422. If the maker of the return had died, the
administrator, executor, or trustee of his or her state was entitled to inspect the return. The
Commissioner had the discretion to open the return to any heir at law or next of kin of a
deceased person or to the duly constituted attorney in fact for such person upon a showing that
the heir or kin had a material interest which may be effected by information contained in the
return. Reg. 62, Art. 1091, Par. 8 (c); Reg. 69, Art. 1090, Par. 8 (b); Reg. 74, Art. 421. Either
spouse filing a joint return had the privilege to inspect it; in the event of the death of either
spouse, the inspection privilege was available to the survivor or the personal representative of
the decedent or duly appointed attorney in fact of the survivor. The Commissioner had the
discretion to allow any heir at law or next of kin of the deceased spouse to inspect the return
upon a showing of a material interest in the return. S.M. 1992, Cum. Bull. III-2, 327 (1924).
Similar rules applied in the case of partnership returns. Any member of a partnership during
any part of the time covered by the return could inspect it as well as representatives or next of
kin of a deceased partner provided they had a material interest effected by information in the
return. Reg. 74, Art. 421; Art. 1090, Par. 7, Regs. 69, 65, and 62. Tax returns filed by or on
behalf of an estate were subject to inspection by the administrator, executor, or trustee of such
estate and, in the Commissioner's discretion, by any heir of law or next of kin of the decedent
or by an attorney in fact for such persons upon evidence of a material interest that may be
effected by information contained in the return. Reg. 74, Art. 421; Art. 1090, Par. 8, Reg. 69,
65 and 62. In the case of trusts, the trustees, any individual who is a beneficiary of a trust
during any part of the time covered by the return, administrators, executors, representatives of
the estate of the deceased beneficiary of the trust or, in the discretion of the Commissioner, any
heir at law or next of kin of such deceased beneficiary, also had access upon a showing of
material interest which may be effected by information contained in the return. Reg. 74, Art.
421; Art. 1090, Par. 9, Regs. 69, 65, and 62. Regulations issued in 1931 expanded access to
non-corporate tax returns by providing access by persons having a material interest in the
taxpayer, for example, beneficiaries of estates and partners of a partnership. T.D. 4317, Cum.
Bull., X-1, 146 (1931).
116. Ratner, supra note 16, p. 427.
117. In 1966, the provision was changed to provide information only on whether a person had
filed an income tax return. P.L. 89-713, Sec. 4; 80 Stat. 1109. The change was made because
of the difficulty of making microfilm (which was the medium used to store the data) available
to the public and because of the desire to keep Social Security numbers confidential. S. Rep.
No. 1625, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), pp.7-8.
118. Ratner, supra note 16, pp. 427-8.
119. Quoted in Leff, supra note 85, pp. 67-68.
120. Id.
121. Id. LaFollette was chastised for attempting to link the controversial issue of tax publicity
with the NIRA. Administrative Procedures, supra note 22, p. 1035 n. 45.
122. Id.
123. Congressional Record, April 13, 1934, p. 6554. LaFollette's proposal was adopted by a
41-34 vote.

71

124. Act of May 10, 1934, Ch. 277, Sec. 55(b); 48 Stat. 680, 698 (1934). Apparently
Representative Wright Patman (D-Texas) conceived the use of pink slips. Administrative
Procedures, supra note 22, p. 853 n. 54. Similar to the earlier votes on publicizing income tax
data, voting on the pink slips was along urban-rural lines. Except in highly urbanized states, a
substantial majority of Democrats and most Republicans favored publicity. Although only one
Northeasterner supported LaFollette's amendments, Midwestern Senators strongly supported
him. The South split almost evenly because Democratic Party stalwarts opposed the
amendments. Leff, supra note 85, p. 68.
125. The pink slip provision was consistent with the New Deal's concern over the level of
corporate salaries. During the depression, corporate executives were viewed by some as an
"extraneous, unproductive layer that soaked up an extravagant share of the shrunken consumer
dollar. The widely bruited gap between a corporation's dispersed ownership and its actual
control cast corporate directors as a specially privileged, self-regulating group that selfishly
hoarded outrageous salaries and bonuses." Leff, supra note 85, p. 74 (1984). Themes of
sacrifice, fraud, frugality, and stockholder rights animated discussions over whether executive
salaries should be limited. The compromise was to require corporations to include with their
tax returns a list of names and total compensation of employees earning more than $15,000.
The Treasury submitted to Congress a cumulative list, which was then made public. Id. p. 77.
Not surprisingly, the disclosure of salaries was also controversial:
We are told that because of this publicity these individuals will become the prey of
racketeers, kidnapers and cranks. In considering the merits of such criticism it is well to
bear in mind that in the past, the wealthy have been, broadly speaking, the only element
in the community exempt from such information. The wages paid to workers in industry
are nearly always a matter of public record. College professors' salaries are known, and
are frequently printed in the catalogues. Employees of the federal government and of
most of the states and cities receive stipends that are officially recorded. The American
temperament being what it is, the income of almost anyone can be estimated within
broad limits, from the scale on which he lives.
Making public the salaries paid by corporations performs a distinct public service;
for example, the facts can be checked against the wages paid by the same corporation and
against the customary plea of poverty when the workers ask an increase in those wages.
As for the danger from racketeers and kidnapers, the first point to make is that these
gentry do not need to wait for a government publication to help them select their
potential victims; and in the second place, the answer in the long run is for the
government to fight the underworld directly, and not by withholding possibly useful data.
New Republic, January 22, 1936, p. 299.
Opponents of this salary disclosure requirement failed to piggyback repeal of this provision
onto the repeal of the pink slips, but in 1938 they succeeded in increasing the $15,000 level to
$75,000. It was not until 1949, when the Treasury testified that it considered the extraction of
1,000 names from 600,000 returns a waste of time, that the salary provision quietly died. Id. p.
80.
126. Senator George W. Norris (R-Nebraska), Congressional Record, 74th Cong., May 27,
1935, p. 4511.
127. Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Jr. (PR-Wisconsin), Congressional Record, April 13,
1934, p. 6553.
128. Representative Wright Patman, Congressional Record, February 15, 1934, p. 2600.
129. Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., Congressional Record, April 13, 1934, p. 6546; March
27, 1935, p. 4512.
130. Janssen, supra note 35.
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131. Saturday Evening Post, June 8, 1935, p. 44.
132. Leff, supra note 85, p. 72.
133. Senator Marvel Logan (D-Kentucky), Congressional Record, March 27, 1935, p. 4506.
134. Representative Robert L. Bacon (R-New York), Congressional Record, February 20,
1935.
135. Leff, supra note 85, p. 70.
136. Representative Robert L. Bacon, Congressional Record, February 27, 1935, p. 2690.
137. Supra note 134, p. 2307.
138. Id.
139. Representative Alfred Beiter, Congressional Record, February 25, 1935, p. 2594.
140. Representative Robert L. Bacon, Congressional Record, February 27, 1935, pp. 2687-81.
141. New York Times, Feb. 27, 1935, p. 5.
142. Saturday Evening Post, April 20, 1935, p. 26.
143. New Republic, March 20, 1935, p. 143.
144. Representative Adolph Sabath (D-Illinois), Congressional Record, March 11, 1935, p.
3391.
145. Representative Charles Truax (D-Ohio), Congressional Record, March 11, 1935, pp.
3392-93.
146. Speech of Representative Bacon, quoted in Return Confidentiality, supra note 15, p. 84.
147. Letter dated Feb. 14, 1935, quoted in Return Confidentiality, supra note 15, p. 62.
148. Report From the Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 6359, Repeal Certain
Provisions Relating to Publicity of Certain Statements of Income, H.R. Report No. 313, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (March 7, 1935).
149. Act of April 19, 1935, Ch. 74; 49 Stat. 158. The Saturday Evening Post described the
repeal as scrapping "what promised to be a card-index system available to every kidnaper,
blackmailer, blue-sky security salesmen, town gossip, gold digger, alimony hunter or other
exploiter on the prowl for victims." Saturday Evening Post, June 8, 1935, p. 23.
150. House Report, supra note 148, p.1.
151. LaFollette is given credit for Wisconsin's law by the Independent, Nov. 8, 1924, p. 353.
152. House Report, supra note 148, p. 2.
153. Congressional Record, May 25, 1928, p. 9847.
154. House Report, supra note 148, p. 2.
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155. Representative Charles Gifford (R-Mass.), Congressional Record, March 8, 1938, p.
3058.
156. Leff, supra note 85, p. 72.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Congressional Record, March 11, 1935, pp. 3408-3411.
160. The vote in the House was 301-99 in favor of a motion to recommit the proposal.
Republicans, who by 1935 enjoyed extraordinary cohesion, voted almost unanimously for
repeal. All third-party Congressmen voted for disclosure, but rural Democrats split slightly
against it and Southern Democrats--whose innate conservatism often surfaced when party
loyalty was not involved--voted for repeal by a margin of almost two to one. Id. p. 3411. The
division in the Senate was somewhat similar, except that Republicans from farm states divided
evenly. No Northeasterners voted against repeal, which is not surprising because none had
voted in favor of the pink slips. More striking was the erosion of support from rural
conservative Democrats.
161. Access to tax returns by the non-public continued to absorb the attention of Congress. In
1936, for example, Congress permitted the inspection of individual as well as corporate
income tax returns by state and local tax administrators. Tax Act of 1936, Subtitle A, Ch. 1
(Part V), Sec. 55 (b)(1); 49 Stat. 158. See I.R.C. Sec. 6103(b)(1). Previously, only corporate
returns were available for inspection.
162. For an excellent history on these myriad of administrative guidelines on disclosure see
Administrative Procedures, supra note 22, at 844-853.
163. Id. at 849.
164. 90 Stat. 1525 (1976).
165. See, Who's Snooping Into Your Tax Returns Now?, U.S. News & World Rep., Aug. 11,
1975, at 61; See also, Confidentiality of Tax Return Information: Hearings Before the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1976); I.R.S. Procedures: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Freedom of Information: IRS: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1974); I.R.C. Sec. 6103 (Supp. 1990).
166. Int. Rev. Code of 1986, Sec. 6103(a). The 1976 changes continued prior law, see supra
note 81 and accompanying text, which permits any bona fide shareholder of record owning one
percent or more of the outstanding stock of a corporation to inspect the return of such
corporation or its subsidiary. I.R.C. Sec. 6103(e)(1)(D)(iii). The shareholder "shall not
disclose any return or return information obtained by him." Id. Sec. 6103(9).
167. Cited in Zeff, 1926 to 1971 Chronology of Significant Developments in the
Establishment of Accounting Principles in the United States, in Rappaport and Revsine,
Corporate Financial Reporting: The Issues, The Objectives and Some New Proposals, p. 219
(1972) (hereinafter cited as Financial Reporting).
168. Saturday Review, April 13, 1963, p.76.
169. Financial Reporting, supra note 167, p. 220.
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170. 15 U.S.C. Secs. 77a-77aa.
171. Financial Reporting, supra note 167, p. 220.
172. 15 U.S.C. Secs. 78a-78hh-1.
173. Measurement standards refer to the methods by which assets, liabilities, ownership and
profit and loss are disclosed. Horwitz and Kolodny, Financial Reporting Rules and Corporate
Decisions: A Study of Public Policy (1982), p.15.
174. Id., p. 10.
175. Id.
176. In 1938, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release (ASR) 4, in which it stated that
financial statements filed pursuant to its rules and regulations that were prepared in accordance
with accounting practices for which there was no substantial authoritative support were
presumed to be misleading, and that footnotes or other disclosures would not rebut this
presumption. The American Institute of Accountants (AIA), the predecessor of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), established a Committee on Accounting
Procedure (CAP), which began to issue accounting research bulletins in 1939. The authority
of the these bulletins was ambiguous because the CAP stated that the force of its opinions
"rested upon their general acceptability." Horwitz and Kolodny, supra note 173, at 12.
The progress of the CAP was disappointingly slow and the AICPA then established the
Accounting Principles Board (APB) in 1959. The APB was supposed to formulate GAAP.
The APB, however, was also criticized for its slowness, as well as for the poor quality of its
opinions. The credibility of the APB was weakened at an early stage in its history when the
SEC refused to accept one of its opinions and forced the Board to reverse itself. Id., pp. 1213. As a result, the APB was replaced with the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
in 1973. The FASB received a vote of confidence from the SEC in the same year in ASR 150.
In ASR 150, the SEC stated that the principles, standards and practices promulgated by the
FASB in its Statements and Interpretations will be considered as having substantial
authoritative support, and contrary practices will be considered to have no such support. As
the SEC said seven years later in ASR 280, "while there is, of course, always the possibility
that the Commission may conclude it cannot accept an FASB standard in a particular area,
such events have been rare."
177. All of the OECD countries (the Western democracies and Japan), and many other
industrial and industrializing nations, have financial disclosure requirements as part of SECtype regulatory frameworks. Such countries also have their versions of generally accepted
accounting principles as well as authoritative standard setting bodies such as FASB in the
United States.
In the United Kingdom, for example, the Stock Exchange plays an extremely important role
with respect to disclosure requirements. France (the Commission des Operations de Bourse),
Italy (Commission Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa) and Mexico (Comision Nacional de
Valores) have a national commission, similar to the U.S. format, that enforces their securities
laws. Japan has a Securities Bureau. In Canada, each province and territory has its own
securities laws enforced by a local administrator. Australia has a National Companies and
Securities Commission. In the Netherlands and Germany the stock exchanges are almost the
exclusive source of securities regulation. Bloomenthal, International Capital Markets and
Securities Regulation, Sec. 1.08[3](1982). For a detailed description of the elaborate Japanese
rules, see Loss, Yazawa, Banoff, Japanese Securities Regulation (1983). Corporations are
required to disclose a variety of financial data in these countries. For a description of the
disclosure rules in various countries, see Bloomenthal, supra.
In 1988, the Organization for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) set forth a list of financial information,
including income taxes, that should be disclosed in the published reports of multinational
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enterprises. OECD, Multinational Enterprises and Disclosure of Information: Clarification of
the OECD Guidelines (1988). Financial reporting requirements, including the disclosure of
income tax expenses, is also being examined on a comparative, cross national basis by two
other important international organizations -- the International Accounting Standards
Committee and the International Organization of Securities Commissions.
In addition to the disclosure of income tax information resulting from securities laws and
accounting standards, several countries have additional forms of disclosure related to their
customs and traditions. In Japan, for example, the national government publishes lists of
companies that pay the largest amounts of taxes and most major firms apparently want to be
mentioned. BNA, Daily Tax Reports, G-3 (Nov. 24, 1987).
Under the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act, the amount of corporate income taxes paid is
a matter of public record, available for public examination at the tax administration.
Telephone conversation with Mr. Lars Hollner, Swedish Embassy, Washington, D.C., Sept.
17, 1993. Since 1914, the "Taxeringskalender," a private publication, lists gross and taxable
income for every Swedish citizen who qualifies. In 1985, for example, the edition for the
Stockholm area included every individual who made more than $15,000 a year and every
couple who made $20,000 or more. Forbes, Feb. 25, 1985, p. 130. (The Forbes article does
not clarify whether the amounts refer to gross income or taxable income.) Anybody with
$63,000 or more in assets also made the list. In 1975, the publishers of Taxeringskalender
started breaking down the list on a county-by-county basis, like telephone directories. Id. "It
turns out the Swedes are such busybodies that the government doesn't need to offer a bounty
for ratting on delinquent taxpayers, as the IRS does. In Sweden this happens anyway. Says a
Swedish official, `Sometimes a jealous neighbor will call tax officials and say, Please look into
my neighbor, who has just bought a new Mercedes-Benz. They call that the royal Swedish
envy.'" Id.
Tax liabilities are also public information in Norway and are published by the newspapers.
Telephone conversation with the Finance Officer, Norwegian Embassy, Nov. 2, 1993.
178. Accounting Series Release 149 (Nov. 28, 1973). For a detailed description, see infra
note 184 and accompanying text.
179. Loss and Seligman, IV Securities Regulation 1856-57 (1990). For detailed background
information, see BNA, Annual Reporting Under the Federal Securities Laws (1987 with 1992
supplement); Austin, Preparation of the Annual Report on Form 10-K, in Securities Filings:
1992 Review and Update (PLI, 1992); Form 10-K, 5 Securities Regulation (1993); Beresford,
Neary, Rossel, SEC Financial Reporting: Annual Reports to Shareholders Form 10-K (1981).
180. The official designation is "Form 10-K, annual report pursuant to sections 13 or 15(d) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934." 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1982).
181. SEC Rule 14a-3(b)(9).
182. The Chronicle of Higher Education, Nov. 3, 1993, p. A21.
183. Regulation S-X governs the form and content (not the accounting standards) of financial
statements. This regulation was first adopted in the 1940's. The most recent general revision
occurred in 1980. Between 1937 and 1982, the SEC published 307 Accounting Series
Releases. The more important releases were codified in Codification of Fin. Rep. Policies, 6
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), para. 72, 901 et. seq. Since 1975, the SEC has published Staff
Accounting Bulletins.
184. Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra note 9, pp. 9-10, summarizing ASR 149.
185. See Loss and Seligman, Securities Regulation 1854-1916 (1990).
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186. This description of CTJ's work is based on the following CTJ publications and reports:
It's Working, But...(1989); The Corporate Tax Comeback (1988); 130 Reasons Why We Need
Tax Reform (1986); Money for Nothing (1986); Corporate Taxpayers & Corporate Freeloaders
(1985); and, Corporate Income Taxes in the Reagan Years (1984).
187. See supra Part G.
188. For a limited proposal, however, calling for the disclosure of the tax returns of
millionaires, see Linder, Tax Glasnost for Millionaires: Peeking Behind the Veil of Ignorance
Along the Publicity-Privacy Continuum, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. of Law and Social Change 951
(1991).
189. This same provision exists in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. See 13 L.P.R.A., Sec.
3055 (1989); 33 V.I.C., Sec. 822 (1992).
190. See Part IV(F), infra.
191. Sec. 12A of Ch. 62c of the Mass. Gen. L., as inserted by Ch. 255, Acts of 1992.
192. The compromise was intended to avoid a "divisive confrontation" that "would inflict
severe, long-run damage. . ." Massachusetts Special Commission on Business Tax Policy,
Majority Report, p. 5 (Sept. 24, 1993)(hereinafter referred to as Majority Report).
193. The Commission was charged inter alia with the responsibility of "making an
investigation and study relative to the business tax policy of [Massachusetts] including, but not
limited to, business tax disclosure...in the context of the goals of equity, neutrality, simplicity,
tax competitiveness, confidentiality, and the public's right to know." Ch. 218 of the Act of
1992, Sec. 3. As part of that study, a report on disclosure was prepared by the staff of the
Commission; see Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra note 9; see also Strauss, State Disclosure of
Tax Return Information: Taxpayer Privacy vrs. The Public's Right to Know, July 1, 1993
(hereinafter referred to as Strauss).
The Staff of the Commission also issued a paper concluding that the Massachusetts tax
structure was relatively neutral and equitable. See Corporate Taxation in Massachusetts: How
Level is the Playing Field? This issue is independent of the disclosure issue; nonetheless, there
was an attempt to confuse the two by opponents of disclosure. They argued, based on the
Staff's paper, that disclosure was not needed because there were no major problems with the
State's tax structure. See Boston Globe, Monday, April 5, 1993, p. 21. The Commission's
Majority Report also cited that study for the proposition that "the corporate excise tax is
reasonably equitable and neutral," which it then used as further evidence against disclosure.
See Majority Report, supra note 192, p. 10. The actual study, however, conceded that "State
and federal laws prohibit members of the public from seeing tax returns or any tax return data
that could lead to identification of specific taxpayers. Therefore this study cannot address
whether a particular corporation paid its 'fair share' of taxes." Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra
note 9, p.2.
The study was strongly criticized by supporters of disclosure on numerous grounds. The
study's conclusion that most of the companies that paid the minimum tax had low profits was
attacked because the report was based on 1990--a recession year when many companies paying
the minimum tax may have legitimately had low profits. The more interesting question is
whether companies with large profits paid low state taxes, similar to the situation that existed
at the federal level prior to 1986.
The study was also attacked for using a defective measure of profits. The paper was also
criticized for basing one of its effective tax rate calculations on taxable income after
apportionment, which ignores defects or weaknesses in the apportionment factor. Because the
report worked with aggregate data based on a sample, another problem was the inability to
identify outliers. By using aggregates, any skewed distribution of credits could also not be
easily identified. In addition, the sample included corporations with the 250 largest tax bills,
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not corporations that were "large" using some other criteria (e.g., sales, payroll, property, book
income, etc.). Finally, the sample included no insurance companies. See Memorandum from
Citizens for Tax Justice to the Massachusetts Special Commission on Business Tax Policy
(June 27, 1993); Memorandum from Robert Tannenwald, Research Director, to the
Massachusetts Special Commission on Business Tax Policy (enclosing additional memoranda,
including one from the author of the study on whether the playing field is level in
Massachusetts) (June 14, 1993).
194. Sec. 82, 83 of Ch. 62cd, Mass. Gen. L., as inserted by Ch. 402 of the Acts of 1992. If the
amount of any item changes, the taxpayer must file an amended report within 30 days.
195. For example, banks must disclose their net interest income; insurance companies must
disclose their premiums taxable in Massachusetts.
196. Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra note 9, p. 5.
197. State Tax Notes, July 12, 1993, p. 74; Majority Report, supra note 192, p. 16. The
Commission made further recommendations on bank tax reform, administrative changes,
improving audits and collections, and forming a task force to study the taxation of insurance
companies.
198. See Boston Globe, Sept. 30, 1993, p. 61.
199. See Massachusetts Senate Bill No. 1757.
200. Id.
201. W. Va. Stat. § 11-10-5s(a).
202. Muchow, Mierke, and Lorensen, First Report on Supercredit (February 1990).
"Supercredit" is the popular name for West Virginia's business investment and job expansion
tax credit.
203. This skewed distribution of the benefits also occurred in New York with respect to that
State's investment and employment tax credits. See Pomp, Reforming a State Corporate
Income Tax, 51 Alb. L.R. 375, 629-639 (1987).
204. Many of these findings parallel New York's experience with its investment and
employment tax credits. Id.
205. It is not uncommon for the cost of tax expenditures, such as investment tax credits, to
rapidly outstrip the revenue losses that were projected at the time they were first being
debated. See, e.g., Pomp, supra note 203, pp. 570, 617. For a more detailed discussion of tax
expenditures, see infra Section V(B).
206. Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra note 9, p. iii (Appendix).
207.Id.
208. Ark. Stat. § 26-18-303(b)(11)(A) - (P). The Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra note 9, p. 8
describes the credits covered by the Arkansas disclosure law as "small" but offers no support
for this characterization.
209. Ark. Stat. § 26-18-303(b)(11)(Q)(emphasis added).
210. There is no sanction against a newspaper, however, publishing such information.
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211. If the request is for information on ten or less taxpayers, notice is mailed to the taxpayers'
addresses of record. Otherwise, notice is published once in a newspaper having general
circulation in the State. The person requesting the information must reimburse the Department
of Finance and Administration for the cost of producing the information. Ark. Reg. 1991-7:
Disclosable Tax Information.
212. See W.S. Compton v. Leathers, 92-7021, Chancery Court of Pulaski County (1992).
213. Ragland, Commissioner of Revenues of the State of Arkansas v. Yeargan, 702 S.W.2d 23
(1986).
214. An earlier proposal would have required the disclosure of all records and files of the
Department of Revenue concerning all taxes except the income tax. This bill was opposed on
the grounds that it would jeopardize Arkansas' exchange of information agreements with the
IRS and with other states. Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra note 9, p. x.
215. The provisions in the disclosure law dealing with economic development reflected
independent concerns about Japanese investment in Arkansas. The information on the events
leading up to the passage of the Arkansas disclosure law is based on conversations with
Arkansas journalists: Dennis Schick (8/16/93) and Carol Griffe (8/17/93).
216. 1911 Wis. Laws Ch. 658, Sec. 1087m--24(1-3).
217. 1919 Wis. Laws Ch. 638, Sec. 1087m-24(1).
218. 1923 Wis. Laws Ch. 39.
219. The Governor of Wisconsin called for repeal of the nondisclosure law shortly after
World War I, when federal tax officials notified him that many Wisconsin corporations were
underreporting their federal income taxes. N.Y. Report, supra note 6, n. 74. In 1943, in
vetoing a bill to restore secrecy, Governor Goodland described disclosure as "an important
factor in enforcing just tax obligations and in preventing tax-dodging and tax frauds." Wis.
Sen. Journal 1394 (July 13, 1943). See also Groh, "Where Income Taxes are Public," The
Reporter, February 19, 1952 ("Implicit in the Wisconsin system is the theory that fear of
publicity discourages dishonesty and back-room deals with tax officials.")
220. A statute enacted in 1933 provided that "no person shall divulge or circulate for revenue
or offer to obtain, divulge or circulate for compensation any information derived from an
income tax return. . ." 1933 Wis. Stat. Ch. 449, Sec. 71.20. This statute expressly excluded
from its prohibition newspaper publication of income tax information and reference to such
information by public speakers. Id.
221. According to Groh, supra note 219, anti-disclosure advocates included "business
organizations such as Chambers of Commerce, along with a good many individuals." A
Wisconsin newspaper reporter who covered the State Legislature in the late 1940s and early
1950s recalls that the Wisconsin Manufacturers' Association opposed public disclosure of
income tax information and that the State's Republican Party made repeal of disclosure a
political priority, claiming that it "drove business and wealthy people out of the state."
Telephone interview with John Patrick Hunter, Associate Editor, Madison Capital Times,
March 3, 1986.
222. The first bill to restore secrecy failed to pass. The second fared slightly better: it passed
the Legislature but was vetoed by Governor Goodland. In his veto message, the Governor
emphatically denounced the proposal to restore income tax secrecy:
"I have always contended and now contend that secrecy in government is a bad
thing, that taxation is a public matter; that the tax returns of those who pay real
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estate and personal property taxes have no veil of secrecy drawn over them; that no
honest return need fear publicity; that it is only the return made by the person or
corporation that evades the law that needs the veil of secrecy. . .to shut out from
public view that which may be a fraud, a cheat, or even a mistake."
Wis. Sen. Journal 1397 (July 13, 1943). Goodland cited a large volume of citizen
communications urging him to veto the bill as evidence that public opinion favored disclosure.
Id. at 1395.
223. 1953 Wis. Laws Ch. 303. This statute incorporated a 1951 amendment that instituted a
$1 inspection fee and that required notifying the taxpayer whose tax information was sought.
1951 Wis. Laws Ch. 714. The current statute is substantially unchanged from its 1953 form.
The Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra note 9, p. 14 reports two reasons why Wisconsin changed
its law from making the entire state tax return public to making only the net tax paid public.
One was concern that state tax information would be abused by then-Wisconsin Senator
Joseph McCarthy. The other reason was the opposition of business groups, such as chapters of
the Chambers of Commerce.
224. Wis. Stat. Sec. 71.11 (44)(b)(1984).
225. Wis. Stat. Sec. 71.11(44)(bm)(1984) prohibits disclosure to non-residents, or residents
acting on behalf of non-resident individuals, firms, or corporations, "except to the extent that
similar information in the state of residence of such person or firm or the state of incorporation
of such foreign corporation is made available to residents of Wisconsin or Wisconsin
corporations."
226. Wis. Stat. Sec. 71.11(44)(b). The requirement that an individual must state the reason for
making the request is meaningless in practice. Apparently, information-seekers are not
required to furnish any special reason; curiosity is sufficient. Telephone interview with Nick
Baldarotta, Custodian of Records, Wisconsin Department of Revenue, March 6, 1986.
227. Wis. Stat. Sec. 71.11(44)(b). One department official reported that notifying the taxpayer
of the request for information deters some persons from seeking information. "A lot of people
are reluctant to let others know that they are looking for information on their tax returns."
Telephone interview with Nick Baldarotta, supra note 226.
228. Conversation with Jeffrey Eagan, Executive Director, Wisconsin Action Coalition,
August 18, 1993. Although the staff of the Massachusetts Special Commission on Business
Tax Policy interviewed Eagan, no mention is made in the Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra
note 9, that information obtained under Wisconsin's disclosure law actually led to the passage
two separate times of an alternative minimum corporate income tax. That report does note that
the Wisconsin Action Coalition's "widely publicized paper sparked a debate about whether
Wisconsin should adopt a minimum corporate income tax." Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra
note 9, p. 34, citing telephone interview with Jeff Egan [sic] of May 18, 1993.
229. See text accompanying supra note 207.
230. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
231. This assumption is re-examined in Sec. V(A), infra.
232. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Legislative Analyst's Office, State of California, Analysis of the 1991-92 Tax
Expenditure Budget: Overview and Detailed Compendium of Individual Tax Expenditure
Programs (1991) (California's tax expenditures for bank and corporation tax programs are $1.8
billion); New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, New York State Tax
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Expenditure Report, 1991-1992 (Mar. 1991). For a discussion of tax expenditures, see infra
Sec. V(B).
234. See, e.g., Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth: The Treasury
Department Report to the President (1984).
235. See, e.g., Pomp, supra note 203.
236. For a more detailed discussion of the state taxation of individuals and corporations, see
Hellerstein and Hellerstein, State Taxation, Vols. I and II.
237. See Pomp, supra note 203, at 630-635.
238. One of the criticisms of a paper (Corporate Taxation in Massachusetts: How Level is the
Playing Field?) produced by the Staff of the Massachusetts Commission, see supra note 193,
was that it was forced to rely on the use of aggregates, averages, and medians, and couldn't
identify any outliers. Furthermore, a meaningful effective tax rate calculation, which is needed
to determine the uniformity of a state corporate income tax, is impossible to develop without
some measure of book income that can be applied on a corporation-by-corporation basis, and
this requires knowing the identity of each taxpayer.
239. The Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra note 9, p. 32, notes the problem of transfer pricing
but concludes that "[i]n order to evaluate the degree to which the Commonwealth
multicorporate taxpayers engage in such practices, investigators would need the tax returns and
financial records of every affiliate of a company, including those in other states. Only auditors
have, and should have, the authority to subpoena such an extensive array of documents."
Apparently the report overlooks the possibility of identifying transfer pricing situations as
suggested in the text.
For one recent example of a situation involving transfer pricing, see Geoffrey, Inc., v. S.C.
Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 1993 S.C. Lexis 134.
240. Without addressing any of the arguments in the text, the Chairman of the Massachusetts
Commission on Business Tax Policy concluded that disclosure by corporate name "does not
bring additional information to the table" compared to anonymous firm-specific disclosure
Majority Report, supra note 192, p. 18.
241. See Part E, infra.
242. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
243. Strauss notes "that the tax circumstances facing a multistate business in other states is not
to be reported to the [Massachusetts] Secretary of State for subsequent public inspection, the
possibilities for misunderstanding and/or misinformation appear to be significant." Strauss,
supra note 193. However, Massachusetts law allows a corporation to provide any other
information to the Secretary of State that it deems necessary. Even without this provision, a
corporation could always use its public relations resources to avoid any misunderstanding or
misinterpretation of published data.
244. See infra notes 253-261 and accompanying text.
245. The Massachusetts legislation provides this opportunity. See supra note 196 and
accompanying text.
246. Massachusetts Special Commission on Business Tax Policy described the provision in
Massachusetts law that allows corporations to explain the disclosed information or provide
additional information, as "connot[ing] guilt until innocence is proven." Majority Report,
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supra note 192, p. 20.
247. In comments that could describe debate over any controversial issue of the day, the
Massachusetts Special Commission on Business Tax policy concluded that "public disclosure.
. .may confuse rather than clarify debate about corporate tax equity. Some commentators are
likely to oversimplify their analysis, claiming inequities and distortions when none in fact
exists. Such charges, rather than leading to enlightened debate, could engender acrimony and
hostility between public interest groups and businesses, damaging the Commonwealth's
already shaky business climate." Majority Report, supra note 192, p. 20. See Part I, infra, for a
further discussion of business climate issues.
248. Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra note 9, p.1.
249. L. Brandeis, Other People's Money (F. Stokes Co. 1932), p. 92.
250. Disclosure to Investors: A Reappraisal of Administrative Policies Under the '33 and '34
Securities Act (Wheat Report, 1969), p.50.
251. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters, 140 Penn. L.R. 1, 6 (1991).
252. Id.
253. Kreimer, supra note 251, p. 119. ["Dissemination of information is a large part of
contemporary government practice."]
254. Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 561 (1982).
255. 5 U.S.C. § 522
256. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13, 1631-44, 1661-65, 1671-77.
257. 15 U.S.C. 1701-20
258. P.L. No. 93-495. §§ 302-05, 307, 401-15, 503, 88 Stat. 1511.
259. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730f, 1831b, 2601-16.
260. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t.
261. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829. These examples are cited in Stevenson, The SEC and
the New Disclosure, 62 Cornell L.R. 50 (1976).
262. See Kreimer, supra note 251, p. 7.
263. Cottle, Murray, and Bloch, Graham and Dodd's Security Analysis, p. 275 (1988).
264. Id.
265. See Part G, infra.
266. Mueller, Corporate Disclosure: The Public's Right to Know, in Financial Reporting,
supra note 167, p. 71.
267. Majority Report, supra note 192, p. 10.
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268. Undercutting whatever minimal benefits might flow from anonymous disclosure, the
Massachusetts Senate passed a bill providing that the number identifying a corporation would
change every year. See supra Sec. III(A). This approach would obviously eliminate the
possibility of conducting longitudinal studies.
269. Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra note 9, p. 1.
270. For example, depending on the information covered by disclosure, it might be possible to
try identify the corporations by matching such information with Form 10-K reports and annual
reports.
271. See Part G, infra.
272. The remainder of this Section is based upon the author's experiences in various states as
well as the issues that emerged in the Massachusetts debate.
273. Flint v. Stone Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107 (1911). The Supreme Court has also made
it clear that corporations cannot claim equality with individuals regarding rights to privacy.
U.S. v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
274. See Part G, infra.
275. See Sec. V(A), infra.
276. Strauss speculates that for small, public companies, and for companies with foreign
competitors disclosure will provide competitors with the private details of the company's
activities. Strauss, supra note 193, p. 13. This problem is most pronounced for small, public
companies and for companies with foreign creditors since "there will be an identity between
their state and federal return and what they provide to the Massachusetts Secretary of State for
public review. They would now have their private financial affairs subject to competitive
scrutiny." Id. In the case that Strauss is worried about, where the state and federal returns are
identical, it is unclear what a competitor will learn under Massachusetts law that it will not
already know from examining the Form 10-K or the company's annual reports. Strauss does
not discuss this possibility because his entire paper fails to mention SEC-mandated disclosed.
Moreover, Strauss does not address the time delay in publishing any tax information. Finally,
if foreign competitors were filing state income tax returns, they could--and should--be subject
to disclosure. See Sec. V(A), infra.
277. Seligman, The SEC and the Future of Finance 203 (1985).
278. Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1978, p. 11.
279. Foster, Externalities and Financial Reporting, 35 J. of Finance 521, 524-5 (1980). The
disclosure of sales information in the SEC Form 10-K was also objected to on the grounds that
it would cause single-product firms "competitive disadvantage." Id. p. 531.
280. See SEC Accounting Series Release No. 149, 1973 SEC Lexis 2313 (1973).
281. It was also alleged that disclosure would lead taxing authorities to question tax
deductions or challenge the taxpayer's favorable interpretation of items.
282. See supra note 280.
283. Even the concept of proprietary information has no fixed meaning. A former
Commissioner of Taxation for New York lists without any explanation the following examples
of proprietary information that a New York corporation is required to identify on its state
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franchise tax return: real estate, whether owned or leased, inventories, other tangible personal
property, and business receipts. Tully, State Tax Secrecy Laws and Federal Grand Jury
Subpoenas in Non-Tax Investigations, 46 Alb. L.R. 78, 84 (1981). A fortiori, much of the
information on SEC Form 10-K would be "proprietary."
284. Corporations that file on a combined basis in Massachusetts will release the information
covered by disclosure on a combined basis. Even if only one member of the group has
extensive operations in Massachusetts, the released data will be aggregated for the combined
group as a whole. It is difficult understanding how Massachusetts competitors will learn
anything useful from disclosure in this situation.
285. Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra note 9, p. 18.
286. Presumably, this analyst was assuming that each store was separately incorporated in a
publicly-traded corporation. But even assuming this, if a store sells a variety of products it is
unclear how a competitor would be able to identify from the disclosed data which were the
"hot" products, especially in fields where fads dominate and today's hot seller is tomorrow's
dog.
287. During a hearing on disclosure, numerous witnesses asserted that disclosure would
provide helpful information to their competitors. Not one, however, provided an example that
linked the disclosed data with any conclusion that would be useful to competitors. Moreover,
none of these witnesses addressed any of the points raised by the analysts in the text who felt
that disclosure would reveal little valuable information. See Transcript of Public Hearing,
Massachusetts Special Commission on Business Tax Policy, June 1, 1993.
288. Foster, supra note 279, at p. 531. The Line of Business Program was abandoned during
the Reagan years. Rodino, Antitrust is Dead--Long Live Antitrust, 76 Geo. L.J. 507, 519
(1987).
289. Mueller, supra note 266, p. 71.
290. Id.
291. H. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1934), cited in the Wheat Report, supra note
250, p. 50.
292. See text accompanying supra notes 211-212.
293. Opponents of disclosure argue that it will encourage rather than deter tax avoidance
because firms will fear the release of proprietary information that could help competitors.
Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra note 9, p. 28. The fact that opponents of disclosure believe
that it will encourage rather than deter tax avoidance because firms will fear the release of
proprietary information is a damaging admission. If they assume that corporations will engage
in tax avoidance to hide proprietary information why not assume that they will engage in tax
avoidance for other reasons, which from their perspective, are equally compelling. In short,
the argument ultimately can be turned on its head in support of the need for more disclosure
rather than less.
294. Joyce, Raiding the Confessional--The Use of Income Tax Returns in Nontax Criminal
Investigations, 48 Fordham L.R. 1251, 1267 (1980).
295. The Massachusetts Commissioner of Revenue testified against that State's disclosure law
on the grounds it "will not help the Department of Revenue do its job." Transcript of Public
Hearing, supra note 287, p. 65. Although disclosure might have some benefit in highlighting
transfer price abuses and cases of tax evasion, its real benefits arise in focussing attention on
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the structure of the tax system. The benefits of disclosure would remain the same even if
every tax return were filed in accordance with the law. Disclosure is concerned with the law
itself and only tangentially with how corporations comply with the law. In this sense, the
focus is different from the Progressives, who saw better tax enforcement as one of the benefits
to be gained from their advocacy of disclosure. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
296. Strauss argues that "[g]iven that other states do not require such public reporting and that
businesses prefer to keep such matters private, it would appear that Massachusetts
disadvantages itself viz a viz other states as a place in which to do business, or to locate or
expand in to do business. Certainly holding constant other considerations which affect the
business location decision (cost and quality of labor, transportation costs and proximity to
markets, the tax costs and quality of various public services, the regulatory environment etc.),
the public reporting requirements are a distinct disadvantage." Strauss, supra note 193, p. 13.
He concludes that the "newly enacted public reporting requirement is part of the history and
tradition in Massachusetts of general political and fiscal instability, and that the legislative
process often finds it convenient to target business taxpayers. . . . Given Massachusetts' recent
history of fiscal instability, it would be prudent for firms considering to move into the state or
expand in the state to ascertain what else, in the areas of corporate tax disclosure or tax policy,
lies in store for them." Id.
297. For a fuller discussion, see Pomp, "The Role of Tax Incentives in Attracting and
Retaining Existing Business," 29 Tax Notes 521 (1985); reprinted in Multi-State Tax
Commission Review (1985); Colorado Municipalities (March-April 1986); New York
Economic Development Working Papers, No. 4 (Rockefeller Institute of Government, 1987);
excerpted in 13 People and Taxes (September 1985).
298. The Massachusetts Staff Draft felt that the strongest argument against tax disclosure was
that it would strengthen the perception that a state is hostile to business. As the staff report
admitted, however, this argument is one of the most difficult to evaluate "because it is
premised on a potential reaction to a unique piece of legislation that has yet to take effect."
Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra note 9, p. 24. Despite this caveat, the Commission itself (as
distinct from the Staff) concluded that "corporate tax disclosure will destroy jobs if
corporations are required to reveal their identity in their tax reports." Majority Report, supra
note 192, p. 18. This type of incautious, hyperbolic statement characterizes the Majority
Report.
299. If the business involves the sale of tangible personal property, P.L. 86-272 would ensure
that no income tax return would have to be filed if the only activities in the state were the
solicitation of sales. If it involves the sale of services or intangible property, P.L. 86-272
would have no applicability.
300. Even state income taxes, which unlike disclosure, affect a corporation's bottom line, have
very little, if any, impact on where businesses locate or expand. See Pomp, supra note 203, pp.
393-409. Accordingly, whether or not a state has a disclosure law should not effect a
corporation's decision to expand or relocate in that state.
Further evidence that the disclosure issue is unlikely to affect anyone's locational
decisionmaking is found in a report by Massachusetts Governor Weld's office in collaboration
with the University of Massachusetts. As part of that study on the Massachusetts economy,
over 2,000 business persons were interviewed. Not one raised the issue of corporate
disclosure. See Choosing to Compete (Executive Office of Economic Affairs and the
University of Massachusetts, 1993). Finally, a search of the Massachusetts newspapers in the
Nexis computer database failed to find any article about a company's relocation to, expansion
in, or relocation from Massachusetts which also mentioned the disclosure issue.
301. See Sec. V(A), infra.
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302. By way of evidence, there was substantial corporate support for the Tax Reform Act of
1986. See, e.g., supra note 3.
303. For example, the Massachusetts High Technology Council, one of the most vocal
opponents of disclosure, was criticized in 1989 for actually helping to create a bad business
climate. According to certain executives of high-tech companies, "The [Council's] 10-yearlong whine about excessive taxation in Massachusetts has tarred the Council with a negative
one-issue image that it cannot shake....But more pernicious than the anti-tax wailing, critics
says, is the council's poor-mouthing of the state's business climate for high-tech firms."
Boston Globe, July 26, 1989, p. 21. An author of a study on Route 128, Massachusetts'
equivalent of Silicon Valley, described the Council as "spread[ing] the bad image of the state
far and wide. If you say something is dying often enough, you hasten the problem along." Id.
304. For examples of the many situations in which the salaries of employees are public
information, see Linder, supra note 188, pp. 967-68.
305. See Part B, infra.
306. For an opposite view, see Linder supra note 188 (advocating that the income tax returns
of millionaires should be published).
307. If disclosure were limited to only publicly-traded corporations, the law would not cover
subsidiaries of publicly-traded corporations (unless the subsidiary itself were publicly traded).
Publicly-traded corporations would have the ability to avoid the law by creating a holding
company to own their stock. To reach these situations, disclosure must reach corporations that
are controlled directly or indirectly by publicly-traded corporations.
308. As part of his criticism of the Massachusetts statute, Strauss raises the question whether
it is "appropriate or compelling to have different public disclosure standards for individuals viz
a viz for profit and non-profit organization?" Strauss finds it "peculiar" that Massachusetts
requires organizations to report publicly but not individuals. Strauss, supra note 193, p. 11,
12. I would have thought it was too late in the day to raise this question. For decades now, we
have demanded extensive reporting by publicly-traded corporations and regulated industries
with nothing comparable for individuals or partnerships. Strauss raises the possibility of
requiring a high level of disclosure from both businesses and individuals. His reasoning is that
"most of the population is more familiar with the mechanics of filling out individual income
tax returns and the implied issues of equity and tax avoidance which accompany various
deductions and sources of income. That greater knowledge and understanding should improve
the enforcement value derived from such public review, since the general public would more
readily understand this sort of information. . . . The circumstances of many business tax
returns, especially of those of multistate businesses, are inherently more complicated. It is
unlikely that the general public understands Massachusetts business tax rules or those of other
states as well as it understands the tax rules governing individual income taxes. . . .Also I
doubt the public appreciates the considerable ambiguity in many state business income tax
statutes. I would guess, overall, that public understanding of state business tax rules is in fact
quite weak." Id. Strauss's arguments, could, of course, be used to justify disclosing corporate
tax information as part of educating the public. Moreover, the public did not seem to have
much trouble understanding the implications of the federal data released by Citizens for Tax
Justice preceding the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The fact that some of the issues surrounding the
corporate income tax are abstruse perhaps explains the sorry state of many state tax laws, see
Pomp, supra note 203, and, if anything, supports efforts at educating the public. Finally, and
quite surprisingly, Strauss does not mention or refer to the extensive reporting already required
by the SEC. The Massachusetts Staff Draft acknowledges, unlike Strauss, that the appropriate
balance between confidentiality and the public's right to know may be different for
corporations than for individuals. Massachusetts' Staff Draft, p. 11.
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309. See Dun's Business Rankings: Public and Private Business Ranked Within Industry
Category and State (1993).
310. See Part B, infra.
311. In many states, the salaries of state employees are public information. See Linder, supra
note 188, p. 967. No distinction should be drawn between an individual who receives one
form of public expenditure--a salary--from an individual who receives another form of public
spending--a tax expenditure.
312. Wheat Report, supra note 250, p. 46.
313. For a perceptive discussion of the definitional issues, see McIntyre, A Solution to the
Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure, 14 U.C. Davis L.R. 79 (1980).
314. The tax expenditure concept was first developed in the United States by the late
Professor Stanley S. Surrey of Harvard Law School. His work in this area reflected his
experiences as assistant secretary of tax policy under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as well
as the insights gained through his other academic and scholarly pursuits. The tax expenditure
concept has been described as the "major innovation in tax and public finance during the last
twenty or thirty years." See Pomp, "The Mortgage Interest and Property Tax Deduction: A
Tax Expenditure Analysis," 1 Canadian Tax 23 n.1 (1979). The concept of a tax expenditure
was developed further by Paul McDaniel, a former professor of law at Boston College Law
School and a long-time collaborator of Surrey's.
For a discussion of state tax expenditures, see Pomp, Rethinking State Tax Expenditure
Budgets, 5 Public Budgeting and Financial Management 337 (1993).
315. The estimates are made on the assumption that a taxpayer's behavior would remain
unchanged if the tax expenditure were eliminated. While this assumption might be unrealistic
in some circumstances, a similar assumption is implicit in stating the cost of explicit spending
programs. For example, a job retraining program that spends $100 is described as "costing"
$100, even though if the program were eliminated, the amount spent on some other program,
such as welfare, might increase.
316. Secretary of the Treasury, Annual Report on the State of the Finances, Fiscal Year 1968,
pp. 326-340.
317. Harris, Tax Expenditure Report Titles and Sources, 5 Public Budgeting and Financial
Management 521 (1993).
318. For a small sampling of the literature on tax expenditures, see Surrey, Pathways to Tax
Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures, (1973); Surrey and McDaniel, The Tax
Expenditure Concept and the Legislative Process, in Aaron and Boskin, eds., The Economics
of Taxation (1980); McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure, 14
U.C. Davis Law Review 79 (1980); Surrey and McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (1985);
McDaniel, Surrey, (eds.) International Aspects of Tax Expenditures: A Comparative Study
(1985). For a concise summary of the issues raised by the tax expenditure concept and an
extensive citation of the literatures, see Surrey, McDaniel, Ault, and Koppelman, I Federal
Income Taxation 232-254 (1986).
319. Surrey and McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept, supra note 318, p. 124.
320. See Pomp, supra note 203, pp. 375, 635.
321. See Legislative Commission on the Modernization and Simplification of Tax
Administration and Tax Law, The New York Investment and Employment Tax Credits, March
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11, 1985; Pomp, supra note 203 pp. 615-672.
322. Analysis of Article 9-A Business Corporation's 1986 Tax Credits, N.Y. State Dept. of
Taxation and Finance (June 1991).
323. This proposal was first made in Pomp, State Tax Expenditure Budgets--And Beyond, in
Gold, The Unfinished Agenda for State Tax Reform 65 (1988); see also Pomp, Rethinking
State Tax Expenditure Budgets, 5 Public Budgeting and Financial Management 337 (1993).
324. As discussed above, see supra Part A, in the case of tax expenditures there is no strong
reason why disclosure should be limited to publicly-traded corporations.
325. To be sure, the amount of the triggering investment could be calculated based on the
amount of the credit claimed. But there is no reason for third parties to make this calculation
when the information is readily available from the taxpayer. Moreover, by requiring the
taxpayer to disclose the amount of the underlying investment, a check is provided in those
cases where the credit might have been miscalculated.
Under the Massachusetts law, a corporation discloses its Massachusetts taxable income and
its tax. It does not disclose its credits but the difference between its taxable income multiplied
by the tax rate and the tax paid is the amount of its aggregate credits. This approach is
acceptable in a state such as Massachusetts, which does not have many credits. In other states
it would be more useful to have the corporation disclose the amount and identity of each of its
credits.
326. See generally, Pomp, Tax Reform for the 80's, 16 Conn. L.R., 925, 926-928 (1984).
327. Int. Rev. Code of 1986, Sec. 243.
328. See CCH Multistate Corporate Income Tax Guide, para. 79.
329. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-217 (1993).
330. See, e.g. Bittker and Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders,
5-23 (1987). The deduction can also be justified using non-normative criteria, such as making
a state attractive for holding companies. Under this rationale, the provision would be properly
viewed as a tax expenditure. See McIntyre, supra note 318.
331. The text assumes that the dividends constitute apportionable business income; other
variations are possible. See generally, Hellerstein and Hellerstein, State Taxation, Vol. I, Ch.
9.
332. For example, it would be difficult to imagine a state being able to enforce rules on fringe
benefits that deviated widely from the federal rules.
333. See Schedule C, Form 1120 (1992).
334. The incorporation of the out-of-state subsidiary will affect the taxable income reported to
A (assuming no combined report is applicable), the business apportionment factor in A, as well
as the taxable income and business apportionment factors of other states with which the
corporation has nexus (again assuming no combined reports are applicable in these other
states). The creation of a subsidiary also lays the groundwork for using transfer pricing to shift
profits from A to lower taxed states.
335. A recent study of the Connecticut corporate income tax, which exempts all dividends,
calculated that one percent of corporate taxpayers reported 83.2% of the total dividends. Three
firms each reported dividends of more than $100 million. Task Force on State Tax Revenue:
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Final Report--Business Tax 62-72 (1991). Some legislators on this task force were shocked by
the existence of a dividend received deduction and the accompanying data. Some of these
same legislators, however, had voted for the exemption when it was introduced in 1981.
336. Some federal provisions commonly incorporated into state law include the deduction for
state income taxes, see Pomp, State Corporate Income Taxes: The Illogical Deduction for
Income Taxes, 42 Tax Law Rev. 419 (1987), reprinted in Multistate Tax Commission Review
(Sept. 1987); the net operating loss deduction, see Int. Rev. Code of 1986, Sec. 172; the
taxation of DISCS and FSCS, see Legislative Commission on the Modernization and
Simplification of Tax Administration and the Tax Law, The N.Y. Treatment of DISCS and
FSCS (1986); and the treatment of interest from state and local bonds.
337. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
338. Int. Rev. Code of 1986, Sec. 6103(p)(8)(A).
339. Massachusetts Staff Draft, supra note 9, p. 16-17. Amazingly, the Commission report (as
distinct from that of the Staff), fails to mention this opinion and cites the possibility of
jeopardizing the exchange agreements with the IRS as one of the reasons for voting to change
the current law. Majority Report, supra note 192, p. 22.
340. Transcript of Public Hearing, Massachusetts Special Commission on Business Tax
Policy, June 1, 1993, p. 67.
341. See Whose Snooping Into Your Tax Returns Now?, U.S. News & World Report, August
11, 1975.
342. Id.
343. This reading is supported by the text of the statute which refers to "his Federal return,"
suggesting that the draftspersons were concerned about individuals. Int. Rev. Code of 1986,
Sec. 6103(p)(8)(A).
344. See supra Sec. IV (E).
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